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Abstract
Smart health monitoring uses real-time monitored data to support diagnosis, treatment,
and health decision-making in modern smart healthcare systems and benefit our daily life. The
accurate health monitoring and prompt transmission of health data are facilitated by the everevolving on-body sensors, wireless communication technologies, and wireless sensing techniques.
Although the users have witnessed the convenience of smart health monitoring, severe privacy and
security concerns on the valuable and sensitive collected data come along with the merit. The data
collection, transmission, and analysis are vulnerable to various attacks, e.g., eavesdropping, due to
the open nature of wireless media, the resource constraints of sensing devices, and the lack of security
protocols. These deficiencies not only make conventional cryptographic methods not applicable in
smart health monitoring but also put many obstacles in the path of designing privacy protection
mechanisms.
In this dissertation, we design dedicated schemes to achieve secure data collection and analysis in smart health monitoring. The first two works propose two robust and secure authentication
schemes based on Electrocardiogram (ECG), which outperform traditional user identity authentication schemes in health monitoring, to restrict the access to collected data to legitimate users. To
improve the practicality of ECG-based authentication, we address the nonuniformity and sensitivity
of ECG signals, as well as the noise contamination issue. The next work investigates an extended
authentication goal, denoted as “wearable-user pair” authentication. It simultaneously authenticates
the user identity and device identity to provide further protection. We exploit the uniqueness of
the interference between different wireless protocols, which is common in health monitoring due to
devices’ varying sensing and transmission demands, and design a “wearable-user pair” authentication scheme based on the interference. However, the harm of this interference is also outstanding.
Thus, in the fourth work, we use wireless human activity recognition in health monitoring as an
ii

example and analyze how this interference may jeopardize it. We identify a new attack that can
produce false recognition result and discuss potential countermeasures against this attack. In the
end, we move to a broader scenario and protect the statistics of distributed data reported in mobile
crowd sensing, a common practice used in public health monitoring for data collection. We deploy
differential privacy to enable the indistinguishability of workers’ locations and sensing data without
the help of a trusted entity while meeting the accuracy demands of crowd sensing tasks.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
1.1

Research Overview
With the development of wireless devices and communication technologies, smart healthcare

systems, which are capable of conducting real-time health monitoring, diagnosis, treatment, health
decision-making, etc., benefit our daily life differently from the traditional paper-based healthcare
system. To achieve accurate health monitoring, smart healthcare systems utilize on-body sensors
or off-body wireless sensing to collect user information, e.g., identity and personal health record.
In addition, ubiquitous wireless networks assist the systems in enabling the prompt transmission of
collected data to cloud for processing or to share with other entities for diagnosis. Some auxiliary
information, e.g., locations, is reported together with health data. With the help of machine learning,
the health data and auxiliary information are analyzed for further investigation.
While bringing incredible convenience to users, these health monitoring applications also
raise severe privacy and security concerns during data collection, transmission, and analysis. The
tremendous amount of data being continuously collected contains highly valuable and sensitive
information. Without proper protection schemes, the data can be easily accessed and breached by
illegitimate entities. The open nature of wireless medium worsens the privacy threats during data
communication. Meanwhile, machine learning techniques are vulnerable to various attacks so the
privacy challenges remain during data analysis. Even worse, traditional cryptographic approaches
do not apply to privacy protection in smart health monitoring due to the resource constraints and
inadequacy in security protocols of health monitoring devices, as well as the lack of centralized
1

trusted entity in health monitoring scenarios. Hence, in this dissertation, we aim to address these
privacy issues and build secure data collection and analysis schemes in smart health monitoring from
the following aspects: restrict the data access to authorized parties only and protect the sensitive
data from leakage, while maintaining high data analysis quality.

1.2

Research Challenges
In the following section, the major privacy and security issues that ought to be addressed

in the smart health monitoring are addressed. The detailed challenges are threefold.
First, the data collected and transmitted by sensing devices can be easily observed and
stolen due to the lack of security protection and the open nature of wireless media. Hence, the first
step of privacy protection is that access to data should be restricted to authenticated entities only.
Because the sensing devices used in smart health monitoring are resource-constraint, traditional
cryptographic approaches do not work on sensing devices for user authentication due to their low
efficiency and knowledge-based property (only capable of verifying “what you possess” or “what
you remember”). Biometric authentication overcomes these deficiencies and successfully verifies the
inherent characteristics of humans. However, biometric authentication’s security and privacy objectives may fail in practice due to the noise interferences in the collected biometrics and the privacy
breach of the biometric database. How to design a secure and efficient biometric authentication
becomes a considerable challenge.
Second, smart health monitoring involves various devices sensing different kinds of physiological and physical signals. The sensing devices may adopt dedicated wireless protocols for data
transmission to serve the unique requirements associated with data types, data report frequency,
data size, etc. This incompatibility and heterogeneity in wireless protocols not only places more
obstacles in the path of privacy protection as traditional authentication methodologies may not
work for devices that cannot communicate with each other, but also brings extra cross-technology
interference (CTI) to wireless communications. CTI is a double-edged sword for data transmission in
smart health monitoring: it leads to transmission failures and errors in transmitted data, but it also
brings distinctive features to be exploited. Given that how CTI influences smart health monitoring
is not thoroughly investigated yet, how to achieve privacy protection in a heterogeneous wireless
environment, analyze the effect of CTI, and handle CTI properly is an important open question.
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Last but not least, despite that the intensive effort is made on identity authentication, it
is not enough to achieve the data privacy guarantee. Since the sensing devices cannot conduct
computationally expensive data encryption schemes, once an adversary bypasses the authentication,
the sensitive data is plaintext to them. In some cases, the sensed data can even be used to infer
other critical information, e.g., user locations. These incur severe concerns on privacy leakage and
threatens users’ properties as well as public safety. Therefore, it is demanding to efficiently and
effectively protect the exact data statistics from adversaries. However, there is always a trade-off
between accuracy and privacy when it comes to data protection. Finding a balance point between
privacy and analysis accuracy is another problem to be addressed in this challenge.

1.3

Scope and Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation contributes to the scheme designs to achieve secure data collection and

analysis in smart health monitoring. The proposed schemes are tailored to the particular constraints
in smart health monitoring and tackle the aforementioned critical research problems efficiently and
effectively. The rest of the dissertation is organized as below.
In Chapter 2, we propose an authentication and encryption scheme for the eHealth system based on ECG signals to address the first research challenge. As discussed in the previous
section, biometric-based authentication is more suitable for smart health monitoring compared to
conventional knowledge-based authentication schemes due to its permanence, distinctiveness, and
undeniability properties. Among all biometrics, ECG (ElectroCardioGram) signal is a promising
one. Unlike other biometrics, e.g., face, iris, etc., the ECG signal cannot be stolen or lost. Moreover,
it is a signal already acquired in most health monitoring applications, so it will not incur extra
data collection costs. Despite these advantages, the nonuniformity and sensitivity of ECG signals
pose challenges in implementing ECG-based authentication. As a result, we make a great effort in
improving the robustness and reusability of the scheme proposed in Chapter 2. With the help of
error-correcting codes and the fuzzy extractor, our method can authenticate patients’ identities and
protect their PHRs while allowing the same ECG signal to be reused and preserving the privacy of
ECG signals.
Though the scheme in Chapter 2 can correct a certain number of errors in ECG signals,
its ability is limited when facing highly contaminated ECG signals. In practice, ECG signals are
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often contaminated by unwanted noises and interference from various sources, such as physical
activities, other physiological signals like brain waves, the displacement of ECG patches, etc. If
the noise and interference are not handled carefully, the security and privacy objectives of ECGbased authentication might fail. In Chapter 3, we propose a more practical scheme that can reliably
authenticate patients with noisy ECG signals. We focus on the noise generated by daily exercises and
apply Singular Vector Decomposition to fulfill successful ECG authentication when human subjects
are experiencing different exercise levels. Differential privacy is exploited to provide more substantial
protection on ECG statistics than the previous scheme.
Following the two works on ECG-based user authentication, we bring forth an enhanced privacy goal in Chapter 4 since merely authenticating the identity of a user is not enough. Apart from
disguising themselves as legitimate users, adversaries can also pretend that they hold an authorized
device and fool the health applications by transmitting falsified data. Hence, the health-related wearables should be authenticated together with their users as “wearable-user pairs” to ensure they are
attached to legitimate users. This advanced privacy goal requires an authentication scheme to verify
user identity and device identity concurrently. Although plenty of works exist on user authentication
or device authentication, none of them can achieve two privacy goals at once. We also have to take
the incompatibility and heterogeneity of wireless environment into consideration. As mentioned in
the previous section about research challenges, existing authentication methodologies do not work
when a ZigBee-enabled monitor join a trusted Wi-Fi network unless either extra hubs/gateways are
deployed or wireless protocols are modified. To minimize the burden of authentication in this complicated wireless environment, we leverage the unique Cross-Technology Interference (CTI) triggered
by heterogeneous wireless transmissions of on-body sensors, along with human physiological activity
measurements (e.g., respiration patterns) to design an authentication scheme between wearables and
users in Chapter 4. Specifically, the authentication from an unknown ZigBee wearable to a trusted
Wi-Fi device is achieved by monitoring the Channel State Information (CSI) changes according to
human respiration. Our approach not only successfully recognizes a legitimate wearable-user pair
but also blocks illegal access from adversaries.
Despite the fact that we turn the CTI happened in a relatively short distance into a helping
hand in Chapter 4, CTI does more harm than good to health monitoring. In Chapter 5, we take nonintrusive human activity recognition as an example to analyze how CTI may jeopardize smart health
monitoring. Recently, non-intrusive human activity recognition has received increasing attention
4

due to its convenience and is adopted in many emerging smart health applications to support daily
health monitoring and emergency alarming, e.g., falling detection. To accurately recognize different
human behaviors without actually touching the human body, ubiquitous wireless signals are widely
adopted, e.g., Wi-Fi signals, whose Channel State Information (CSI) can precisely reflect human
movements. Unfortunately, nearly all Wi-Fi-based recognition systems assume a clean wireless
environment, i.e., no interference will compromise the developed algorithms, which, apparently, is
not feasible in practice. Even worse, for systems using Wi-Fi 2.4GHz signals, the widely existing
interference from coexisting protocols, such as ZigBee, Bluetooth, and LTE-Unlicensed, can easily
compromise the recognition process, posing a hard limit on further enhancing the accuracy. As a
result, the work in Chapter 5 uncovers a new signal adversarial attack against Wi-Fi-based human
activity recognition systems by intentionally injecting interference using coexisting protocol signals.
The contaminated Wi-Fi signal will distort CSI estimation and finally output a false recognition
result. Unlike traditional jamming attacks, this new adversarial attack is intelligent and stealthy in
avoiding being detected from traffic analysis. At the end of Chapter 5, we discuss some potential
countermeasures against this attack.
In chapter 6, we address the last research challenge and look into the protection of data
statistics in public health monitoring, which is a type of large-scale health monitoring. Recent
public health monitoring takes advantage of mobile crowd sensing, where a crowd sensing server
outsources sensing tasks to the crowd for mobile data collection, to collect health data and related
environmental data. When collecting environmental data related to human health conditions, e.g.,
air pollution levels, noise levels, etc., the mobile crowd sensing servers require crowd sensing workers
report location information together with environmental data to achieve their objectives. This
incurs severe concerns on location privacy leakage and threatens workers’ properties as well as
public safety. In some cases, even sensing data can be used as auxiliary information resulting in
location privacy breaches. Many existing works apply differential privacy mechanisms for location
privacy preservation to tackle this problem. Still, they cannot efficiently fulfill privacy goals because
each worker only considers their own privacy. As a consequence, the accumulated privacy budget
will lower down the composed privacy level of all the workers’ locations. In addition, deploying
differential privacy is costly for workers and it will degrade the quality of data required in crowd
sensing tasks. How to balance the cost and provide accurate aggregated data while fulfilling privacy
objectives becomes a challenging issue. Therefore, we propose a group-differential-private game5

theoretical solution, which addresses these limitations in a privacy-preserving and efficient way. Our
scheme enables the indistinguishability of workers’ locations and sensing data without the help of a
trusted entity while meeting the accuracy demands of crowd sensing tasks.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation and discusses some future research work.
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Chapter 2

A Robust and Reusable
ECG-based Authentication and
Data Encryption Scheme for
eHealth System
©[2016] IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from P. Huang, B. Li, L. Guo, Z. Jin and

Y. Chen, ”A Robust and Reusable ECG-Based Authentication and Data Encryption Scheme for
eHealth Systems,” 2016 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), 2016, pp. 1-6,
doi: 10.1109/GLOCOM.2016.7841541.

2.1

Chapter Overview
The advancement of information and communication technologies (ICT) has greatly boosted

the development of electronic health (eHealth), which integrates ICT with traditional healthcare systems, and improves health data management as well as the whole healthcare system [10]. eHealth
system has changed people’s daily life other than paper-based system for its extraordinary advantages, such as more efficiency, high accuracy, and broader availability [51]. Implementations of
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eHealth system are currently underway internationally. For example, UK has invested at least £12.8
billion in a National Programme for Information Technology (NPfIT) for the National Health Service,
and the Obama administration in the United States has similarly committed to a $38 billion eHealth
investment in healthcare [23]. However, security and privacy issues impede the wide acceptance of
the eHealth system. Among them, authentication and data privacy are especially concerning. When
there is a need for medical services, patients have to be authenticated. Without a good authentication mechanism, adversaries may forge legitimate user’s identity and access her information.
Personal health records (PHRs) contain extremely sensitive information such as name, age, home
address, disease and treatment history, all of which should be kept private to unauthorized users.
According to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), PHRs should be
encrypted before releasing to protect the privacy of users, or users may encounter threats like fraud
or information misuse [33]. Most of eHealth applications have not provided efficient ways to tackle
with these serious security and privacy concerns. Due to the lack of centralized trust authorities,
traditional authentication methods and cryptographic approaches of keys generation, management,
and distribution cannot be directly applied to meet the specific demands for the eHealth system.
Therefore, it is highly needed to bring forth a new methodology for user authentication and data
encryption.
We propose to address the above issues by introducing biometrics, which are human body
characteristics, such as face, iris, fingerprint, voice, and gait [69]. Ordinary cryptographic methods
verify “what you possess” (e.g., an ID card) or “what you remember” (e.g., a password), but biometrics overcome their deficiency to verify “who you are” instead [68]. Every biometric satisfies the
following criteria: 1) Universality: everyone should have the characteristic; 2) Distinctiveness:
any two persons’ characteristics should be sufficiently different; 3) Permanence: the characteristic
should be sufficiently invariant (with respect to the matching standard) over a period of time; 4)
Collectability: the characteristic can be measured quantitatively [69]. With these traits, they can
be used for user authentication and data privacy preservation [17]. Among all biometrics, the ECG
signal is a promising candidate, which does not only fulfill the above requirements, but also have
additional advantages. For example, suppose a patient Alice is under continuous ECG monitoring,
she needs to periodically send her ECG data to the hospital and meanwhile authenticate herself.
Under this circumstance, fingerprint-based schemes require fingerprint sensors, while iris-based ones
need expensive iris scanners. However, authenticating Alice and encrypting Alice’s ECG data with
8

her ECG signals does not need extra devices.
To be more specific, we present a privacy-preserving ECG-based user authentication scheme
based on fuzzy extractor and digital locker. In our scheme, a patient is able to utilize her own ECG
signal features as the key for data encryption and authentication. Our scheme not only preserves
the privacy of users’ data, but also provides strong robustness and reusability properties.
Our Contributions: Our contributions are listed as follows:
 We utilize ECG signals in a robust way to generate cryptographic keys for data encryption

and decryption.
 User authentication is achieved by using ECG signals.
 Our scheme can tolerate the turbulence of ECG signals.
 Better security and reusability are achieved while requiring short time, little computation, and

small storage resources.
The following content will be organized as: First, we introduce the preliminaries for our
scheme in Section 2.3. Second, we describe the system model in Section 2.4. In the next section 2.5,
we bring forth the details of our purposed scheme. Finally, we analyze the security assurance
theoretically and evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency through experiment in Section 2.6.

2.2

Related Work
There are some existing works on ECG-based authentication [34, 77, 116]. The first step of

them is signal processing to extract certain features that can present ECG signal’s characteristics
accurately before utilization, such as wavelet coefficients [6, 32, 81, 112]. However, those works are
not suitable for cryptographic-based schemes. Due to the permanence of ECG signals, the results of
wavelet transformation are not uniformly distributed and are comparatively stable. Once the key is
leaked, there is no way to change it. So the transformation results cannot be used directly as keys.
Treating ECG signals with chaotic functions [26] can get variable results, but the stability of chaotic
function is not yet validated. Then, a scheme named fuzzy extractor is proposed by Dodis [36]
to solve this permanence issue. It can convert noisy nonuniform inputs into reliably reproducible,
uniformly random strings, and tolerate the turbulence of ECG signals. Therefore the random strings
9

are appropriate to be a key. There are some works based on fuzzy extractor [168], yet they are not
reusable since they do not preserve privacy if the same signal is enrolled for multiple times. A fuzzy
extractor is reusable [18] if it remains secure even when a user enrolls the same or correlated values
multiple times. Reusability is particularly important when input values are biometrics, which cannot
be changed or created. Both Boyen [18] and Canetti [19] discuss reusability, but they are not strong
enough, as they cannot protect keys if the features themselves are compromised.

2.3
2.3.1

Preliminaries
ECG Signal Features
The ECG signal is an electrical signal associated with the electrical activity of the human

heart.
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Figure 2.1: A Typical ECG Complex
Obviously the ECG signal meets the criteria of biometrics forbeing universal, continuous,
and difficult to counterfeit. Different ECG signals conform to a fundamental morphology. However,
they do exhibit personalized traits, such as relative timing of the various peaks, beat geometry, and
responses to stress and activity [133]. These traits are influenced by the physiology and geometry
of the heart, body build, gender, and age [62], which make ECG signals distinguishable from person
to person. As illustrated in Fig. 2.1, a typical ECG complex consists of various components such
as P wave, PR interval, QRS complex, J point, ST segment, T wave, etc. They will be evaluated
and classified based on their amplitude, length of time, and location on the tracing to tell different
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individuals apart. The QRS complex is the most recognizable and unique part of the ECG, so it is
frequently utilized to extract features.

2.3.2

Distance-recoverable Encryption
An encryption is a distance-recoverable encryption (DRE) [152] if the distance of two val-

ues can be derived from the distance of two encrypted values. It is defined as: Given an encryption function Γ and a key Ω, let Γ(ρ, Ω) be the encrypted value of ρ. The encryption function Γ is distance-recoverable if and only if there exists a computational procedure ϕ such that
∀ρ1 , ρ2 , Ω, ϕ(dist(Γ(ρ1 , Ω), Γ(ρ2 , Ω))) = dist(ρ1 , ρ2 ).

2.3.3

Binary BCH Codes and Syndromes
The BCH codes form a class of cyclic error-correcting codes to correct errors occurred during

communication. The binary (n, k)-BCH codes has t-error-correcting ability, where n = 2m − 1
is the codeword length, and n − k is the number of parity checksum bits. The value t satisfies
n − k ≤ mt (n − k = mt when t is small) and the minimum distance between codewords satisfies
2t + 1 ≤ dmin ≤ q m − 1. The codes can be constructed in this way: Let α be any nonzero element
of GF (2m ), where m is a positive integer. The generator g(x) is the manic polynomial of minimum
degree having α0 , α1 , . . . , α2t as roots. The codewords generated by g(x) is the collection of all vectors
f such that g(x) divides f (x), where f (x) is a polynomial f (x) = f0 + f1 x + · · · + fn−1 xn−1 of degree
n − 1 or less with coefficients in GF (2), associate the n-tuple or vector f = (f0 , f1 , . . . , fn−1 ) [97].
Syndrome S is the remainder when the code f (x) is divided by g(x). It is a 2t-tuple (S1 , S2 , . . . , S2t ).
By looking up the syndrome table of error patterns, syndrome decoding can correct the error occurred
to code f (x) during transmission.

2.3.4

Fuzzy Extractor
A fuzzy extractor [36] is a pair of randomized procedures Generate (Gen) and Reproduce

(Rep). The probabilistic generation procedure Gen can output an extracted string r ∈ {0, 1}l of
length l and a public helper vector based on the input w. The deterministic reproduction procedure
Rep allows users to recover r from the corresponding public vector and any vector w′ close enough
to w, satisfying dist(w, w′ ) ≤ t, where t is the threshold of tolerable distance. If dist(w, w′ ) > t,
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then no guarantee is provided about the output of Rep.

2.3.5

Digital Locker
Digital locker is a construction to lock secret value K with a new feature vector v, which

comes from parts of the feature vector w. A digital locker consists of two algorithms: lock and
unlock. One algorithm lock veils the secret value as L with v. Another algorithm unlock outputs
the secret value from the input v ′ if v ′ = v, or we can see an error message with high probability.

2.4

System Model

2.4.1

System Model
As shown in Fig. 2.2, the entities in our system include patients and hospitals.

 Patients: Patients provide ECG features and PHRs. The sensors attached to their bodies

are used to continuously monitor and collect raw ECG data. Then, patients use their mobile
devices to generate keys, lock keys, and encrypt PHRs. The locked key L and encrypted data
C will be sent to hospitals.
 Hospitals: Upon receiving the data, hospitals will store them in the databases. When the

related departments and personnel in a hospital request for patients’ data, the ECG-based key
can be recovered from L to decrypt corresponding encrypted PHRs.

2.4.2

Security Model
In our model, both patients and hospitals are honest but curious, which means that they

will strictly follow the protocol but will try to get private information passively. Collusion attacks
between users or between users and hospitals are not considered in our work.

2.4.3

Design Objectives
Our proposed scheme will achieve following objectives: 1) The monitoring and feature ex-

traction parts are efficient and reliable enough to support accurate key recovery. 2) It can protect
the privacy of both the features and PHRs, even after multiple times of enrollment. 3) The user has
12
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Figure 2.2: System Model
sufficient control over his key and data; 4) The computation complexity and communication cost
are low enough for mobile devices.

2.5
2.5.1

Proposed Scheme
Overview
The basic data flow is illustrated in Fig. 2.3. The monitored ECG signals go through feature

extraction, randomness extraction, and key generation process in sequence to generate keys. Then,
keys will be locked and sent with encrypted data, including patients’ ECG data, to the hospital.
The hospital can use those information to do authentication and data decryption. To instantiate a
private ECG-based authentication system, we have to ensure that the data will never be exposed in
the unprotected form. We will thoroughly discuss the scheme in Section 2.5.2.

2.5.2

Scheme Details

2.5.2.1

Feature Extraction
Suppose Alice is a patient and her raw ECG signal is first recorded by ECG sensors. She then

applies a time window of length T to truncate the ECG signal and captures the QRS complex. The
QRS complex is amplified by amplifier value A and matched via high order Legendre Polynomials
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[77]. Mathematically, the Legendre differential equation [7] is expressed as:
d
d
[(1 − x2 ) pn (x)] + n(n + 1)pn (x) = 0
dx
dx
The solutions of the Legendre differential equation for n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , form a polynomial sequence
called the Legendre polynomials. Legendre polynomials is computed on mobile devices using Rodrigues’ formula [149]:
pn (x) =

1
2n n!

dn
[(x2 − 1)n ]
dxn

The n-degree equation used for fitting data is given by y(x) = a0 +

Pn
1

ai pi (x). The

polynomial coefficients a0 , a1 , . . . , an are combined together with the time window size T and the
amplitude multiplier A to form the raw feature vector, z := {ca0 , ca1 , ca2 , . . . , can , A, T }, where c is
a constant to magnify the difference between coefficients.
Since attackers can reconstruct the original ECG waveform given the feature vector, Alice
P
maps z to w as w = z × M + γ, where M is a n × n invertible matrix which satisfies i mi,j = 1,
and γ is a random vector whose elements are within the range [−2θ , 2θ ]. This mapping is distancerecoverable because M acts as a linear transformation, so ϕ(dist(w, w′ )) = dist(z, z ′ ), where ϕ is
the Euclidean distance.
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2.5.2.2

Randomness Extraction
After Alice obtains her feature vector w, she uses a reusable fuzzy extractor constructed

from (n, k)-BCH codes with generator g(X) to extract enough randomness from it. The randomness
extracted from each feature ri is computed as ri = Hx (wi ), where Hx is a hash function in a universal
hash family. The universal hash family H [22] is a class of hash functions {Hx : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}l }.
Here, n is the length of BCH codewords, and l is the length of randomness string. H is defined to
be universal if the possibility of a pair of distinct keys being mapped into the same index is less
than 1/l. The hashing operation is performed after making a random choice of hash function from
the universal class H. The universal hash function already gives the optimal length of extracted
randomness [36].
Alice also computes the syndromes Sc of feature values for future authentication. If the feature element is viewed as wi (x) = wi0 +wi1 x+· · ·+win−1 xn−1 , every element wi has a corresponding
syndrome Sci for (n, k)-BCH codes:

Sci = wi (x)

mod g(x) = {wi (α1 ), wi (α2 ), . . . , wi (α2t )}

The syndromes for all features Sc = {Sc1 , . . . , Scn+2 } will be sent to hospitals for authentication.

2.5.2.3

Key Generation and Transmission
Next, Alice generates the key based on her features and sends the locked key to hospitals

since the communication channel is not entirely secure. It is a practical way to ensure that both
sides obtain exactly the same key for encryption and decryption. Also, Alice can gain control on
key generation by this method. The detailed procedure is described in the following steps:
First, Alice randomly chooses q constants 1 ≤ j1 ≤ · · · ≤ jq ≤ n to pick up several features
and produces a permuted feature vector v := {wj1 , . . . , wjq }. The key K is generated based on
chosen extracted randomness rji : K := rj1 || . . . ||rjq , where || denotes concatenation.
Then, Alice computes and outputs the locked key L = {(nonce||Ψ(nonce, v) ⊕ (K||0t ))}
and helper vector Su = {j1 , . . . , jq }, where nonce is a one-time random number, Ψ is a cryptographic hash function, and t is a parameter making sure that K||0t is of the same bit-length with
nonce||Ψ(nonce, v).
15

Finally, Alice needs to periodically send her ECG data to the hospital for data update and
diagnosis. As she is under continuous ECG monitoring, her ECG data in the hospital’s database
must be consistent with her most recent data. Moreover, her ECG features may change gradually
due to illness, so she has to guarantee that the features she left at the hospital can correctly authenticate herself. Hence, she encrypts her up-to-date ECG data P with the key K through symmetric
encryption methods, and sends her encrypted data C = E(P, K) to the hospital for further diagnosis, together with Υ = {L, Sc , Su }. Both traditional encryptions like AES and less common ways
like chaotic map are feasible.

2.5.2.4

Authentication and Data Decryption
When the hospital receives Υ, it authenticates Alice’s identity and decrypts data. Alice

has previously left features w′ at the hospital. Those features are defined as the template features,
which need to be updated over time. We use e to represent the slight difference between w and w′ ,
and e resembles the error pattern for BCH codes, such that w′ = w + e.
The hospital imports procedure unlock in the digital locker and Rep in the fuzzy locker to
perform authentication and data decryption. Due to the distance-recoverability of mapping and the
characteristic of BCH codes, the difference between helper tuple Sc and Sc′ is:
dist(Sc , Sc′ ) = ϕ1 (dist(w, w′ )) = ϕ1 (ϕ2 (dist(z, z ′ )))

where ϕ1 is the syndrome computation, ϕ2 is the matrix transformation. They are all Euclidean
distances. It indicates that the distance between Sc and Sc′ is the syndromes of error patterns e. So
the syndrome of each error pattern for each feature wi is syn(ei ) = |syn(wi ) − syn(wi′ )|. By looking
up the syndrome table, the hospital can decide the entire error patterns e, and recover features wrec
from w′ : wrec = w′ − e.
For all w′ , w satisfying dist(w, w′ ) ≤ t, wrec = w. The correctness of wrec is verified by
computing the syndromes. If Screc = Sc , Alice’s claimed identity is authenticated.
Given Su , the hospital constructs v ′ as {wrecj1 , . . . , wrecjq }. If the hospital is authorized, it
knows nonce, so it can unlock L as K||0t = L ⊕ (nonce, Ψ(nonce, v ′ )). The hospital recovers the key
K from the result by discarding t bits of 0, Finally, the hospital can decrypt the data C with K.

16

Proof of Correctness

dist(w, w′ ) ≤ t
∀i, p(vi = vi′ ) ≥ (1 − (

tq
t q
) ) ≈ e− n+2
n+2

So the probability that the key cannot be unlocked properly under η-times of trying is at
most:
pfail = (1 − (1 −

tq
−
tq
t q η
n+2
) ) ≈ (1 − e− n+2 )η ≈ e−ηe
n+2

It indicates that enough times of attempts will inevitably give birth to success since lim pfail ≈ 0.
η→∞

2.6
2.6.1

Protocol Evaluation
Reusability Analysis
Here, reusability can be viewed as the indistinguishability of keys, as well as the indistin-

guishability of the raw features from generated keys, or even processed final features.

2.6.1.1

Indistinguishability of Keys
The indistinguishability of the key can be proved according to the lemma provided by

Canetti [19].
Proof of Correctness Let U denote the uniform distribution over {0, 1}. Suppose the attacker
can make q queries,
η

E[S {unlock(vi ,r)}i=1 (K, {ji,1 , . . . , ji,k }ηi=1 , k, κ)−

Since

q(q+1)
2α

η

E[S {unlock(vi ,r)}i=1 (U, {ji,1 , . . . , ji,k }ηi=1 , k, κ) ≤

q(q + 1)
2α

is negiligible if α is sufficiently large, the statistic distance between the key K

and U δ((K, Su ), (U, Su )) upon viewing the helper vector Su is also negligible. Thus, it is nearly
impossible to distinguish between K and U .
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2.6.1.2

Indistinguishability of Raw Features
Next, we prove the indistinguishability of raw features.

Proof of Correctness As mentioned in Section. 2.5.2.1, w = zM + γ, z = (w − γ)M T . Suppose
γ ∗ is a randomly sampled vector from [−2θ , 2θ ], 2θ > Zext . Then, the probability of distinguishing
z from randomness(γ ∗ ) is negligible.
Since every element in w is within the range [−Wext , Wext ],

P

j

Mi,j = 1, all elements in γ

are within the range[−2θ , 2θ ], every element in w − γ is within the range [−Wext − 2θ , Wext + 2θ ].
Every element in γ ∗ is within the range [−2θ , 2θ ]. Given a value λ ∈ [−Wext − 2θ , Wext + 2θ ], the
probability of successfully guessing it to be one in the w − γ is:

P (θ) =

1
1 2Wext
+ P r{(wi − γi ) ∈ [−Wext − 2θ , −2θ ]} + P r{(wi − γi ) ∈ [2θ , Wext + 2θ ]} ≤ +
2
2
2θ

The probability of successfully guessing it to be one in the γ is: Q(θ) = 12 .
The statistical distance between them is:

δ(P, Q) =

1X
2(n + 2)Wext
|P (θ) − Q(θ)| ≤
2
2θ

which becomes negligible if θ is sufficiently large. So w − γ and γ ∗ are statistically indistinguishable.
Therefore, z = (w − γ) × M T is indistinguishable from z ∗ = γ × M T , which can be seen as
uniformly distributed.

2.6.2

Empirical Evaluation
We use software implementation to simulate this entire process. Empirical evaluation is

conducted via MATLAB and communication system toolbox, on a workstation with an Intel Core i5
CPU running at 3.20 GHz and 8 GB RAM. The original ECG data come from the online database
MIT-BIH Normal Sinus Rhythm Database [47], MIT-BIH Long-Term ECG Database [47], European
ST-T Database [47], and Apnea ECG Database [47, 107]. Our experiments include not only interdatabase comparison, but also intra-database ones. The result shows that comparing signals cross
databases will not affect the overall accuracy greatly, which indicates that our scheme has the
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potential to be worldwide. The data set has 90 person’s ECG data in total, and we randomly pick
6-14 records of different time slots for each person.
Let c = 100 , we then set n = 31 for our binary (n, k)-BCH codes. Since the number
of checksum bits n − k ≤ mt (n − k = mt when t is small) and the minimum distance between
codewords dmin ≥ 2t + 1, where dmin is determined by generator polynomial g(x), the generators,
k, and the correcting ability t for each k are computed and shown in Table. 2.1. We choose n = 31
because when n = 31, there exist values greater than 11 for the number of information bits k. The
range [0, 212 − 1] is already enough to cover the range of feature values, so larger n is unnecessary.
We evaluate our scheme under four t values.
Table 2.1: Error Correction Ability for (31, k)-BCH code
k
26
21
16
11

2.6.2.1

t
1
2
3
5

Generator polynomial g(x)
x5 + x3 + x2 + x + 1
x11 + x10 + x8 + x7 + x6 + x4 + x3 + x2 + x + 1
x16 + x15 + x13 + x10 + x7 + x3 + 1
x22 + x20 + x17 + x15 + x14 + x7 + x6 + x4 + x3 + x2 + 1

dmin
4
5
7
11

Effectiveness of ECG-based Encryption and Authentication
Our aim for effectiveness evaluation is to show the empirical results on correctness and

privacy-assurance of the design. In this part, the false acceptance rate (FAR), which represents the
possibility that the signals coming from different users are viewed as from the same one, and the
false rejection rate (FRR), which is the possibility that the signals from the same users are mistaken
as from different individuals, are used to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme. The
half total error rate (HTER) is also obtained as HTER = (FAR + FRR)/2. Table. 2.2, Fig. 2.4
and Fig. 2.5 shows the FAR, FRR, and HTER performance evaluated by the data versus to the
difference tolerance t and amplitude amplifier A.
Table 2.2: FAR and FRR Performance, A = 20
t (k)
FRR
FAR
HTER

1 (26)
0.9441
0.0016
0.4728

2 (21)
0.2668
0.0154
0.1411

3 (16)
0.0208
0.1923
0.1066

5 (11)
0
0.6886
0.3443

Impact of Tolerance Level: The tolerance level t denotes the correctable error bits
between two feature vectors. When t grows larger, the gap between two signals is of higher possibility
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to be bridged. Therefore, the two signals coming from either the same person or different users are
more likely to be regarded as identical, so FAR increases as t grows, while FRR is on the opposite
trend. Judging by HTER, the performance reaches it peak at t = 3.
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Figure 2.4: The Error Probability
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Figure 2.5: The Error Probability, t = 3, c = 100

Permanence and Distinctiveness: The permanence property of ECG signals allows the
individual to use his ECG signal whenever he wants without worrying that, he cannot decrypt his
own data or verify himself due to some turbulence of his signal. The characteristic is reflected by
FRR. As for distinguishing different users, FAR demonstrates this distinctiveness. The simulation
results are illustrated in Fig. 2.4 and Fig. 2.5. In these three graphs, the stable value of HTER
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is the lowest when t = 3, which echoes the result in Table. 2.2. So we focus on the results when
t = 3. The FRR remains quite low when A ≤ 18, being close to 0. Even when A increases to 50,
it still fluctuates around 10%. The FAR plunges to 20% when A = 16. As A becomes larger, FAR
gradually goes below 10%. Overall, our scheme can achieve the accuracy of 90% with a cost of only
10 seconds to record raw ECG signals.
Impact of Amplitude Amplifier: In Fig. 2.4 and Fig. 2.5, the impact of amplitude
amplifier on FAR, FRR, and HTER is also shown. The tendency of FAR and FRR is the opposite
as that in Table. 2.2. Since increasing A will magnify the difference between signals, which tends
to exceed the error-correcting capability, the scheme is more likely to decide that two signals are
from different people even if they are actually from the same source. It explains the higher FRR
and the lower FAR as A grows larger. However, if the amplifier value is chosen to be large enough,
e.g. greater than 16, we can see that HTER is stable. Generally, for t = 3, the scheme works well
for A ≥ 16. The specific choice of A is decided by the demand on FAR and FRR.
2.6.2.2

Efficiency
The computational cost of privacy-assurance in our scheme is also analyzed. The two time

costs that users’ care most are authentication time and unlocking time. The faster the speed is, the
more desirable the services are. We perform 3000 rounds of simulation to calculate the time costs
of generating locked keys, recovering features, authenticating users, and unlocking keys individually.
As shown in Table. 2.3, the time costs are stable and tolerable for users, especially the authentication
part, which takes about 45 ms.
Table 2.3: Average Time Cost
Generate and Lock
0.487 s

2.7

Recover
0.310 s

Authenticate
0.045 s

Unlock
0.468 s

Chapter Summary
In this work, we propose a privacy-aware, robust, and reusable ECG-based system for

authentication and data encryption. The design exploits techniques from different domains, and
achieves the following novel benefits, 1) In our architecture, the key generated is nearly uniformly
distributed; 2) The patient gains much control over the key generation; 3) The scheme is reusable
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in terms of both keys and raw features. The scheme handles the issues of authentication and data
privacy preservation very well. We prove through theoretical analysis and empirical experiments
that our proposed design is secure, accurate and light-weight. We will explore users’ revocability on
keys and experiment the effect of illness on our scheme in the future.
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Chapter 3

Practical Privacy-preserving
ECG-based Authentication for
IoT-based Healthcare
©[2019] IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from P. Huang, L. Guo, M. Li and Y. Fang,

”Practical Privacy-Preserving ECG-Based Authentication for IoT-Based Healthcare,” in IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 6, no. 5, pp. 9200-9210, Oct. 2019, doi: 10.1109/JIOT.2019.2929087.

3.1

Chapter Overwiew
The aging population and prevalence of chronic diseases have led to high demands for

more comprehensive long-term in-home health monitoring applications other than the continuous
monitoring on ECG signals only. With the rapid development of sensing technology, intelligent health
monitoring IoT devices, such as ECG patch, blood pressure band, pulse oximeter, etc., can collect
health data and provide real-time feedback to patients and hospitals, either as a warning of impending
medical emergency or as a monitoring aid during exercises [21]. The increasing demands signify
the importance of protecting the tremendous sensitive health data collected during monitoring. As
discussed in the previous chapter, compared to other biometrics, the electrocardiogram (ECG) signal
is a more suitable choice for user authentication and data privacy protection in medical applications
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in that it does not need extra sensors and is hard to get lost or stolen. Suppose that a patient Alice
has chronic diseases requiring long-term monitoring. A medical IoT for ECG monitoring is equipped
to collect her ECG signal daily, especially during exercise, for timely emergency detection. Since
her ECG signal is already acquired during the monitoring, it is convenient for her to authenticate
herself with her ECG signal. Therefore, the security improvement and medical data diagnosing can
be fulfilled simultaneously.
Nevertheless, the accuracy of biometric authentication highly depends on whether biometric
traits are acquired under controlled environmental conditions from patients and free of noise. The
requirement for controlled environmental conditions in biometric authentication is contradictory to
the properties of the IoT-based health monitoring. During the long-term monitoring, which should
work all the time to detect any health emergency timely, the environmental condition is changing due
to patients’ mobility. The ECG signal monitoring during exercises, when most chronic heart diseases
take place, is especially important. However, existing schemes [34, 112, 115] only deal with online
datasets or resting ECG signals, while the ECG signals in real situations are usually contaminated
by noise and artifacts, such as muscle movement and patch displacement when the patient is moving.
The authentication and diagnosis cannot be successfully performed with noisy ECG signals. On the
other hand, the secrecy protection of ECG signals is also problematic while it is pivotal in preventing
adversaries from stealing or forging a legitimate patient’s ECG signal and breaking into her medical
records [1]. The highly sensitive property of ECG signals (e.g., revealing illness) further magnifies
the significance of privacy preservation.
Contributions: To overcome the above limitations, we propose a scheme that is able to
authenticate patients with noisy ECG signals while ensuring the privacy of stored templates. Our
contributions are summarized as follows:
1. The proposed ECG-based authentication is reliable even with noisy inputs. The noise detection
and elimination is real-time. Thus, the application of ECG-based authentication becomes more
practical than ordinary ones for daily use, especially for long-term health monitoring.
2. The most common daily exercises, i.e., walking, running, and jumping, are included. Our
scheme can detect the motions and adapt the algorithm according to current moving status.
3. The privacy of ECG templates is protected by providing indistinguishability. The sensitivity
of ECG signals is considered while the authentication accuracy is preserved after optimized
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privacy enhancement.
4. Our scheme is tested on signals with real world noises instead of artificially added noises.

3.2
3.2.1

Related Work
ECG-based Authentication
Existing ECG-based authentication schemes rely on fiducial [84] or non-fiducial features

(e.g., pulse active ratio [115], wavelet coefficients [6, 112], and Legendre coefficients [108]) to present
ECG signal’s characteristics. Due to the permanence of the ECG signal, the produced features
are constant and sensitive, so privacy guarantee should be added. Chaotic functions [27] provide
a solution for varying representation of features, but its stability is not yet validated. A scheme
named fuzzy extractor is proposed in [36] for authentication and some works extend it to a reusable
one [20, 64]. However, the authentication process in them is not efficient in that it is done as a
step towards getting the key, and the clues needed for authentication may compromise the privacy
of features. A more significant deficiency in works related to ECG-based authentication is that a
majority of them do not consider the active authentication. Authors in [128] only estimates the
baseline wander under differential exercises when de-noising the signal and pay no attention to other
noise contamination.

3.2.2

Noise Elimination in ECG signals
Either linear or nonlinear methods have been proposed [148] to eliminate noises in ECG

signals. Linear methods do not consider the overlap between noise frequencies and signal frequencies.
The wavelet-based methods [25] are the most widely used nonlinear approaches, but their accuracy
is restricted by the choice of mother wavelet and they may lead to oscillations in the reconstructed
ECG signals [114]. In order to solve these deficiencies, Wang et al. [148] propose an adaptive wavelet
decomposition. However, this scheme has a high demand on SNR when reconstructing signals.
Singular Vector Decomposition (SVD) [135] can effectively extract compressed features from the
ECG signal and then recover a clean ECG signal from the noisy one. However, most traditional
ECG signal decomposition with SVD has to be done after obtaining the entire ECG data matrix,
which can bring down the efficiency of authentication. Moreover, almost all existing works are only
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tested on artificially-added noises on real or simulated ECG signals, so there efficiency on real-world
noisy ECG signals are doubtful. In our work, we take the advantage of SVD and boost its efficiency
when applying it to authentication procedure.

3.3
3.3.1

Preliminaries
Basic Features, Noise, and Artifacts in the ECG Signal
The ECG signal is an electrical signal reflecting the electrophysiologic patterns of the human

heart muscles when the heart is depolarizing and repolarizing. Different ECG signals conform to
a similar fundamental morphology, while exhibiting personalized traits, such as relative timing of
the various peaks, beat geometry, and responses to stress and activity [133]. The personalized
traits are distinctive among human subjects and can be quantified in time domain and frequency
domain. Thus, the human identity authentication is enabled via ECG signals. As illustrated in
Fig. 3.1a and Fig. 3.1b, a typical ECG complex consists of various fiducial components such as P
wave, PR interval, QRS complex, J point, ST segment, and T wave. The QRS complex is the most
recognizable and unique part of a ECG signal, which is frequently utilized for feature extraction in
human authentication [109].
In practice, ECG-based authentication may far from being accurate because ECG recording
is always contaminated by noise and artifacts. The actual personal traits are hard to be directly
detected in noisy ECG signals, so the authentication process fails if using the inaccurate features.
The most common high-amplitude ECG noises [118] that cannot be removed by simple in-band
filtering are electromyogram (EMG) signal interference, baseline wander (BW), muscle artifact, and
electrode movement. The ECG signals recorded during exercises are contaminated by unwanted
signal components with greater energy.

3.3.2

Singular Value Decomposition
How to recover and conduct feature extraction from a noisy ECG record is quite challenging.

Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) [48] is a method to decompose orthonormalized eigenvectors
from the input matrix, which holds the fundamental features of the input and separate orthogonal
components in the input.
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Figure 3.1: ECG waveforms
Definition 1. Let A be a real m × n matrix with m ≥ n, then A = U ΣV T , where U T U = V T V =
V V T = I n,

Σ = diag(σ1 , · · · , σn ). The matrix U consists of n orthonormalized eigenvectors

associated with the n largest eigenvalues of AAT , and the matrix V consists of the orthonormalized
eigenvectors of AT A. The diagonal elements of Σ are the non-negative square roots of the eigenvalues of AT A; they are called singular values, which are assumed to be: σl ≥ σ2 ≥ · · · ≥ σn ≥ 0.
Thus if rank(A) = r, σr+1 = σr+2 = · · · = σn = 0.

3.3.3

Differential Privacy
Traditional cryptographic methods are burdensome to protect ECG signals and the en-

crypted ECG signals can hardly be used for diagnosis. Hence, we introduce differential privacy as
defined in [39], which is first defined on databases. Databases D1 and D2 differ in at most one
element if one dataset is a proper subset of the other and the larger database contains just one
additional row.
Definition 2 (Differential Privacy). A randomized function K gives ϵ-differential privacy if for all
data sets D1 and D2 differing on at most one element, and all S ⊆ Range(K),

P r[K(D1 ) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ϵ) × P r[K(D2 ) ∈ S].

The probability is taken is over the coin tosses of K.
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(3.1)

Thus, the risk of privacy leakage increased after this element participating in a database
is bounded by exp(ϵ). The differential privacy with privacy budget ϵ is named as (ϵ, 0)-differential
privacy.
The Laplace mechanism is a basic differential privacy mechanism, which adds Laplacedistributed noise variables to the query result.
Definition 3 (The Laplace Mechanism). Given any function f : N|X | → Rk , the Laplace mechanism
is defined as:
ML (x, f (), ϵ) = f (x) + (Y1 , · · · , Yk )

(3.2)

where Yi are i.i.d. random variables drawn from Lap(∆f /ϵ).
The query result returned to the requester is a perturbed one based on the ground truth
f (x). This mechanism preserves (ϵ, 0)-differential privacy.

3.3.4

Notations
For clarity, we use different font styles to describe matrices, vectors, and elements, which

are the bold type, the calligraphic type, and the normal one, respectively. An example is listed in
Table 3.1, together with some other notations appear in the work and their corresponding definitions.
Table 3.1: Notations and Definitions
Notation
M
Mh
MTv
mi,j,h
c
f
M, M
H, N
TS , TQ , TA
AS , AQ
U, V , Σ
A, ν
Kh
K
C, Ce
C˚

Definition
a 2-D matrix containing inputs from ECG channels
the h-th row/channel in M
the v-th column/sample input in M
the i-th element in the j-th segment of Mh
the denoised and perturbed version of M
the channel number, sampling time duration for M
fiducial features regarding time durations
fiducial features regarding amplitudes
singular vector decomposition representation
acceleration and speed for motion detection
the divergence between two ECG signals on channel h
the overall divergence between ECG inputs and ECG
template
fj,h
the Legendre polynomial fitting coefficients of Mj,h , M
the fitting coefficients after soft thresholding

28

3.4
3.4.1

ECG-based Authentication in noisy environments
Overview
Fig. 3.2 demonstrates how our authentication system captures features, generates templates,

and successfully authenticates patients even when the input signals are contaminated by noises.
A patient’s ECG signals are first obtained using a wearable ECG acquisition module and then
transmitted to a processing device via wireless communication channel (e.g., Bluetooth). After
receiving the signals, the device applies SVD to de-noise the signal. The features are then extracted
and stored as templates in the device as well as in the hospital’s database. Later, when the patient
requests for her health data, an authentication request is issued to the device and the hospital. Her
ECG signals and other data from motion sensors are recorded. Her motion will be inferred from
sensors and her ECG signals are de-noised according to the detected motion status. Features are
then extracted from the de-noised signals concurrently and transmitted securely to the device and
hospital. They will be compared with templates to verify the patient’s identity.

Feature Template Extraction
Patient
Templates

SVD
ECG Signals Processing
(Rest Position) Device

Fiducial Feature
Extraction
Comparison
Motion
Detection

ECG Signals

Processing
Device

Clean Signals
and Features

Coefficients
Fiducial Feature
Extraction

De-noising

Real-time Feature Extraction
and Transmission

Hospital

Authentication

Figure 3.2: System Architecture

3.4.2

Attack Model and Challenge
ECG signals and their features can be captured and stored for indefinite amount of time.

Given enough accurate features, it is possible to reconstruct the desired ECG signal at a later time.
In [40], authors generate synthetic ECG signals from feature distributions to launch attacks against
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ECG biometrics.
In our model, the attacker intends to access the patient’s data without stealing the patient’s
ECG template directly. Therefore, the adversary tries to infer a patient’s ECG feature statistics
from the template database. This attacker is physically outside the hospital, but he can query the
ECG template database stored at the hospital and get the distribution of ECG statistics. A simple
example is that, he gets the distribution for all patients’ templates for the first query, and he retrieves
the distribution after making a query to the dataset without patient Alice at the next time. By
subtraction, the attacker knows Alice’s features. Hence, based on a number of intermediate querying
results, the attack can aggregate results and successfully infer Alice’s ECG information. This kind
of inference attack on databases is extremely common. Finally, the attacker reproduces Alice’s ECG
signal and pretends to be Alice by authenticating himself with the acquired ECG information.
The challenge in blocking this kind of attackers is how to carefully protect the privacy of
templates as well as their statistics, so that the inferred ECG signal will not be validated while the
template still provides enough information for Alice to authenticate herself.

3.4.3

Template Acquisition and Training
Assume that the ECG acquisition module allows H independent signal channels for inputs.

For clarity, we use different font styles to describe matrices, vectors, and elements, which are the
bold type, the calligraphic type, and the normal one, respectively (e.g. M , Mh , and mi,j,h ).
3.4.3.1

Data Recording and Training
The patient stays in a rest position while recording her ECG signal and the entire data is

recorded as a H ×N matrix Ω, which has H ECG channels and the signal in each channel is sampled
for N times. Since the data is recorded during rest position with negligible noise interference, the
signal can be directly decomposed with SVD to train singular vectors for signal and noise separation:
Ω = U ΣV T , where Σ is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are the singular values of Ω. Both
U and Σ are saved for further noise elimination.
3.4.3.2

Fiducial Feature Extraction
After obtaining the eigenvalues, R peak locations are first detected and the signals are

segmented with a window with size W centering at R peaks. After truncation, the remaining signals
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are denoted as M . Mj,h is the j-th segment on the h-th channel in M . The locations of R peaks
loc(R)j,h in each Mj,h are marked to synchronize signals for authentication. The fiducial features
that we plan to select from one segment are described in Fig. 3.1b. When processing Mj,h , all
features from the last segment Mj−1,h are updated as following:
– Average activation time TAj,h : the average time length from the peak of P waves, which are
the local maximum before a R peak, to R peaks.

TAnew = loc(R)j,h − loc (max V[0 : loc(R)j,h ))
h
i
TAj,h = (j − 1)TAj−1,h + TAnew /j
j,h
– Average QR duration TQj,h and amplitude Aj,h
Q : TQ is the average time length from the first

minimum points before R peaks (locate in Q waves) to R peaks, and Aj,h
Q is the average
difference between their amplitudes.

TQnew = loc(R)j,h − loc(min V[0 : loc(R)j,h )
h
i
TQj,h = (j − 1)TQj−1,h + TQnew /j
j−1,h
j × Aj,h
+ V(R)j,h − V(Q)j,h
Q = (j − 1)AQ

j,h
– Average RS duration TSj,h and amplitude Aj,h
S : TS is the average time duration from R peaks

to the first minimum points after R peaks (locate in S waves), and AtS is the average difference
between their amplitudes.

TSnew = loc(min V[loc(R)j,h : W ]) − loc(R)j,h

h
i
TSj,h = (j − 1)TSj−1,h + TSnew /j
j−1,h
j × Aj,h
+ V(R)j,h − V(S)j,h
S = (j − 1)AS
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3.4.4

Authentication in Noisy Environments
In practice, the patient is usually moving while authenticating with backend servers. There-

fore, we propose a solution for patients under light exercise level to accomplish successful authentication. The ”light exercise level” here is defined as: ECG signals are contaminated by noises
so that the morphology of the ECG signals is distorted in time domain and fiducial features are
hard to be directly extracted from signals. The muscle movement, patch displacement, and heart
rate changes are the main contributions. However, the exercise level is not too high to produce
destructive changes (e.g., lost of R peaks) to ECG signals. A typical example of light exercise level
is walking, where the user’s heart rate is slightly boosted and the chest is experiencing moving so
the patch may be distached from the chest bursty.

3.4.4.1

Motion Detection
Our ECG monitor is a portable one worn on waists or arms with embedded accelerometer

and gyroscope. Accelerometer (e.g.,

on x axis) measures the sum of acceleration and gravity

component, Dacl (x) = A(x) + grav(x), and angle rotation data from gyroscope (e.g., on x axis) is
denoted as Dgyr (x). The linear acceleration and velocity are easy to get by subtracting the gravity
component, but angular velocity needs a complementary filter [78] to take the advantage of both
sensors’ properties. The linear accelerations, linear velocity and the angle velocity on x axis at time
t are calculated as:
Atlin
t
νlin
t
νang
(x)

=

p
A2 (x) + A2 (y) + A2 (z)

= Atlin ∆t + ν t−1


d α′ arctan √

=

A(x)
A(y)2 +A(z)2

dt



+ (1 − α′ )Dgyr (x)

where α′ is a parameter that balance the data from accelerometer and gyroscope to produce accurate
angle velocity.
t
t
The angle velocities on y and z axises, νang
(y) and νang
(z), are calculated in the similar way
t
as νang
(x). The angle degrees at time t are also known given velocities. According to acceleration,

velocities, and angle degrees, the motions are categorized into walking, running, and jumping, which
are the most common exercises in daily life. In general, running has higher speed on XY plane than
walking and jumping. Using angular information alone is hard to distinguish between walking and
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running, but it can help us tell them from rest positions, such as sitting and lying, because walking
and running involve more vigorous muscle activities [45]. Then we take advantage of the gravity
component grav(z) to separate running from jumping, since the locations of people’s arms/waists
when jumping are higher than when running. Finally, we calculate the angle degrees in case that it
is misclassified as other exercises when the patient is moving her arm during rest positions.

3.4.4.2

Motion-aware Noise Elimination
If the patient’s motion is detected and classified, the input ECG signal M ′ is supposed to

be contaminated with unwanted signal components. As the noise space is time-orthogonal to ECG
signal space, the singular values of signal space is stable, so the noises in the input can be easily
discarded by reconstructing ECG signal from the stored U and Σ2 for M ′ :

d′ = U Sb′
S ′ = U T M ′ , Sb′ = [s′1 · · · s′r 0 · · · 0], M
where S ′ is divided into Sb and S̄ corresponding to the signal and the noise subspaces. The ECG
d′ .
signal is recovered from signal subspace as M
However, directly applying SVD for reconstruction cannot eliminate noises efficiently due to
the variability of ECG signals and motions. We also have to wait for the entire input matrix before
denoising while motions may only happens in a short period during input. Therefore, we propose a
weighted online SVD to let the algorithm automatically adapt to the variations.
T

According to the definition of SVD, Σ2 can be re-formulated as U T M ′ M ′ U . In our
scheme, this eignvalue-related matrix will be updated along with U when more authentication data
moves in. During the authentication, we deploy Jacobian transformation to eliminate off-diagonal
elements in Σ2 after receiving every signal sample to catch its precise features and adapt itself to new
incoming ECG signals. To balance the template and incoming data, different weights are assigned
w.r.t. motion status. The effect of newly sampled signals is relatively less important for more
violent activities with smaller weight β given the fact that they are more heavily contaminated.
The procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1, where U v , Sv′ , Qv are the eigenvectors, subspace
matrix, and the Jacobian rotation matrix [49] updated after receiving the v-th input vector M′T
v and
T
α + β = 1. After the training process, the close approximation of Σ2 is QTN (αΣ2N −1 + βSN SN
)QN ,

which will stored with other training results, including U N .
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Algorithm 1 Motion-aware de-noising of ECG signals
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:

Initialization: U 0 = U , Σ20 = Σ2 ,i = 0
while v ≤ N do
v =v+1
Sv = U Tv−1 M′T
v
Update motion status. Assign α and β according to current motion status.
2
T
Σ2′
v = αΣv−1 + βSv Sv
2
T 2′
Σv = Qv Σv Qv
U v = U v−1 Qv
Sbv =[sv,1 · · · sv,r 0 · · · 0], S̄v =[0 · · · 0sv,r+1 · · · sv,r+n ]
c′ = U v Sbv
Recover ECG signals as M
v
end while′
c
return M

3.4.4.3

Feature Extraction and Authentication
At each sampling time t, the system de-noises the ECG samples and finds out the needed

fiducial features TA , TS , TQ , AS , and AQ by detecting the maximum point (R peak) and nearby local
maximum/minimum points. These fiducial features are computed and the signal is truncated in the
same way as when training template. Meanwhile, each sample in the latest segments is compared
with the template M without delay. The features are updated after each segment.
To quantify the segment comparison results for authentication, we leverage the concept of
Kullback-Leibler divergence [74], which measures the similarity between two ECG signal segments.
To avoid the drift between the template and inputs, the divergence computation starts after the
detected R peaks in segments are synchronized with those in the template. At each sample time in
the j-th segment of the h-th channel, t ∈ [locRj − W/2, locRj + W/2], the divergence Kh is updated:
tKth = (t − 1)Kt−1
+
h

X

mi,j,h log

i

m′i,j,h
mi,j,h

(3.3)

The overall divergence is computed as the average over all channels:

Kt =

PH

h=1

Kth

H

The authentication request is successful if K is below a threshold. Otherwise, the fiducial
features will be compared with the template features. This patient is rejected if the distances between
each pair of features exceeds a bound, but will be accepted as the features are close to the template.
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3.5

Privacy enhancement
Now the patient is able to authenticate herself with her ECG signals, but the template signal

and features are exposed to inference and reproduction attacks. In this section, we show how to
statically protect the privacy of templates in the database via differential privacy without intolerably
distorting authentication accuracy.
Before the privacy enhancement scheme, we use Legendre polynomials fitting [64] to preprocess ECG signals so that ECG signals are efficiently represented and compressed. Each channel
in the template is matched with high order Legendre Polynomials [77]. For the ease of description,
our scheme is illustrated on a single channel. The Legendre differential equation [7] can be expressed
as:
d
d
[(1 − x2 ) pn (x)] + n(n + 1)pn (x) = 0.
dx
dx
Solutions for Legendre differential equations when n = {0, 1, 2, . . . , κ} form a polynomial
sequence called Legendre polynomials, which are denoted by pn (x). Suppose that the location of
the first R peak in the template is in line with x = 0, then the κ-degree equation used for fitting
data is given as:
′

y(x) =

k
X
r=1

3.5.1

"
c0,r +

κ
X

#
ci,r pi (x − loc(R)r )

(3.4)

1

Basic Design
Given a template matrix M , the algorithm first uses k ′ (κ + 1) polynomial coefficients to fit

a single channel with k ′ segments in the template. Since each segment is compared independently,
we denote the coefficients for one segment as Cj,h = {c0,j,h , c1,j,h , . . . , cκ,j,h }. Then, the Laplace
noise Lap(λ) is applied to Cj,h :

Pr(Lap(λ) = x) =

1 −ϵ|x|/λ
e
,
2λ

(3.5)

whose mean is 0 and variance is 2λ2 . The noises added to Cj,h is denoted as Lapκ (λ) and the
perturbed outputs are Cej,h = Lapκ (λ) + C + j, h. Finally, the algorithm computes the noisy signal
fj,h from the fitting equation m̃i,j,h = c̃0,j,h + Pκ c̃k,j,h pk,j,h (x − loc(R)j,h ).
segments M
k=1

35

3.5.1.1

Privacy Level
The privacy level achieved by the technique of differential privacy depends on the sensitivity

of the data query. In our scenario, the query result for data is the set of Legendre polynomial
coefficients. Therefore, the sensitivity of the Legendre polynomial fitting is defined as the maximum
amount the fitting coefficients can change when the ECG signal in that channel changes, which is
much smaller than simply applying differential privacy to each signal sample. According to the
definition of differential privacy, we use the Manhattan distance, |C − C ′ |, to measures the distances
between two fitting coefficient vectors C and C ′ .
Definition 4 (Legendre polynomial fitting query sensitivity). Denote the fitting query to one ECG
segment in channel Mh is LPoly(Mj,h ) and its result is Cj,h . The Manhattan sensitivity of any
fj,h :
query LPoly to one segment is the maximum distance of changing Mj,h to M

fj,h ) = max Cj,h − Cej,h
∆(L)= max LPoly(Mj,h ) − LPolyi (M

The sensitivity bounds the drift in results of each query. For a query LPoly, the achieved
privacy level is ϵ = ∆ (L) /λ. Then, the problem of guaranteeing privacy while protecting accuracy
turns into restricting the changes in fitting results and deciding a proper parameter λ. According
to the query sensitivity, we define the privacy level of our algorithm as:
fj,h of our perturbation algorithm is ϵ-differentially private, where ϵ =
Theorem 1. The results M
∆(L)
λ .

Proof: The coefficients obtained by adding Laplace noises Lap(λ) is ϵ-differentially private, and
fj,h is reconstructed from coefficients, so it also follows ϵ-differentially privacy.
M
3.5.1.2

Accuracy Analysis
The accuracy of our perturbation algorithm is inversely represented by the faulty noisy

query results. The results could be inaccurate due to the loss due to the approximate fitting and
negative effects of the added noise. We define several metrics to quantify the accuracy as follows.
Definition 5 (Approximation Loss). The approximation loss is the loss of Legendre fitting with
order κ + 1 and more. The loss is the sum of amplitude differences between original ECG samples
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in segment Mj,h and the samples from signals reconstructed from Legendre polynomial coefficients.
"
Lossj,h = Mj,h − c0,j,h +

κ
X

#
ck,j,h pk,j,h (x − loc(R)j,h )

(3.6)

k=1

Definition 6 (Expected Negative Effect on Accuracy). Suppose that the distribution of noise follows
F, we formulate the expected deviation and the error probability of coefficients as the expected negative
effects. The expected deviation neg1 is the expected standard deviation between perturbed coefficients
and original ones. The error probability neg2 is the count of perturbed coefficients that exceed a
threshold averaging over the polynomial degree.
v
u κ
uX
2
neg1 (P(Cj,h )) = t
EF |ck,j,h − c̃k,j,h |
k=0

neg2 (P(Cj,h ))=

Theorem 2. As λ =

∆(L)
ϵ ,

EF count [|ck,j,h − c̃k,j,h | ≥ γ]
= Pr [|ck,j,h − c̃k,j,h | ≥ γ]
κ+1

the expected negative effect of our algorithm is:

neg1 (P(Cj,h )) =

√

κ + 1λ



γ 
1
−γ
neg2 (P(Cj,h )) = 1 −
exp
− exp
2
λ
λ
Proof: According to differential privacy’s properties:

v
v
v
uκ+1
uκ+1
u κ
X
u
uX
uX
√
2
2
t
t
neg1 (P(Cj,h )) =
EF |ck,j,h − c̃k,j,h | =
E |Lap(λ)| = t
λ2 = κ + 1λ.
k=0

k=0

Z
neg2 (P(Cj,h )) = Pr [|ck,j,h − c̃k,j,h | ≥ γ] = 1 −



γ 
1
−γ
=1−
exp
− exp
2
λ
λ
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k=0

γ

Z

−γ

Lap(λ)(x)dx −
−∞

−∞


Lap(λ)(x)dx

Obviously, the choice of Legendre polynomial order attributes to the approximate loss, and
the negative metrics are related to the choice of λ and the degree of polynomial fitting, where λ
involves the query sensitivity ∆(L). To formally analyze the deviations, we assume all constituent
sensitivity to be 1 as in [113], so ∆(L) = κ + 1.

3.5.2

Extended Design

3.5.2.1

Observation
From the analysis above, we can show that the usefulness of the template is violated because

the deviations are supremely large with a big κ. To reduce noises, we import an existing noise
reduction approach, soft thresholding [101] with a threshold τθ , to constrain a coefficient c̃i in Ce as
c̊i :



c̃i − τθ ,



c̊i =
c̃i ,




 c̃i + τθ ,

c̃i > τθ
(3.7)

− τθ ≤ c̃i ≤ τθ
c̃i < −τθ

The principle behind it is that the noises added to small coefficients are usually much
larger than the coefficients themselves, but the perturbed coefficients are still comparably small, so
regulating them to zeros will make perturbed coefficients less noisy [13]. As for those important
large coefficients, it cuts down the values of added noises to confine the drifts. The threshold τθ
should be related to privacy budget and do not compromise the achieved differential privacy.

3.5.2.2

Noise Smoothing for Privacy Enhancement
The goal of soft-thresholding is to minimize the variances of C˚− C in order to alleviate the

shifting of coefficients originating from noises. Given Ce and Equation (3.7), minimizing the variance
˚ − V ar(C) after soft-thresholding can be formulated as:
error V ar(C)

minimize
τθ

X

G=

c̃2i + τθ2 − 2|c̃i |τθ



i:c̃i ∈[−τ
/
θ ,τθ ]

subject to τθ ≥ 0
X
G≥
c̃2i + 2(κ + 1)λ2
i
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(3.8)

Proof: Since ci = c̃i − ni , the formulation of variance error can be simplified as following:
˚ − V ar(C) =
V ar(C)

1 X 2
(˚
ci − c2i )
κ+1 i


1 X
1 X 2
(˚
ci )2 − (c̃i − ni )2 =
(c̊ − c̃2i ) − 2λ2
κ+1 i
κ+1 i i


X
X

1 
=
c̃2i + τθ2 − 2|c̃i |τθ −
c̃2i  − 2λ2
κ+1
i
=

i:c̃i ∈[−τ
/
θ ,τθ ]

where ni is the noise sampled from Lap(λ).

P
P
As i c̃2i and 2λ2 are known, the objective function can reduced to i:c̃i ∈[−τ
c̃2i + τθ2 − 2|c̃i |τθ .
/
θ ,τθ ]

Algorithm 2 Searching for the optimized τθ
˜ in descending order and assign new indexes.
Computes 2(κ + 1)λ2 . Sort |C|
for j = 0 : κ do
˜ exceed the range [−τθ , τθ ]
The first j elements in the newly-ordered |C|
Pj
2
2
4:
Compute k=1 c̃k+ 2(κ + 1)λ 
Pκ
Pj
5:
Solve (κ − j)τθ2 − 2 k=j+1 |c̃k | τθ − k=1 c̃2k − 2(κ + 1)λ2 = 0

1:
2:
3:

6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:

if there is a solution and τθ ≥ 0 and |c̃j | > qτθ ≥ |c̃j+1 | then
Store τθ in the first candidate vector.
else
Find the minimum point τθ of the formulation in Step 5
if τθ ≥ 0 and |c̃j | > τθ ≥ |c̃j+1 | then
Store τθ and its corresponding minimum in the second candidate vector.
end if
end if
end for
return the first element in this vector, otherwise return the element in the second vector with
the smallest minimum

We propose a searching algorithm on Ce to calculate a suitable τθ . As shown in Algorithm 2,
it first excludes a certain number of large c̃j from the range [−τθ , τθ ] and solve the quadric equation to
P
let the objective function reach its potential minimum i c̃2i +2(κ+1)λ2 . If the potential minimum is
not achievable, it computes the minimum distance between the objective function and the potential
minimum. Then, it kicks one more c̃j out of range and begins another round of searching. Finally,
it chooses the c̃j that satisfies the constraints and minimizes the objective function.
Theorem 3. The privacy guarantee is not degraded after soft-thresholding.
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Proof: An intuitive proof is that the threshold τθ is produced merely on C, which is generated on
Lap(λ) and the λ itself, so the privacy guarantee is the same.
This theorem can also be proved in another mathematical way from the aspect of probability
density function (pdf). The pdf of C˚ − C is the convolution of the pdf of Laplace noise and softthresholding errors, where the pdf of soft-thresholding is a set of Dirac Delta functions ampi δ(x −
loci ), whose amplitudes and locations have following properties:
X

∀i, loci ∈ [−τθ , τθ ]

ampi = 1,

i

Hence, the probability of distinguishing a polynomial fitting coefficient from another after
perturbing with Laplace noise and soft-thresholding is:
P





Lap(t − c1 ) ∗ i ampi δ(x − loci ) X
pdf [c̊1 = t]
∆ (L)
∆ (L)
P
=
=
ampi exp
= exp
pdf [c̊2 = t]
Lap(t − c2 ) ∗ i ampi δ(x − loci )
λ
ϵ
i
which achieves the same privacy budget ϵ as the basic perturbation scheme does.

3.6
3.6.1

Performance Evaluations
Data Collection
In our experiments, we use two online datasets in PhysioBank databases [46], which are

MIT-BIH Arrhythmia (MA) database [102] and MIT-BIH Noise Stress Test (NST) database [103].
MIT-BIH Arrhythmia database contains two-channel ambulatory ECG recordings obtained from 47
subjects. The NST database adds artificial noises to the clean recordings No. 118 and No. 119 from
the MA database, whose signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) are 24, 18, 12, 6, 0, and -6 dB, respectively.
Besides online datasets, we recruit 30 healthy subjects to record their ECG signals voluntarily. During recording, they perform different physical activities (resting, walking, running, and
jumping). Data are collected with a lightweight wearable physiological monitor BioRadio 700-0016
and its software BioCapture, which support up to three leads. The electrode positions following
Einthoven’s system [96]. The recording situation and an example of recorded waveforms are illustrated in Fig. 3.3. The data descriptions are summarized as in Table 3.2:
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ECG Channel 1
ECG Channel 2
ECG Channel 3

Electrode 2

Electrode 1

Accelerometer X
Accelerometer Y

Electrode 3

Accelerometer Z
Gyroscope X
Gyroscope Y

Ground

Gyroscope Z

Figure 3.3: Demonstration of Recording and Signals
Table 3.2: Datasets
Dataset
MA/NST
Collected

3.6.2

Gender
25(M) 22(F)
20(M) 10(F)

Age
23-89
21-40

Sampling
360 Hz
250 Hz

Duration
30 mins
20 mins

Effectiveness of De-noising and Authentication
The de-noising and authentication process is performed on all dataset to test root mean

square error (RMSE), divergence, and authentication accuracy. We import F1 score, which is defined
below, to evaluate the accuracy of correctly verify whether a test instance is from the authorized
user regardless of the physical movements.

F1 =

2 × TruePositive
2 × TruePositive + FalsePositive + FalseNegative

We perform de-noising from ”bad” signal entries in NST database and our collected data,
then compare them with corresponding clean recordings. We chooses 100 segments with 10 seconds
for each person, motion type, and SNR, and normalize all ECG recordings, then compute the average
RMSE, divergence, and F1 score before and after de-noising.

3.6.2.1

De-noising Stability under different SNRs
The de-noising reliability under different pre-determined SNRs is evaluated using NST

dataset, which can be observed in Fig. 3.4. Data collected from 30 subjects is not evaluated here
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Figure 3.4: The de-noising result under different SNRs
because it is hard to determine the SNR in a real ECG signal. The amplitudes of the original signal
correspond to the left y-axis and those of the recovered signal correspond to the right y-axis. The
differences between de-noised results are negligible so they are plotted as one line corresponding to
the left y-axis. The outcomes for SNR ≥ 0 are clean ECG signals with identical QRS complexes
and the RMSEs after normalizing are as small as 0.002. We can conclude than successful de-noising
and authentication are guaranteed regardless of SNRs.

3.6.2.2

Motion Types
We extract 6,600 segments lasting for 10s from our collected data to compare the de-noising

and authentication results for signals under different motion types, 3,000 segments of which are
collected during walking and the other 3,000 and 600 segments come from running and jumping
scenario, respectively. The numbers of segments are in correspondence to the recording time of
each motion. The ECG signal undergoes small, continual noise interference when the objective is
walking while experiencing large, continual/abrupt distortions with high energy when the subject
is running/jumping. Table 3.3 and Fig. 3.5a use the divergences and F1 scores to demonstrate the
results. The unwanted signal component has relatively small energy when the patient is walking, so it
is easy for the algorithm to recover the signal. However, the noise signal appearing when the patient
keeps running or jumping is sometimes too sharp for the U to react and separate it from signals,
which will jeopardize the stability of de-noising and authentication. Therefore, the authentication
performance is the best when the subject is walking while being the worst for jumping, and the
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divergence (defined in Equation (3.3)) and F1 score for jumping have the largest STDs.
Table 3.3: Authentication under different types of movement
Status
Divergence Mean
Divergence STD

Walking
0.6116
0.1634

Running
1.8391
0.3612

Jumping
4.6458
0.7483

Values in Fig. 3.5a also prove the effectiveness of de-noising. The F1 scores after de-noising
are all increased compared to those before de-noising. The improvement for jumping is the most
significant. It is almost meaningless to authenticate jumping subjects before de-noising, but the
score is much more acceptable after de-noising.
96.21
90.19

93.24

83.12
78.30

80

95.0
92.5

94.85±1.35
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93.81±1.36

87.5 84.91±2.64
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Figure 3.5: F1 Score Performance

3.6.2.3
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Figure 3.6: The F1 score comparison

Authentication Time
To evaluate the time efficiency, we calculate the average F1 scores when the authentication

process ends after different lengths of recording time with all movement types. The means and STDs
of authentication accuracy, are shown in Fig. 3.5b. The scores indicate that the authentication
performs better with longer recording time. It can be observed that the authentication becomes
more accurate and stable with longer recording time, with smaller STDs and a F1 score over 94%
for our collected data and 97% for NST dataset. A recording time of 3 seconds is not enough to
reliably recognize the patient with a score around 85% for the real-life data and the improvement
for time longer than 7s is less significant. Therefore, we set the recording time for authentication as
a constant, e.g., 7s, in the following experiments from the aspects of accuracy and time efficiency.
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3.6.2.4

Experimental Results Comparison
To prove the superiority of our proposed ECG-based authentication scheme, we compare

our scheme with other ECG-based mechanisms with noise cancellation. The comparison are done
among the following schemes:
a. A basic nonlinear ECG features detection based on Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) [54].
b. A more advanced method based on Adaptive Fourier Decomposition (AFD) [148], which is
implemented on the AFD toolbox developed by Wang et al. [4].
c. A SVD-based scheme in [135].
The aforementioned schemes are only tested on signals with artificially added noises, which
are too simple compared to real scenarios. As shown in Fig. 3.6, the first simple method may work for
artificially added noises, but it cannot distinguish real-world noises at all. Its authentication accuracy
is very low because it cannot separate any noises from signals. The AFD-based one performs better
than the previous straightforward one due to its adaptive feature, but it requires the estimated
SNRs. We estimate some SNRs from the signal amplitudes and pass them to the algorithm, but
the performance still falls behind our scheme when experiencing higher level of noises due to the
inaccurate estimation on SNR of real-world signals. Moreover, the time consumption of AFD is high.
Therefore, the AFD-based algorithm is not suitable for authentication purpose. The last SVD-based
one cannot adapt itself to motion status as well as the variations in noises, so the reproduced ECG
signal may be distorted and the authentication accuracy is not greatly boosted after de-noising.

3.6.3

Privacy Guarantee

3.6.3.1

ROC Curve
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is a graph to illustrate the classification

performance under varied thresholds by plotting true positive rate against the false positive rate.
Its area under curve (AUC) is an important metric to quantify the performance. In Fig. 3.7, AUCs
for curves of ϵ = 5 are larger than those for curves of ϵ = 1, because higher ϵ indicates lower privacy
bound, which brings worse privacy guarantee but better performance in terms of authentication
accuracy. The classification ability after applying differential privacy is poor in the traditional
academic point system, since the corresponding AUCs are merely between 0.6 and 0.7. However,
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after applying soft-thresholding, the AUC of ϵ = 1 becomes 0.766 and that of ϵ = 5 is 0.861. Though
it is still smaller than the AUC without privacy guarantee due to an inevitable trade-off between
privacy and utility, the performance is ranked as good, which means it is acceptable.

1.0
True Acceptance Rate

0.8
0.6
0.4

w/o privacy
w privacy, epsilon=1
w privacy&thresholding, epsilon=1
w privacy, epsilon=5
w privacy&thresholding, epsilon=5
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Figure 3.7: ROC curve for different ϵ
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Figure 3.8: Effect of privacy bounds
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Figure 3.9: Impact of different polynomial degrees

Different Privacy Bounds
Overall, the performance is improved after soft-thresholding as shown in Fig. 3.8a and

Fig. 3.8b. The trends in F1 score and RMSE show that the accuracy is lower with smaller privacy
bound, which indicating stricter privacy demand. Although applying differential privacy with smaller
privacy budgets (ϵ = 0.5) will degrade the authentication service greatly with only around 70%
accuracy even after soft-thresholding, a patient can authenticate herself with her protected template
with an accuracy rate about 90% when ϵ = 10. This accuracy rate is close to the upper bound
(the accuracy rate without applying differential privacy). It implies that the patient can enjoy the
accurate authentication together with the protection of differential privacy if the budget is loosened.
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As shown in Fig. 3.8b, the RMSE descends with the growing of ϵ due to the looser privacy requirement
and the RMSE after soft-thresholding can be reduced to the tenth of the one before thresholding.
The deviation caused on ECG signals by differential privacy is reduced and the effectiveness of
soft-thresholding is verified.

3.6.3.3

Different Polynomial Degrees
f from noisy
Under choices of different Legendre polynomial order κ, we reconstruct signals M

f and M and the F1 scores achieved.
coefficients and compute the summation of RMSE between M
As shown in Fig. 3.9b, due to the enlarging sensitivity of Ce when polynomial order κ is increasing,
there is a slight drop in F1 score and dramatic rise in RMSE. The tremendous growth in RMSE
does not substantially drop in F1 score because Legendre polynomials cover some uniqueness of ECG
morphology and the uniqueness is retained even after applying differential privacy. Apparently, the
performance is still enhanced by soft-thresholding.

3.6.4

Efficiency Analysis
We implement our algorithms on Python 2.7 for over 10,000 iterations to estimate the

running time. Evaluation results about running time are listed in Table 3.4. Training a template
takes up about 3.359 seconds. Its swiftness enables timely online template training for patients. The
average time for extracting fiducial features from a 10-second ECG signal and comparing it with the
template is about 0.7432s. The extended privacy enhancement scheme uses only 0.00071 seconds to
fit the ECG template with polynomials, add noises to polynomial coefficients, smoothing noises, and
reconstruct the signal from noisy coefficients. The running time of our scheme is small and stable,
which indicates that the proposed scheme is efficient and causes negligible extra burden.
Table 3.4: Running Time

Mean/s
STD/s

Training
3.3591
0.1071

Authentication
0.7432
0.0907
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Privacy Enhancement
0.00071
0.00046

3.7

Chapter Summary
In this work, we have presented an ECG-based authentication scheme for IoT-based health-

care that provides authentication ability when the ECG input is noisy and protects the privacy
of stored ECG templates. Our scheme makes several novel contributions: preserve the timeliness
of authentication by implementing light-weighted online algorithms; effectively disaggregate noises
from ECG signals to ensure a reliable authentication; provide indistinguishability via differential
privacy to prevent adversaries from inferring the patient’s ECG information; improve the accuracy
by applying soft-thresholding while holding the claimed privacy guarantee. Our experimental evaluation on both online dataset and real-world experiments shows that the proposed approach can
effectively and efficiently authenticate patients while ensuring the privacy of templates.
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Chapter 4

Wearable-User Authentication via
Cross-Technology Interference in
Heterogeneous Environments
4.1

Chapter Overview
Long-term smart health monitoring is facilitated by wearable devices that collect multi-

dimensional data continuously, timely, and accurately. Recently, there are plenty of works to improve the efficiency and comfortableness in personal health monitoring by making wearable sensors
smaller and more noninvasive with advanced technologies, e.g., nanomaterials. These wearables can
be closely attached to the tissue surface to capture the thermal, electrical, mechanical, or chemical
changes of objectives, including glucose concentration in sweat, the gas molecules in exhaled breath,
and physiological signals that reflect heart function [106]. As the wearable devices are evolving
quickly and becoming more widely deployed, more privacy and security issues are incurred. Existing
ways for authentication, including the two aforementioned ECG-based authentication schemes, only
verify the identities of people accessing data to prevent unauthorized access, but a stronger authentication is expected in health monitoring. The verification should not be limited to the user identity,
but shall be extended to the data sources. If the health data are coming from malicious entities and
mismatch with genuine user identities, applications may hazardously produce incorrect diagnosis
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results and healthcare recommendations. Consequently, to achieve these two goals simultaneously,
a new wearable must first get authenticated to verify that it is possessed and accessed by legitimate
users only, for which we denote as the “wearable-user authentication”.
Unfortunately, current practices lack standardized regulations due to wearables’ resource
and ability constraints, as well as the various wireless protocols in use [150]. For example, a blood
glucose monitor, whose data update frequency is low, may be a tiny device using ZigBee protocol to
achieve long battery life, whereas continuous electrocardiography (ECG) signals should be transmitted by Wi-Fi to meet their transmission bandwidth requirement. In this heterogeneous environment,
where devices with different resource constraints use different wireless protocols to transmit various
types of data, additional hubs/gateways are required for authentication in traditional authentication
systems. However, ZigBee-enabled monitors can hardly fulfill security goals even with the help of a
hub/gateway because ZigBee standard does not provide a strong security guarantee, and monitors
have limited ability and resources for complicated protection. To overcome these constraints, we
intend to find shared features of wearables despite using diverse wireless protocols and measuring
different health parameters. The shared features we plan to utilize are the ubiquitous wireless signals
transmitted from wearable devices, and we authenticate a new wearable-user pair with the help of a
wearable that is already verified. For example, a new ZigBee-based wearable is to be verified that it
is placed on the same legitimate user with a trusted Wi-Fi-based device, corresponding to the aforementioned examples of blood glucose monitor and ECG monitor. Existing authentication schemes
may provide similar solutions, such as device-to-device (D2D) authentication. Specifically,
most D2D authentication schemes in IoT either use a pre-installed key [122] or generate a common
key based on shared features, such as Channel State Information (CSI) and Received Signal Strength
Indicator (RSSI) [8], and nonlinear distortion of speaker-microphone systems [70]. In practice, the
major drawback of the above works is that they overlook wearable systems’ heterogeneous abilities
and wireless environments. They can only work for devices with similar embedded hardware or under
the same wireless protocol and fail to authenticate the wearable-user pair. Meanwhile, extracting
identical secret information from CSI requires a short distance between devices to (e.g., less than
0.4λ ≈ 5cm for 2.4GHz in [156], where λ is the wavelength), which is too strict for general wearable
systems.
To make sure that our scheme can support wearable authentication better, we explore the
mutual influence between the coexisting heterogeneous wireless technologies, e.g., Wi-Fi and ZigBee
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transmissions in the 2.4GHz band [83], which is named as Cross-Technology Interference (CTI).
Most previous studies focus on mitigating CTI to avoid packet corruption and thus boost service
quality [63]. However, the full potential of CTI is not reached. The on-body deployment of wearables
in health monitoring provides an opportunity to trigger unique CTI sequences, which are reflected on
CSI and affected by device distance, transmission power, and user-dependent physiological behavior,
e.g., respiration and ECG [141]. In this work, instead of reducing CTI, we leverage its uniqueness
to develop a novel authentication scheme among coarsely positioned devices of diverse capabilities.
Our contributions are listed as follows,
 Our work is the first to leverage CTI across Wi-Fi and ZigBee in heterogeneous environments

for authentication.
 By exploring the potential of CTI, we bypass the constraints of existing authentication ap-

proaches based on shared secrets and wireless signal physical layer properties. The achieved
wearable-user pair authentication achieved more complex goals than regular authentication.
 The authentication scheme is robust against illegitimate accesses. Our design does not need a

centralized trusted third-party, and thus, reduces deployment costs.
The rest of this chapter is organized as below. Sec. 2 gives preliminaries about wireless
signals and how they are used in health monitoring, followed by our motivations in Sec. 3. The
theoretical reasoning is provided in Sec. 4. Sec. 5 gives the detailed design of our authentication
scheme. Thorough evaluations are given in Sec. 6 to prove the effectiveness. Sec. 7 discusses related
works. Sec. 8 summarizes the chapter.

4.2
4.2.1

Related Work
CSI-based Respiration Measurement
In healthcare systems, CSI is acquired from deployed Wi-Fi-based devices to achieve contact-

free respiration measurement, which is more convenient and non-intrusive than other methods
[91, 141]. The chest movement caused by respiration is reflected in the amplitudes and phases
of channel response. This method is first proposed in WiSleep [90] to detect human respiration rate
for sleep monitoring based on CSI in commodity smartphones. Clear ripple-like patterns of CSI
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amplitudes, which correspond to the movement of chest, are detected. They also find out that not
all the CSI sequences show the pattern of breathing. For example, subcarrier 30 does not contain
as much information of breathing as other subcarriers. In their work, sleeping position detection is
also achieved. Further research works discover the possibility of detecting more detailed information
such as abnormal breathing patterns and heart rate [87,91]. In [85], authors further extract biometrics from respiration interfered CSI to enable user authentication. Compared to these works, our
work defines the “relative distance” and thus captures more physiological information and achieves
simultaneous device-user authentication.

4.2.2

Device/User Authentication in Healthcare
Existing device or user authentication schemes designed for healthcare are based on physi-

ological values, channel properties, etc. [9].
4.2.2.1

Physiological-based schemes
The physiological-based schemes can authenticate either user’s or device’s identity. They

first extract features from some physiological signals, such as electrocardiogram (ECG) signals and
electroencephalogram (EEG) signals, and then generate a common secret from the extracted features
[64, 75, 126] for devices with similar features. Recently, smartwatches or wristbands are more and
more used in authentication due to the plethora data they can collect. Authors in [41, 136] use
multi-modal biometrics to authenticate the wearable users with machine learning models. They
are straightforward, but they can not simultaneously verify device and user. They are not scalable
because they require a powerful device to collect multiple dimensions of biometrics while in practice,
some health monitoring devices may lack the required sensing module and do not have built-in
mechanisms to authenticate themselves.
4.2.2.2

Channel-property-based Authentication
Channel property is a shared, symmetric metric, regardless of devices’ sensing abilities.

In [154], two devices are close to each other, so the channel reciprocity produces a common secret
based on RSSI for two devices while preventing the eavesdropper from getting this secret. In [123],
authors analyze the characteristics of on-body (both transceivers are located on the surface of or in
close vicinity to body) and off-body (at least one transceiver is off-body) channels to block secret
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information from off-body attackers. The fundamental shortcoming is the RSSI values are integers
and only changes within a narrow range when the person is breathing. Hence they cannot capture
physiological activities precisely [90].
Device authentication based on CSI is usually more accurate and achieves higher secret
generation rate than RSSI-based ones. In [155], a CSI-based secret generation protocol is proposed
using a validation recombination mechanism. However, it requires high signal-to-noise-ratio to reach
an agreement as even a single bit mismatch will result in a failure. Despite of the advantages, CSI
is very sensitive so it is easy to be contaminated or corrupted by CTI among monitoring traffics.
However, channel-property-based schemes are severely obstructed by the distance restriction
and wireless coexistence in healthcare scheme. The RSSI and CSI observed by two devices vary
greatly if they are placed more than one wavelength away [44, 156]. Moreover, a healthcare system
involves various wireless protocols due to the diversity in manufacturers and demands, while CSI is
not supported in protocols other than Wi-Fi, and RSSI is not unified due to nonidentical transmission
powers. Our work overcome their limitations.
In [163], authors uses a hash function to generate a chain of Authorization Code and transmits the Authorization Code to achieve the authentication between ZigBee-based devices and WiFi-based devices. In their settings, the devices using different protocols can understand each other’s
messages through Cross Technology Communication techniques. It requires additional modification
in device hardware and/or protocol design, which is not practical for regular health monitoring sensors. Compared to their work, our work achieve authentication with existing protocol designs and
is easier to be used.

4.2.2.3

Non-contact Respiration-based Authentication
Recently, researchers are investigating into leveraging channel properties that contain fea-

tures brought by physiological activities for human identity authentication and people counting. To
achieve authentication, existing works either extracting human respiration rate from CSI [140] or
directly using breathing patterns for classification [65]. These works are efficient in their evaluations
regarding mitigating noises and trying to tackle the complex multi-person situation. However, these
works merely focusing on mitigating interference, and primarily only natural environmental interference. For example, to combat noises, authors in [140] combined CSI on different subcarriers to
enhance the Signal-to-noise ratio. This approach can select an optimal set of subcarriers under natu52

ral random noises but will probably enhance the CTI that spread over many subcarriers and worsen
the noise contamination, especially if the CTI is intentionally injected into most Wi-Fi subcarriers.
In this case, intending to separate interferences from signals may detrimentally discard information
for identification. On the contrary, our work bypasses these limitations by using CTI and achieving
two goals, “wearable-user authentication” simultaneously.

4.3

Preliminaries

4.3.1

Channel State Information and Physiological Signal Sensing

4.3.1.1

Channel State Information
The Channel State Information (CSI) is a metric to evaluate channel properties of trans-

mission links that are multiple-input/multiple-output (MIMO) radio channel [76]. It is produced
by estimating the time-varying channel frequency response for the Orthogonal Frequency Division
Multiplexing (OFDM) symbols. This information describes how a signal propagates from the transmitter to the receiver and represents the combined effect of, for example, scattering, fading, and
power decay with distance.
Suppose a communication system has NTX transmitter antennas, NRX receiver antennas,
and Ns OFDM subcarriers in one channel. This channel exists NTX × NRX × Ns subcarriers when
transmitting signals. The CSI H(f, t) measures channel frequency response in different subcarriers
with frequency f [144]. Let X(f, t) and Y (f, t) represent the transmitted and received signal
with different subcarrier frequencies. H(f, t) can be calculated at the receiver side using a known
transmitted signal via H(f, t) = Y (f, t)/X(f, t):


h11



 h21

H(f, t) =  .
 .
 .

hNRx 1

h12

···

h1NTx

h22
..
.

···
..
.

h2NTx
..
.

hNRx 2

···

hNRx NTx






,




(4.1)

where hmn is the complex transmission coefficient from transmitter the antenna m to the receiver
antenna n. hmn reflects the condition of transmission link and is sensitive to the changes in the
lengths of transmission paths. When a human subject is in the transmission environment of Wi-Fi
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signals, their movements change the path lengths of Wi-Fi signals and thus, perturb the CSI. From
the variation of CSI, the human movements can be recognized.

4.3.1.2

Physiological Signal Sensing by CSI
The sensitive CSI is rich in information and can reflect not only vigorous human activities

but also small-scale movements caused by physiological activities, such as breathing and heartbeats.
A human respiration cycle includes inhalation and exhalation, during which air is taken in and
pushed out by the forces from lung and surrounding muscles. An important muscle involved is the
diaphragm, a dome-shaped muscle at the bottom of the lungs. It controls breathing and separates
the chest cavity from the abdominal cavity. When a breath is taken, it flattens out and pulls
forward, making more space for the lungs. During exhalation, the diaphragm expands and forces
air out [3]. By monitoring the amplitudes and phases of channel state information (CSI), the
displacements of muscles that occur in respiration cycles can be detected [165]. When monitoring
the respiration cycles, the muscle movements, and the vibration of blood vessels in the chest area
caused by heartbeats are also captured. Recently, there are works that track breathing and heartbeat
simultaneously by filtering out the interference of breathing in CSI [86].
As indicated in [138], sensing physiological signals from CSI are not as accurate as from
on-body sensors and faces practically constraints in large-scale environment, but is still effective
enough to identify individuals. The respiratory system, if elaborated as a mechanical behavior,
is actually the pressure differences applied to the system, either by the respiratory muscles or by
external devices, and the associated volume changes of the system [100]. Previous studies on the
nature of respiration show that the properties of respiration are determined by physical factors such
as pulmonary structure, different respiration scenarios, mechanical properties of lung tissue (e.g.
intraesophageal pressure, lung compliance, and lung resistance), and the interaction with organs or
body parts, etc., [43,53]. The volume of breathing depends on the elastic forces within the respiratory
system, while the breathing rate is decided by forces resulting from frictional resistance within the
lung parenchyma and the surrounding tissues and forces relating to acceleration of mass. Most of
these influence factors are determined by distinctive human demographic attributes and vary from
person to person. This distinctiveness also applies to heartbeats. Inspired by these research findings,
we leverage the existing Wi-Fi signals emitted from wearable devices and discover how the unique
physiological information embedded in the CSI can help our goal of authentication.
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4.3.2

Cross Technology Interference between Heterogeneous Wireless Protocols
In practice, the CSI is under the influence of the transmission of signals other than Wi-Fi

signals. The 2.4 GHz ISM band is a license-free radio band that is shared by industrial wireless network standards based on IEEE 802.15.4 (ZigBee, WirelessHART, and ISA100), IEEE 802.11b/g/n,
and other protocols. When these signals are propagating in the same frequency, they interfere with
each other and the reliability of wireless communications could be deteriorated due to this CrossTechnology Interference (CTI). The CTI among protocols will cause significant packet loss, where
the degree of interference is determined by various types of factors, including transmission rate,
energy, and distance. More specifically, 802.11b networks have a much larger impact than those of
802.11g due to its longer channel-time for 802.11 packets [83]. Under the presence of Wi-Fi traffic,
the transmission latency will increase for traffic using 802.15.4 due to the use of CSMA/CA protocol
in the data link layer. When the 802.15.4 radio is far away from the smartphones or the channel
RSSI is low, the Wi-Fi traffic is not corrupted. However, ZigBee packets are contaminated by Wi-Fi
traffic, and thus they will be discarded by the receiver. On the other hand, 802.11 packets will
backoff during 802.15.4 transmissions when the distance is small.
Recent studies find out that when the power level of on-going ZigBee traffic is not high
enough to interrupt Wi-Fi transmission, the Wi-Fi packets will be successfully delivered, though
the preambles of Wi-Fi packets are interfered and the amplitudes of CSI are changed [52]. In
the heterogeneous environment of health monitoring, the CTI is inevitable. Instead of mitigating
CTI, we plan to explore the uniqueness lying in the statistical features of CSI hmn triggered by
CTI to supplement the distinctiveness of physiological information and thus fulfill wearable-user
authentication simultaneously.

4.4
4.4.1

Motivation
Overview
To address the diversity of commercial health-related wearables, we propose an authentica-

tion scheme that takes advantage of CTI-interfered CSI changes detected by on-body Wi-Fi-based
wearables. Since wearables are attached to the human body surface, the CSI is jointly affected by
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the user’s physiological activities, e.g., respiration and heartbeats, and CTI from other wearables
belonging to this user together. Hence, not the device, but the wearable-user pair is authenticated
by the combined information, and illegitimate users, who fail to mimic the physiological activities
and CTI, are prevented from using the device. Our scheme turns the “harmful” CTI from ZigBee
wearables into a helpful hand.
Legitimate
ZigBee Device
Classification Model
Training

Wi-Fi Device

Success

Respiration

WiFi
Router

Illegitimate
Device

CTI
Detection

CSI
Recording

Classification-based
Authentication

Failure

Wi-Fi Device
Respiration

Figure 4.1: System Description
Our proposed system is illustrated in Fig. 4.1. Assume that a Wi-Fi on-body device is
trusted, and a wearable device using a different wireless protocol, e.g., ZigBee, is trying to authenticate itself to the Wi-Fi device before data collection. The ZigBee-based wearable sends ZigBee
packets in the presence of a Wi-Fi transmission pair, i.e., a Wi-Fi router and the Wi-Fi device.
After detecting the presence of CTI from CSI, the Wi-Fi device begins capturing CSI samples. The
individual-dependent inhalation-exhalation process and heartbeats will result in wireless channel
path changes and the distance from the ZigBee device to the Wi-Fi device, demonstrated as CSI
characteristic changes in CTI-interfered Wi-Fi packets. Then, the Wi-Fi device is able to uncover
unique features and decide if the new device is attached to the legitimate wearer’s body by a trained
classification model.

4.4.2

System Setting
As shown in Fig. 4.2, we consider a healthcare scenario, where the user has several wearable

devices attached to body for monitoring different physiological and daily activities.
•Wi-Fi Router: It communicates with the Wi-Fi device using 802.11 protocol and works as an
anchor for generating background Wi-Fi traffic.
•Wi-Fi-based Wearable:

This device is considered as a trusted device, which is able to collect
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WiFi Transmission
ZigBee Cross-Tech. Interference

WiFi Router
Wi-Fi Device
ZigBee Device
Figure 4.2: System Model
health-related data and send data to the cloud via a Wi-Fi router in 2.4GHz band. It may be
worn on wrist or attached to chest according to its functions. It detects and records CTI. It is also
responsible for comparing the template with CTI-interfered CSI for authentication.
•ZigBee-based Wearable: The ZigBee-based device is capable of broadcasting ZigBee packets and
generating CTIs with its transmission. It is attached to the user’s upper body, where the majority
of health monitoring devices are place, including chest, neck, and abdomen.

4.4.3

From Human Respiration and CTI to CSI
To analyze the practicality of designing an authentication scheme using “interfered” CSI

measurements, we demonstrate how CSI amplitudes change with physiological activities and CTI
from ZigBee transmission. Specifically, as shown in Fig. 4.2, we use a Raspberry Pi 4 as the
Wi-Fi wearable, which is installed with Nexmon [119], a C-based firmware patching framework for
Broadcom/Cypress Wi-Fi chips enabling functions including raw Wi-Fi signal transmission and CSI
extraction, and a TI CC26x2R Wireless MCU LaunchPad to send ZigBee packets periodically on
overlapping frequencies.

4.4.3.1

CSI Changes with Physiological Activities and ZigBee Interference
We attach the Wi-Fi device to a subject’s chest, set up the transmission power of ZigBee

device on abdomen, and measure the CSI values of Wi-Fi packets. Fig. 4.3 demonstrates CSI time
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Figure 4.3: The Impact of ZigBee traffic on CSI
series obtained with and without ZigBee interference in the tenth subcarrier of Wi-Fi Channel 1.
In the first round of data collection, there are no interfering signals in the transmission
environment and the human subject is sitting still, so physiological activities, e.g., breathing, is the
only factor that can greatly affect CSI. Despite random noises, the amplitudes of uncontaminated
CSI show a clear cyclical up-and-down tendency, which matches the back-and-forth chest movements
during respiration and indicates the existence of inhale-exhale cycles. Here, approximately two cycles
are recorded.
Then, we add ZigBee interference to the previous settings by letting LaunchPad send a few
packets at power -15dBm. Each ZigBee packet is designed to cover approximately 40 Wi-Fi packets
and the interval between ZigBee packets covers around 15 Wi-Fi packets. From Fig. 4.3, we can see
that the CTI is captured by the increased CSI amplitudes while the peaks and valleys in respiration
cycles can still be visually detected. From these findings, we tell that CTI can change CSI amplitudes
while preserving some physiological features. We further speculate that, given different patterns of
ZigBee packet flow, the CSI pattern influenced by ZigBee packets may also vary.
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Figure 4.4: ZigBee traffic on CSI - Different Tx power
4.4.3.2

CSI Distinctiveness and Similarity among Subjects
Then, we place the two devices on two human subjects. The transmission power levels of

the Wi-Fi device, the distance between the Wi-Fi device and router, and the distance between the
Wi-Fi device and ZigBee device are set to be the same. The CSI amplitudes demonstrate apparent
differences for two human subjects due to their distinct demographic attributes, as shown in Fig. 4.4.
When the ZigBee device works at -15 dBm, the amplitudes from the two subjects almost have no
coincidence point. The distinctiveness of CSI sequences between subject 1 and 2 is obvious. When
the power of the ZigBee device is assigned with a larger value (0 dBm), the interfered amplitudes are
much higher than those when ZigBee power is -15 dBm, and two subjects’ amplitudes move closer
to each other. Nevertheless, they are still misaligned.
We the Kendall rank correlation coefficient [99] to test whether two raw CSI sequences are
statistically dependent. The sequences are aligned by the first peak. The correlation coefficients
between Subject 1’s and Subject 2’s CSI sequences when the power of ZigBee is 0 dBm and -15 dBm
are 0.0666 and 0.0071 with a p-value of 0.1611 and 0.1879 respectively. It echoes the findings that
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CSI sequences are distinctive person-wise and higher ZigBee noises may weaken the distinctiveness.
The correlation coefficients between two Subject 2’s CSI sequences when the power of ZigBee is 0
dBm is 0.8281 with a p-value of 0.0005, which verifies the similarity between the same subject’s CSI
sequences. The correlation coefficients between Subject 2’s CSI sequences when the power of ZigBee
is 0 dBm and -15 dBm are 0.2844 with a p-value of 0.0001. It indicates that even being contaminated
by different CTI, the CSI sequences coming from the same person are more closely correlated than
those from different persons. Overall, the average same-person coefficient for 10 subjects under the
identical level of CTI is 0.88011, the average different-person coefficient for 10 subjects under the
identical level of CTI is 0.08267.
In addition, we quantize this distinctiveness via Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) distance.
DTW is a technique used to measure the similarity between two arrays or time series with different
lengths. We collect CSI series with the aforementioned settings from 10 subjects. The DTW
distances between series are calculated and normalized by the average amplitudes of clean CSI. The
average DTW distances between CSI series of the same subject is 1.919, while the average DTW
distances between different human subjects under 0 dBm and -15 dBm ZigBee interference is 4.623
and 13.654. Obviously, CSI series obtained from the same user are similar but those obtained across
subjects show distinctiveness.

4.4.3.3

CSI Distinctiveness and Similarity on Wi-Fi Subcarriers
To further investigate the distinctiveness of CSI sequences based on the aforementioned

observations, we statistically explore the CSI amplitudes on different Wi-Fi subcarriers. An example of the means and variances of CSI amplitudes from thousands of Wi-Fi packets with different
interference power levels on each subcarrier are calculated and demonstrated in Fig. 4.5. The differences are more significant at subcarriers 10-30, because these subcarriers react more acutely to
CTI because of the higher sensitivity to chest displacement at their frequencies [91]. When the
ZigBee transmission power is larger (-6 dBm), the gap between statistics is smaller. It echoes the
findings in Section 4.4.3.2: the higher CTI hides more physiological features and brings CSI from
different subjects closer, the lower CTI incurs less ZigBee-related information and may impede the
authentication from device perspective. These differences are also visible on other pairs chosen from
10 tested subjects.
The feasibility of designing a wearable-user authentication scheme based on CSI sequences
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Figure 4.5: Means and Variances of CSI for Different Subjects
is demonstrated in Fig. 4.6 as supplementary to the statistical analysis in Section 4.4.3.2. Though
the ZigBee power levels are different, the means and variances share a similar tendency and their
values are quite similar for the identical human subject. This empirical observation shows that,
besides the fact that different human respiration and ZigBee transmission patterns uniquely impact
CSI, the CSI sequences interfered by different levels of CTI for one subject nearly remain stable.
The average DTW distances between CSI series acquired from pairs of subjects are computed
to show the similarity and distinctiveness, which are shown in Table 4.1. The trends of DTW
distances echo with the aforementioned analysis. Therefore, the feasibility of our proposed CTIenabled authentication scheme is fully presented.
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Table 4.1: DTW distances on subcarriers
Subcarrier
Same subject
Different subjects, -6 dBm
Different subjects, -12 dbm

4.4.4

15
1.521
6.344
11.504

20
1.554
4.758
10.851

25
2.122
1.397
6.182

30
1.291
2.006
1.029

Adversarial Model
We assume there is an active attacker, Eve, that can sense the wireless environment, inject

new traffic, and replay packets to pretend itself as a legitimate one. The malicious device controlled
by Eve is off-body and at least more than one wavelength away (12.5 cm for 2.4GHz) from ZigBee
devices in case being visually detected. The attacker may perform attacks whenever it detects the
transmission from the legitimate device. Our work makes no exploration of protecting against passive
attacks such as eavesdropping attacks and information leakage because the information exchanged
during the authentication process reveals no value.

4.5

Measuring Distance Variations
In our scheme, we turn the traditional CSI-based device authentication problem into “how

to verify the ZigBee device’s physical proximities to the Wi-Fi device and the device is on the body”.
To formulate this problem, we define the term “relative distance”, which is the dynamic distance
between Wi-Fi device and ZigBee device during respiration. In the following, we theoretically
demonstrate how the relative distance is touched by respiration and CTI and further prove the
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feasibility of leveraging unique CTI for authentication. In particular, the signal received by the
Wi-Fi device at time t is:
r(f, t) = s(f, t)H(f, t) + ω(f, t),

(4.2)

where s(f, t) is the signal sent from the Wi-Fi router, H is the CSI matrix, and ω is the noise. Note
that we only consider the amplitudes of the CSI values in this work.

4.5.1

Path Changes Due to Muscle Displacement
The displacement of muscles around the patient’s chest largely depends on respiration rather

than heartbeats. During regular respiration cycles, the human subject’s chest and abdomen occurs
in a periodic way. This cyclic process alters the “relative distance” between the on-body Wi-Fi
device and ZigBee device and impacts the path lengths of Wi-Fi connections. Fig. 4.7 illustrates
that the regular respiration will cause path changes reflected by surroundings and the line-of-sight
(LoS) path between the Wi-Fi device and the Wi-Fi router. To further investigate how respiration
impacts the received CSI characteristics, we have the following formulation as in [144]:

ϕ(t) = e−j2πdk (t)/λ ,

H(f, t) = e−j2π∆f t

X

(4.3)

ak (f, t)ϕ(t),

(4.4)

where ak (f, t) is the attenuation (complex value) and initial phase offset of k-th path, ϕ(t) is the
phase shift on k-th path caused by path length change, λ is the wavelength, dk (t) is the change
of path length on k-th path, e−j2π∆f t is the phase shift caused by the carrier frequency difference
between the sender and receiver, and t is the time variable. Hence, the power of CSI, |H(f, t)|2 , can
be calculated as:

|H(f, t)|2 =

X

|ak (f, t)|2 + 2

k

X


ak (f, t)am (f, t) cos

k̸=m

2πdk (t) − 2πdm (t)
+ ϕkm
λ



where ϕkm is a constant value.
We take a step further to analyze how the path is changing during inhalation and exhalation.
As shown in Fig. 4.8a, △AEC represents the LoS path and m-th path reflected by the wall when the
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Figure 4.7: Path Changes due to Respiration
user is inhaling, while △BED jointly draws the LoS path and m-th path during exhaling. Since the
drift of LoS path is far smaller than the distance from Wi-Fi device to router, EC and ED roughly
coincide. The chest displacement of a normal adult is less than 6.25 cm (half of the wavelength for
2.4GHz Wi-Fi) [66]. Therefore, to show CSI can be leveraged as a stable feature, we demonstrate
that CSI changes can be mapped to the path changes during one inhale-exhale process.
Theorem 4. The CSI power in one respiration cycle is monotonically changing with time in correspondence to the inhale-exhale process.
Proof:
CD
sin θ2 − sin θ1
sin(π − 2θ3 ) − sin(π − 2θ4 )
2 sin θ3 cos θ3 − 2 sin θ4 cos θ4
=
=
=
BD − AC
sin θ3 − sin θ4
sin θ3 − sin θ4
sin θ3 − sin θ4
Obviously, 0 < sin θ3 < sin θ4 < 1 because θ3 < θ4 . So,

2 sin θ3 cos θ3 − sin θ3 > 2 sin θ4 cos θ4 − sin θ4 .
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Moreover,
2 sin θ3 cos θ3 − 2 sin θ4 cos θ4
2(sin θ3 − cos θ3 ) − 2(sin3 θ4 − cos3 θ4 )
=
sin θ3 − sin θ4
sin θ3 − cos θ4
= 2 − 2 sin θ3 cos θ4 − 2 sin2 θ4 − 2 cos2 θ3 < 2

Thus, 1 <

CD
BD−AC

< 2, indicating that 0 < 2πdk (t)/λ − 2πdm (t)/λ < π/2.

For two pairs of (dk (t1 ), dm (t1 )) and (dk (t2 ), dm (t2 )) satisfying the above inequality, the
direction cosine of a direction vector l going through these pairs of point is

cos α = q

cos β = q

dk (t2 ) − dk (t1 )
2

2

[dk (t2 ) − dk (t1 )] + [dm (t2 ) − dm (t1 )]
dm (t2 ) − dm (t1 )
2

.
2

[dk (t2 ) − dk (t1 )] + [dm (t2 ) − dm (t1 )]

Then,

al =

∂(2 − 2 sin θ3 cos θ4 − 2 sin2 θ4 − 2 cos2 θ3 )
= cos α(−2 sin θ3 − 4 sin θ4 ) + cos β(−4 sin θ3 − 2 sin θ4 )
∂l
= sin θ3 (−2 cos α − 4 cos β) + sin θ4 (−4 cos α − 2 cos β)

If dk (t1 ) < dk (t2 ) (e.g., during exhaling), dm (t) < dm (t2 ):

al < sin θ4 (−6 cos α − 6 cos β) < 0

The shift is monotonically decreasing during inhaling because,

al > sin θ3 (−6 cos α − 6 cos β) > 0

The shift is monotonically increasing.
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Figure 4.8: CSI Changes Regarding Distances

4.5.2

Relative Distances Changes During Respiration

The CTI-interfered CSI can be estimated from the received symbols r = H + H Z sk + w

with known ground truth symbols, which is usually transmitted on pilot subcarriers, as


Ĥ = rs∗ = H + H Z |s| + ws∗ ,

(4.5)

where H Z is the changes on CSI caused by CTI.
The ZigBee device is also experiencing periodic displacement caused by respiration no matter
it is placed on chest or abdomen. If it is placed on chest, it experiences displacements similar in
tendency but different in distances compared to chest displacement. If placed on abdomen, the
deviation produced by abdomen displacement on CSI measurement is comparably small due to the
small abdominal wall displacement, which could be only 1/8 of the chest displacement [66]. The
abdominal wall moves in the opposite direction to the direction of chest during breathing. As
illustrated in Fig. 4.8b, the relative distance drift between ZigBee device and Wi-Fi device during
an inhale-exhale process is |DF − CG|, where DF represents the extreme of exhaling and F G is for
the extreme of inhaling. Intuitively, if the line of between the midpoint of F G and the midpoint of
CD is perpendicular to CD, |DF − CG| = 0; if the midpoint of F G is above the midpoint of CD,
DF − CG > 0; otherwise, DF − CG < 0. If DF − CG > 0, the received CTI power of ZigBee
packets decreases during exhaling because the Wi-Fi device moves farther away from the ZigBee
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device. F G’s midpoint is person-identifiable since it is determined by body figures and respiration
situations. Therefore, the LoS path length in CSI power |H(f, t)|2 and relative distance in CTI
interference are both dynamically changing when the user is inhaling or exhaling, which makes the
CSI sequence sole environment-wise and person-wise, as well as unpredictable to attackers.

4.6

CTI-enabled Wearable Authentication
In the detailed design, the Wi-Fi device acquires a CSI template by training CSI sequences

collected with CTI from an authorized ZigBee device. Then, to initiate the authentication protocol,
a newly attached ZigBee device sends its authentication request packets and generate CTI. We
expect that the received CSI changes will be close enough to the changes embedded in the template.

4.6.1

ZigBee Packet Design
The ZigBee device has to send packets on ZigBee channels that are overlapped with Wi-Fi

channels in the frequency domain, i.e., ZigBee Channel 11, ZigBee Channel 13, and Wi-Fi Channel
1, to raise CTI. We assume the ZigBee device in our system is half-duplex, and it sends authentication request packets with length Tp and time interval of Ti . Meanwhile, Wi-Fi packets in regular
transmission have a length Tp′ and time interval Ti′ . Generally, ZigBee packets last longer than Wi-Fi
packets in the time domain, so Tp > Tp′ . To let ZigBee packets cover the maximum number of Wi-Fi
packets, their packet lengths and transmit intervals are designed as:

Tp > n × 2Tp′ + Ti′ ,


Ti < 2n × Tp′ + Ti′ − Tp

p × (Tp + Ti ) = q × Tp′ + Ti′

where n, p, q are integers.

4.6.2

CTI Detection
According to the experimental results in Section 4.4.3, the statistics of CSI sequence changes

after ZigBee packets get involved. After acquiring a sample of CSI at time t, the Wi-Fi device
computes the variances V ar(t) = {V ar(t)m , · · · , V ar(t)n } on subcarriers m to n interfered by CTI
for the latest s samples. The dynamic thresholds for each subcarrier is assigned in line with the
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Figure 4.9: Overlapped ZigBee Packet Design
experimental setting in [93],
2

2

|H(t)|2 = {min |H(fm , t)| , · · · , min |H(fn , t)| },
2

where fi is the center frequency of subcarrier i, i ∈ [m, n] and min |H(fi , t)| means the minimum
CSI power in the latest s samples at time t. If for more than half of the total subcarriers, V ar(i) >
2

2

min |H(fi , t)| while V ar(t′ ) < min |H(fi , t)| for t′ < t, the Wi-Fi device believes that it confronts
CTI and begins recording CSI sequences.

4.6.3

Authentication Mechanism Design
We apply the Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs),

which are capable of learning long-term dependencies and nonlinear dynamics when classifying time
sequences in the authentication scheme. The authentication is successful only if the CTI-involved
CSI sequences can be classified into the same class with the template.

4.6.3.1

Template Acquisition and Training
In practice, the types and locations of on-body wearables are limited, most of which are

attached to the chest, abdomen, and wrist in corresponding to the locations of internal organs. If
the device with a Wi-Fi module is worn on the wrist, i.e., smartwatches, the user places that hand
on the chest and starts CSI recording. Otherwise, the Wi-Fi device is directly placed on the chest.
The upper body area is divided by two lines separating the chest area with the abdomen and neck
due to their different displacement distances during respiration so that CSI sequences collected in
the same area share similar patterns. In both the chest and abdomen/neck sections, we choose 3 - 7
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locations, where the distances between these locations are 10 cm. By placing the ZigBee device on
determined locations, a bunch of CSI sequences are collected. These CSI sequences are de-noised
with principal component analysis [137] to extract dominant features and both “template 1” and
“template 2” are labeled as class “legitimate”.
If these devices are shared by multiple people, which means that there could only one device
but are multiple “wearable-user pairs” needed to be authenticated, the classification model treats
the authentication as a multiclass classification task, where each class corresponds to the legitimate
samples of each user. However, instead of directly output the predicted classes, we translate the
results into “illegitimate” and “legitimate” for each user. For every user, the classes belonging
to other users are equal to “illegitimate” classes from their point of view, which means that the
authentication fails if their data is classified into any other users’ “legitimate” class. If there is only
one “wearable-user pair”, the user collects some extra CSI sequences by placing the ZigBee device
wherever away from their body and labels the CSI sequences as “illegitimate”.
Finally, The LSTM RNNs are trained with these samples to learn their features.

4.6.3.2

CSI Recording, Classification, and Authentication
Suppose at timestamps {t1 , t2 , · · · , tn }, the Wi-Fi device measures a series of CSI powers

from P = {Pt1 , Pt2 , · · · , Ptn }. We list the elements in Pt1 as an example:
Nsh t1
Nsh t1
Nsh t1
1t1
1t1
1t1
sh t1
1
, · · · , hN
Pt1 = {h1t
11 , · · · , h1NTx , · · · , hNRx 1 , · · · , hNTx ,NTx · · · h11
1NTx , · · · , hNRx 1 , · · · , hNTx ,NTx },

where Nsh is the number of Wi-Fi subcarriers covered by ZigBee channel. The CSI sequences, after
truncated by a window and filled with forward-filling and back-filling, are passed to the LSTM layer.
The LSTM layers use memory units with forget gates, combined with an input layer and an output
layer. The forget gates control the oblivion of old CSI values and help updating the new cell state.
The input layer picks the new CSI value for update and creates a new candidate cell state. Then,
the cell state is weighted and calculated from the output of forget gates and candidate cell state.
We use log loss function and a sigmoid activation function in our model. The output layer is a
fully connected one with softmax activation function, and the outputs of each softmax function
characterize the probability distribution over classes. The sequence will be classified into the one
having the highest probability among classes “legitimate” and “illegitimate”. The authentication is
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successful if P can be classified into “legitimate”, which means that P is either this user’s “template
1” or “template 2”. Otherwise, the failure on authentication may be attributed to reasons like CTI
is not detected, or the ZigBee device is not on the proper user, etc.

4.7

Scheme Evaluation

4.7.1

Security Analysis

4.7.1.1

Feasibility of CSI-based Authentication
In the proposed scenario, the channel is dynamic due to chest movement. Coherence time

is a metric describing the dynamic features of a communication channel, which is defined as the
time duration over which the channel impulse response is considered stable. An approximation of
f
coherence time Tc is given by Tec = 0.423/ff
m , fm =

v
e
c fc ,

where fc the center frequency, ve is the

average approximation of subject, and c is the speed of light. The human subject is sitting at a
fix position, so the movement involved is slow and steady. The time duration of one ZigBee packet
follows, Tp < Tc , which means that CSI values are not contaminated by Doppler shift. the CSI-based
authentication is feasible.

4.7.1.2

Analysis of Device Authenticity
We analyze how our scheme defends against two kinds of common active attacks to demon-

strate device authenticity.
Spoofing Attack: Devices are verified based on the physiological activity and relative
distance information. If the attacker Eve, who locates at a place one wavelength away, pretends to
be a legitimate device and requests for authentication, she cannot generate the same CTI as the
ZigBee device. So, she can succeed only if a sequence of CSI values guessed by Eve is close enough
to the actual measurement, which has a very low probability. Even if she compromises Wi-Fi router
and knows the respiration pattern due to channel reciprocity, Eve still cannot perform spoofing
attack because of the unpredictable ZigBee interference with the Wi-Fi device.
Injection and Replay Attacks: An active attacker can inject a packet or record ZigBee
packet and replay it to the Wi-Fi device for authentication. However, when recording CSI samples
for authentication, the relative distances between the attacking device and Wi-Fi device are different
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from the relative distances between the legitimate device and Wi-Fi device. Therefore, the levels
of CTI caused by the attacking device and the legitimate device are different. The Wi-Fi device
can easily know that the CTI-interfered CSI samples do not share similar features. As a result, the
attacking device will not recognized as a legitimate one. These attacks are successfully defended.

4.7.2

Experiment Setting
We detail our experimental settings consisting of devices, environment, and human subjects

to evaluate the performance of our proposed wearable authentication scheme.

4.7.2.1

Experiment Devices
We use Texas Instrument SimpleLink Multi-Standard CC26x2R Wireless MCU LaunchPads

(LAUNCHXL-CC26X2R1) and Raspberry Pi 4 in our experiment. To save the resource consumption
on Raspberry Pi, the LSTM RNNs are first trained on a laptop. The Raspberry Pi is only responsible
of testing after optimizing LSTM RNNs model into a TensorFlow Lite model or updating only a
portion of layers in the model when new data coming in. This step can greatly reduce the burden
of Raspberry Pi.

4.7.2.2

Wireless Environment
We use Channel 1 (2401 MHz-2423 MHz with center frequency 2412 MHz) among all 802.11n

Wi-Fi channels. As for ZigBee, we choose Channel 11 (center frequency 2405 MHz) and Channel 13
(center frequency 2415 MHz) that overlap with Wi-Fi Channel 1. 20 Wi-Fi packets are transmitted
per second.

4.7.2.3

Human Subject Setting
Two setups as shown in Fig. 4.10. In the first setup, one Raspberry Pi is tied to the subject’s

chest and another Raspberry Pi is placed on the desk used as the Wi-Fi router. The launchpad is
tied around abdomen. The Raspberry Pi is tied to wrist in the second setup, where users raise their
arms and place it on the chest during authentication.
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Figure 4.10: Experiment Settings
4.7.2.4

Dataset Setting
Our experiment is set up to verify that our scheme can work at a more strict scenario, where

one device is shared by multiple people, or, in other words, there is only one device but are multiple
“wearable-user pairs” needed to be authenticated. Ten female and ten male human subjects, whose
ages are between 22 and 50 and heights are between 160 cm and 180 cm, are recruited. For each
subject and each round, we record and label a CSI sequence lasting 20 seconds, which contains about
360 packets and covers 4-7 respiration cycles. In total, we collect 30 rounds (10 minutes) for each
individual, 15 rounds for each ZigBee device. Before each round, the location of ZigBee devices is
changed to be 10 cm away from the previous location by moving the elastic cord rings. The dataset
is split into training (80% in total, 40% for template 1, 40% for template 2), validation (10%) and
test (10%) sets. The trained models are validated on another 10% of data. The trained model is
tested to Raspberry Pi on the remaining 10% data.
For each user, the classes belonging to the other 19 users equal to “illegitimate” classes from
their point of view, which means that the authentication fails if their data is classified into any other
users’ “legitimate” class (either “template 1” or “template 2”). This dataset setting is to mimic the
situation that 20 people share one single device, while in practice, the number of users should be
much smaller.
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Identified Subject

4.7.3

Device Authentication Performance
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Figure 4.11: Confusion Matrix of Accuracy

The number of received Wi-Fi packets is not constant for every round due to the changes in
the environment, so the classification performance metrics for each subject is weighted averaged over
the number of packets received. The average true positive rate (TPR) is reflected by the confusion
matrix in Fig. 4.11. We observe that the achieved TPR is over 90% for 19 out of 20 subjects, where
the highest among them is 97%. The average TPR is around 92.09% with a standard deviation
of 2.39%. The false positive rates (FPRs), or false acceptance rate, has a mean of 7.95% and a
standard deviation of 3.04%. The false negative rates (FNRs), or false rejection rates, has a mean
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of 7.96% and a standard deviation of 2.42%. The comparably high TPRs and low FPRs verify the
effectiveness of our proposed authentication scheme. We then explore the detailed influence factors
of performance.

4.7.3.1

Optimal ZigBee Transmission Power

ZigBee Power
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Figure 4.12: Authen. Accuracy - Person-wise
Here, we use accuracy, which is the ratio of true positive and true negative to all results,
to quantify performance. Due to the unique physical and physiological properties, the effect of CTI
is different among individuals. Thus, the most beneficial (contributing to the highest TPR) ZigBee
power is also different person-wise. For example, the accuracy can be as high as 100% for subject 18
when the power is -12 dBm in Fig. 4.12, while the accuracy for subject 8 under the same setting is
only 86%. Therefore, it would be better if the ZigBee power is a user-defined parameter. However,
there are some common characteristics that lie within. For example, the accuracy is downgraded
for the population when the power is below -15 dBm because the power level is too low to carry
enough identifiable variations to CSI values. Therefore, results under -15 dBm are discarded when
considering the overall accuracy.

4.7.3.2

ZigBee Channel Selection
To identify whether choosing different ZigBee channels (frequencies) will affect the authen-

tication performance, we compare the accuracy for ZigBee devices working on Channel 11, and 13,
respectively. For each power level, we calculate the average Euclidean distances between the accu-
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Figure 4.13: Authen. Accuracy - Channel-wise
racy set with 20 subjects from Channel 11 and the set from Channel 13. The average Euclidean
distances are drawn in Fig. 4.13. Only the accuracy from subject 1 is drawn for clarity. In all, the
average Euclidean distance is always under 0.05 and is nearly 0 under some circumstances, indicating the small differences between the two sets. From the small Euclidean distances and proximity
of two value sets from subject 1, we can tell that the authentication accuracy is stable in terms of
frequency and will not be influenced by the selection of ZigBee channels.

4.7.3.3

Choice of Training Parameters
To study how the settings of LSTM RNN impact accuracy, we run training and testing

under different training lengths (the numbers of input CSI samples) and batch sizes (the numbers of
samples processed before the model update). Initially, we perform 50 rounds of training and testing
under different training lengths with a batch size of 100. Then, the training length is set to 500 and
we repeatedly test the model with varying sizes of batch. As shown in Fig. 4.14, the accuracy is
increasing with more training data and larger batch size. When the training data contains more than
350 packets (transmitted in about 20 seconds) and the batch size is over 75, our system can achieve
consistent accuracy of over 90%. The cost of building CSI profiles for accurate authentication is
negligible.
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Figure 4.14: Overall Accuracy of Authentication Model

4.7.4

The Comparison between Two Setups
We further investigate if our scheme can achieve similar performance even if the Wi-Fi

device is not closely attached to the chest. To compare the performance under two setups, Tab. 4.2
illustrates the statistics of TPR differences between the two sets of classification results. The overall
average difference is as low as 2.469% and the STD is below 1%, from which we reason that the
performance is not greatly impacted and remains stable even if the Wi-Fi device is tied on wrist
instead of chest. The displacements brought by chest are explicitly reflected in wrist movements
when wrist is placed on the chest. The accuracy difference shows dissimilar patterns in terms of
subjects due to their physical diversities. Generally, the differences are smaller when the ZigBee
power is lower because less CTI is triggered. Despite of the differences, the performance remains
high for both setups. Therefore, our scheme is generalized to common on-body devices placed on
body.
Table 4.2: Accuracy Comparison for Setup 1 and Setup 2
Power
Metrics
Average
STD
Median

-3 dbm

-6 dbm

-9 dbm

-12 dbm

-15 dbm

3.501%
0.572%
3.336%

2.565%
0.817%
2.570%

2.414%
0.833%
2.291%

2.312%
1.124%
2.434%

1.558%
0.798%
1.095%
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4.7.5

Performance against Illegitimate Access
Then, we test the performance against the adversarial device Eve. We define a metric as

the attack success rate to quantify the defense results, which is the ratio of the number of CSI
sequences from the active attackers that are falsely recognized as from the legitimate device to the
total number of samples.

4.7.5.1

Distance to the Wi-Fi Device
The power of the illegitimate device is set to -6 dBm. The distance is expressed as a ratio

of the distance from attacking device to the Wi-Fi device to the distance from the legitimate device
to the Wi-Fi device. As shown in Fig. 4.15a, it can pretend to be a legal device with a probability
below 50% only if its distance to the Wi-Fi device is the same as that of an authenticated device,
which is smaller than the overall authentication accuracy due to the unpredictable relative distance
and environmental variations when the illegitimate device is placed off-body. However, any attacker
in that small range will be visually detected. When the distance becomes larger, the probability
plunges. The attacker cannot mimic CTI even by holding similar energy as a legal device from Wi-Fi
device’s view, so the probability is no greater than 8%, which does not exceed the misclassification
rate in Fig. 4.11. Therefore, the attacker gains no advantage.

ZigBee Power -6 dbm
ZigBee Power -12 dbm
ZigBee Power -21 dbm

Attack Success Rate

0.4
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Figure 4.15: Unintended Successful Authentication
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4.7.5.2

Transmission Power
Then, we set the distance ratio of the attacker to 3, its attack ability is tested with different

ZigBee transmission powers. The results are listed in Fig. 4.15b. Obviously, the overall success
rate is smaller than the misclassification rate of the original authentication scheme. Hence, the
attacker is still powerless even he tries to altering its transmission power. Under such a low attack
success rate, attackers can be blocked out with brief methods, i.e., put a restriction on the number
of authentication attempts.

4.8

Chapter Summary
The growth of wearable devices brings significant security challenges. Most wearables can-

not perform efficient authentication due to heterogeneous environments and constraints. This research work takes advantage of CTI resulted from wireless coexistence and embeds it with human
physiological signals to achieve on-body wearable-user authentication. The changes of ZigBee-WiFi relative distances and Wi-Fi path lengths during respiration are explored both empirically and
theoretically. The proposed scheme breaks the boundary of protocol incompatibility and achieves
simultaneous wearable-user authentication while preventing illegitimate access from unauthorized
wearables. Through extensive experiments and analysis, we demonstrate the practicality, efficiency,
and security of the authentication scheme.
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Chapter 5

IS-WARS: Intelligent and Stealthy
Adversarial Attack to Wi-Fi-based
Human Activity Recognition
Systems
©[2021] IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from P. Huang, X. Zhang, S. Yu and L. Guo,

”IS-WARS: Intelligent and Stealthy Adversarial Attack to Wi-Fi-based Human Activity Recognition
Systems,” in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, doi: 10.1109/TDSC.2021.3
110480.

5.1

Chapter Overview
Human activity recognition, a branch of smart human sensing, has become increasingly vital

in advanced human-computer interaction [92] and has been widely integrated with Virtual Reality
technology, health monitoring, smart homes, safe driving, security surveillance, etc. The ubiquitousness of human activity recognition applications persuades both academic and industrial communities
to explore the ability of non-intrusive sensing due to practical concerns. As such, leveraging changes
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of invisible wireless signals to capture unique activity characteristics becomes a good candidate for
further expanding the methodology of human sensing. Among all of the commonly accessible signals, the Wi-Fi signal is the handiest one because of its rich information and wide deployment. Most
existing Wi-Fi-based human activity recognition systems leverage Channel State Information (CSI)
for deriving high-accuracy human activities. In particular, the CSI, originally used as a metric to
estimate the channel condition, can reflect many regular activities due to its sensitivity to human
movements occurred in the transmission paths [144]. Unfortunately, the transmission of wireless signals is delicate and vulnerable to dynamic and complex environments. This vulnerability becomes
even more severe when multiple wireless protocols share the same spectrum, which is a common
case nowadays. These coexisting signals interfere with each other and worsen the transmission environment. Though many works have put efforts in designing advanced de-noising schemes for CSI
sequences and lowering the negative effects of environments, existing recognition systems can still be
compromised by powerful attackers. For example, a common wireless jammer can take advantage
of the MAC protocol, e.g., Carrier-Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA), to
maliciously congest the entire transmission link by adding noises. However, this type of jamming
attack is highly perceptible by the transmission pair because it will jeopardize the expected Wi-Fi
transmissions. Hence, in this work we discover a new type of powerful and inconspicuous attack,
IS-WARS, to compromise the Wi-Fi-based activity recognition system without impacting normal
Wi-Fi transmissions. We take advantages of the cross-technology signals to craft a Wi-Fi adversarial
example to stealthily compromise the CSI, which is expected to misclassify the corresponding activities. Compared with the traditional jamming attack, this new attack is more serious in terms of
its stealthiness and potential consequences. Taking health monitoring as an example, an abnormal
behavior (e.g., falling) can be misclassified as common activities for elderlies living alone, resulting
in the missing of emergency calls and first aids. To successfully craft the adversarial signals, there
are several critical challenges to be considered,
 Added noises should be imperceptible. The Wi-Fi MAC layer protocols will immediately detect

the increasing level of noises and drop the crafted adversarial signals.
 Added noises should bypass the de-noising scheme. To cause the misclassification of received

adversarial example, the level of noises cannot be too small to be removed by de-noising
schemes adopted in the recognition system.
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The above contradicting requirements cannot be easily fulfilled by simply adding noises
for generating the adversarial example. To address these challenges, we apply the cross-technology
interference (CTI) on overlapped frequency bands for crafting. The attacker sends controllable noises
to intentionally cause the CTI, which will finally contaminate the received CSI sequences. In practice,
many overlapping protocols, such as ZigBee and Bluetooth, can cause severe CTI to Wi-Fi traffic
over ISM 2.4GHz bands [56, 60, 83]. While most of the previous studies try to avoid CTI to enhance
communication performances [42, 59, 61] and some works show that the CSI amplitudes influenced
by CTI can be leveraged for cross-technology communication [52, 169], they use machine learning
models to handle the features of CTI-interfered CSI as a black box so the detailed and quantified
effect of how CTI will impact the CSI remains underexplored. Therefore, for this work, we will
first discuss the principles of state-of-the-art human activity recognition systems, then provide a
thorough study on how CTI can modify the CSI sequence, and finally, demonstrate the attacking
process of stealthy attacks using the CTI. Our main contributions are listed as follows,
 This work provides a comprehensive study on quantifying the impact of CTI on normal Wi-Fi

transmissions.
 This work identifies a new intelligent and stealthy adversarial attack on many Wi-Fi-based hu-

man activity monitoring systems using received CSI sequences and demonstrates the difficulty
in mitigating the CTI-based attack.
 Extensive real-world experiments demonstrate the existence and feasibility of the attack.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 gives preliminaries about WiFi-based activity recognition. Section 3 provides an overview of our attack IS-WARS, followed
by a feasibility analysis in Section 4. Section 5 shows the detailed design of IS-WARS. Section 6
thoroughly evaluates attack performance. Section 7 discusses related works and Section 8 concludes
the chapter.

5.2
5.2.1

Related Work
Applications of Human Activity Recognition
Two major application scenarios of wireless human activity recognition are healthcare mon-

itoring and gesture recognition. The recognition of healthcare applications involves dangerous mo81

tions and emergent vital signal monitoring. Dangerous motion recognition often utilizes the deployed
in-home wireless transceivers. One representative work is WiFall [147], which uses CSI as an indicator of falling and enables accurate alert of potential injuries. Vital signs, including heartbeat,
respiration, blood volume, etc., bring displacement of body surface to be detected by wireless signal characteristics. In [58], authors build testbeds for respiration monitoring based on commodity
devices and prove the effectiveness of wireless monitoring. Gesture recognition is a more generalpurpose application, which has been widely applied in Virtual Reality and human-computer interaction. In [139], authors achieve contactless gesture recognition via Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
RFID as a tag array, benefiting users’ daily life in time-saving. However, the consequences brought
by successfully attacking these vital applications are severe.

5.2.2

Wireless Signal Interference
Because of spectrum overlapping, wireless signals are always facing the threats of unexpected

interference from other signal sources. Existing works mostly focus on detection [28], mitigating [61],
achieving coexistence [83], or exploiting the interference. However, these works analyze from plain
metrics, such as packet loss, to estimate interference, without providing detailed analysis and cannot
reduce the loss caused by interference but bring heavier burdens of assessing and hopping. In [52],
Guo et al. use SVM to classify Wi-Fi packets that are contaminated by ZigBee packets. Wi-Fi
packets are symboled as 0 and 1 in terms of whether being contaminated or not. Then, they use
0s and 1s to represent messages that both Wi-Fi and ZigBee receivers can decode. The authors
use CTI to fulfill cross-technology communication (CTC), but the experiments cannot provide any
generalized conclusion.

5.2.3

Existing Attack against Wireless Systems

5.2.3.1

Jamming Attack and Countermeasures
Wireless jamming is a common attack to compromise the service of wireless systems. The

main objective of the jamming device is to ensure that the legitimate nodes cannot use the network by
purposefully interfering with the physical transmission and reception of wireless communications. As
summarized in [159], there are four kinds of jammers: constant jammer, deceptive hammer, random
jammer, and reactive jammer, in which the deceptive jammer is similar to our attacker. A deceptive

82

jammer emits a legitimate bit sequence which gives the network an impression of the presence
of a legitimate node. This impersonation makes deceptive jammers more effective than constant
jammers. In [130], authors deploy deceptive jammer to confuse information acquisition without
arousing the awareness of the hostile radar. Although this kind of jammer is intelligent, their packets
can be easily identified in CSI-based recognition due to environmental differences and unique location
profiles. They do not have the same objective as our attack and are not stealthy enough to achieve
a long-term negative effect.
There are some works in countering the wireless jamming attack, especially cross-technology
jamming. In [31], a ZigBee device will assume that it is suffering from a jamming attack if there
are too many failed attempts of transmission when sensing channels, and it will force transmission
in busy channels. Suppose the ZigBee packet is transmitted but corrupted due to cross-technology
interference. In that case, the authors apply a band stop filter to isolate slower rate Wi-Fi subcarriers,
reduce total interference, and then compensate the distorted ZigBee signals with the Direct Sequence
Spread Spectrum (DSSS) scheme. However, it is difficult to do these steps vice versa. The filter
cannot completely remove the impact of CTI, and Wi-Fi signals cannot be compensated by DSSS
because DSSS only available in old version 801.11b and low data rates in 801.11g. The attacker in
our attack can cover a Wi-Fi channel with as many ZigBee channels as they desire, which makes
it very challenging for the receiver to recover corrupted subcarriers using the information in clean
subcarriers,

5.2.3.2

Illegitimate RF Sensing and Existing Countermeasures
Illegitimate RF sensing is a kind of attack where attackers sensing and analyzing the Wi-

Fi signal that bounced off the human body to detect human activity for malicious purposes, e.g.,
detect if there is anyone at home to prepare for an illegal break-in. The basic principle of protecting
against illegitimate RF sensing is obfuscating the wireless signal characteristics used for human
activity recognition, such as amplitude gain, delay, Doppler shift, etc.
In [111], the adversary uses a single-antenna receiver to sniff the wireless transmission.
They place a reflector near the legal wireless receiver. The reflector can receive and transmit signals
and modify the reflected packet copies by controlling three multipath components: amplitude gain,
delay, and Doppler shift, before relaying copies to the legitimate receiver. Their scheme preserves the
normal data communication, but since any features that reveal physical information are distorted,
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the legal wireless receiver cannot recognize human activity from the received signal as well.
To enable simultaneous protection and legitimate human activity sensing, authors in [160]
define a term named “adversary region”, which is the place that adversaries can perform attack
without being visually noticed. In their scheme, the reflector is placed outside the legitimate sensing
region. The reflector is equipped with a directional antenna to scan the adversary region, broadcast
modified copies, and avoid sending the modified copies to the legitimate receiver. This scheme has
several limitations. First, knowing the location and shape of the potential adversary region are
required to make this scheme work and the reflector has to be placed in the adversary region, which
leaves the indoor area unprotected and increases the chance of being noticed by the attacker, as well
as the chance of failed protection. Second, there is a huge decrease in recognition accuracy shown in
evaluation results. The recognition accuracy of legitimate sensors drops from 0.9 to 0.78. Though
this accuracy is still much higher than the one suffered from our attack, it is definitely incredible
harm to system performance. Lastly, since the reflector is using a directional antenna to scan the
region, it is not guaranteed that the reflector can obfuscate all copies sensed by the adversary, as
claimed by the authors. Receiving partially corrupted results may block adversaries from successfully
sensing human activities, but it is possible for an attacker to separate obfuscated packets from clear
ones through analysis. Moreover, our attacker does not need the fully correct copies of humanactivity-interfered signals to perform attacks. Our purposed attack remains threatening to existing
systems.

5.3
5.3.1

Preliminaries
CSI in Wi-Fi-based Recognition
Compared to other usable channel properties (e.g., Received Signal Strength (RSS), phases)

for activity recognition, CSI, which is a widely used metric in multiple-input/multiple-output (MIMO)
radio systems [76] to estimate the channel condition of transmission links, contains more fine-grained
information than RSS and is less vulnerable to noises than phase information alone.
Suppose a MIMO communication system has NTX transmitter antennas and NRX receiver
antennas. x is the sent signal and n denotes the noise. The received signal can be modeled as:

y = Hx + n,
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where H is the CSI matrix. H(f, t), which is the CSI matrix measuring channel frequency response in different subcarriers with center frequency f at time t, can be calculated at the receiver
side by solving a set of equations using a known transmitted/received signal pair via H(f, t) =
Y (f, t)/X(f, t):
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where hmn is the complex transmission coefficient from the transmitter’s antenna m to the receiver’s
antenna n. Most of the human behavior recognition systems leverage the changes incurred in hmn
and other derived metrics, e.g., Doppler shift, to determine the corresponding activities.

5.3.2

CTI in Heterogeneous Environment
Due to the wireless coexistence in the 2.4GHz ISM band, CSI can be easily contaminated by

interferences from devices using not only traditional Wi-Fi protocols (e.g., 802.11 b/g/n/ac) but also
other wireless standards in the overlapped spectrum, such as IEEE 802.15.1 Bluetooth and IEEE
802.15.4, i.e., ZigBee, WirelessHART, and ISA100. The latter, known as Cross-Technology Interference, could bring a detrimental impact to the reliability of Wi-Fi communication, e.g., significant
packet loss in a highly crowded heterogeneous environment. Existing works have demonstrated that
the preambles of Wi-Fi packets can be impacted and the CSI amplitudes will be greatly altered by
on-going ZigBee packets during Wi-Fi transmission when Wi-Fi traffic is not backoff [52].

5.3.3

Signal De-noising and Threats
Despite that CTI’s interference to CSI has been proved, we have to take the broad spectrum

of de-noising approaches into consideration, such as smooth filter [125], low-pass filter [121], principal
component analysis (PCA) [29], linear interpolation fitting [57], Kalman filter [151], and wavelet
transform [35]. Most of them have been employed in the Wi-Fi-based recognition system to discard
unavoidable noises and further capture more accurate human activities. Unfortunately, these de-
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noising schemes can only help remove the out-band noise. The noise caused by CTI cannot be easily
detected and eliminated, which will inevitably contaminate CSI [28]. If no adequate de-noising
approaches specifically for CTI noise, it is highly possible that sending malicious cross-technology
wireless signals can impact the CSI and further compromise Wi-Fi-based recognition systems.
Recently, there are some noise detecting methods specifically designed for CTI. For example, authors in [169] proposed cyclostationarity analysis that uses the distinct repeating patterns
shown by different signals to differentiate between Wi-Fi signals and CTI. They compute the Spectral Correlation Function (SCF) in the frequency domain on each subcarriers. For the subcarriers
whose amplitude and phase information are distorted by CTI, some peaks are sufficiently visible on
corresponding SCF, while SCF without interference does not exhibit any peak. However, it can only
detect the CTI that distributing on a small range of frequencies and tries to recover the interfered
subcarriers. It is efficient for detecting unintended CTI but not that useful if the CTI is carefully
distributed over a bunch of subcarriers.

5.4

System Overview and Assumptions

5.4.1

Problem Definition
We consider a device-free indoor Wi-Fi-based human activity recognition system as de-

scribed in Fig. 5.1. When there is a human subject moving around, the Wi-Fi signals sent from
Wi-Fi senders are interfered with human body’s reflection, so the signals received contain specific
and unique changes incurred by different types of human activity. The goal of the recognition system is to find features in each set of numerical changes and map them to the designated activities.
The idea of our attack is to deploy a cross-technology signal source, e.g., a ZigBee device, to intentionally send a malicious signal, expecting to create an adversarial example to change CSI at the
receiver side and finally cause incorrectly identification of the recognized activity. For example, the
uncompromised Wi-Fi receiver 1 can correctly recognize the user’s behavior as “sweeping the floor”,
while the Wi-Fi device 2 suffering the CTI from a nearby ZigBee attacker fails to output the correct
behavior.
To design this new attack, named as Intelligent and Stealthy adversarial attack to Wi-Fibased Human Activity Recognition System (IS-WARS), we mainly consider two different mechanisms in current literature, 1) Classification-based Approach. A large quantity of data with
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WiFi Receiver 2

Incorrect Recognition

“Running”
Attacker
Figure 5.1: IS-WARS Attack Overview
known activity labels is collected. Their patterns are learned via clustering, machine learning methods, etc. and further used for classifying unknown ones [50, 71, 105, 145, 161]; 2) Model-based
Recognition. They theoretically model the relationship between channel properties and human
activities, such as Fresnel zone model and velocity model. Common quantities include Angle of
Arrival (AoA), Time of Flight (ToF), speed, distance, Doppler shift, and phase [110, 141, 153, 171].

5.4.2

IS-WARS Attacker Model
A complete IS-WARS attack process includes three steps, 1) sense and observe wireless

environment (e.g., sniff Wi-Fi packet), 2) generate interference, and 3) bypass de-noising and cause
classifications. Based on the challenges discussed in Section 1, an IS-WARS attacker needs to achieve
the following three objectives:
Objective 1. Before launching an attack, an attacker can obtain preliminary knowledge about the
system through sensing and observing. Here, we demonstrate two levels of abilities an attack has.
 Basic:

Obtain superficial knowledge about the recognition system, such as the frequency

band that Wi-Fi senders/receivers are working on, the average statistics of CSI sequences, by
sensing and observing the wireless environment. The attacker must know the information of the
channel that the Wi-Fi packets are transmitted on. The attacker can sniff CSI multiple times
to measure the impact of interference due to the low cost of sensing the system’s small-scale,
indoor environment.
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 Advanced: To launch a strong attacker, the attacker may be able to acquire some more ad-

vanced information about the system. For example, the attacker may know the deployed
locations of Wi-Fi senders/receivers in some cases, such as when the system is deployed in a
public indoor area. If the attacker spends enough time sniffing, they can even know how CSI
sequences impacted by human activities may look like. The attacker is not necessarily to be
very close to the scene when sniffing. The CSI characteristics, including the distinct variances
caused by human movements, are detectable even if there is a wall between the sniffer and the
receiver [172]. The technical details that cannot be sensed or observed easily, e.g., how the
system processes the signals, may not be known to the attacker.
Objective 2. The IS-WARS attack has to “intelligently” adapt to different wireless environments
and device settings based on the acquired knowledge about the recognition system. Meanwhile,
the attack should be “stealthy” enough to prevent the Wi-Fi receiver from knowing that the malicious interference has been embedded in the received signal. The generated interference should be
high enough to incur CSI changes but relatively low to not impact normal Wi-Fi transmission and
decoding.
Objective 3. The generated malicious CTI noises should survive after the de-noising schemes
deployed both by the Wi-Fi receiver and by the recognition system.

5.5
5.5.1

Feasibility study
Theoretical Analysis of CTI Impact on CSI
The Wi-Fi receiver can overhear ZigBee transmission on designated subcarriers overlapped

with ZigBee communication channels. However, most commodity Wi-Fi devices are not capable of
understanding cross-technology messages and only hear ZigBee signal as an added power on the
original Wi-Fi signal, which is reflected on CSI as a part of channel status.

5.5.1.1

Effects to Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio
Assuming the WiFi receiver Wi has one single antenna and is in the transmission range of

the ZigBee transmitter Zj , Zj is working on the spectrum overlapped with Wi , the received signal
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y k at the k-th timestamp can be reformulated as:

y k = (hk +

X

Z

hk j )xk + nk ,

j

Z

where hk is the CSI without CTI, hk j is the CTI perturbation caused by Zj , xk is the transmitted
signal, and nk is the noise.
The Wi-Fi packets will not back-off if the Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR)
detected in Wi-Fi transmission is qualified, while the CTI is still affecting the estimated CSI. Therefore, the ground truth SINR ηk and the SINR from system’s view ηk′ can be derived as follows:
P
Z
|hk |2 pk + j |hk j |2 pk
|hk |2 pk
′
ηk =
,
,
η
=
P
k
Z
pnk
pnk + j |hk j |2 pk

(5.2)

where pk the signal power at k-th timestamp and pnk is the noise power complying to a normal
distribution.

5.5.1.2

Factors in CTI-enabled CSI perturbation
We try to find out why CSI can be perturbed by the presence of ZigBee signals from the

r
aspect of signal propagation, which is often described by the path loss. Suppose that Pi,j
is the
Z

power of signal emitted from Zj and received at Wi , denoted as |hk j |2 pk in Equation (5.2). The
r
relationship between Pi,j
and the power of the transmitted signal by Zj , i.e., Pjt , is as follows if free

space path loss is considered:
Pjt
PL (di,j ) = 10 log r = PL (di ) + 10ν log
Pi,j



di,j
di


+ ϕj

(5.3)

where PL (·) is the path loss, di is the close-in reference distance, di,j is the distance between Wi
and Zj , ν is the path loss exponent, and ϕj is the shadow fading factor with a normal distribution
N (0, σϕ2 ).
From Equation (5.3), it is clear that PL (di,j ) is determined by di,j and PL (di,j ) − PL (di )
follows a normal distribution:

PL (di,j ) − PL (di ) ∼ N (10ν log(
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di,j
), σϕ2 ).
di

Z

r
The transmit power Pjt is another dominant factor for Pi,j
, and thus, also for the CSI |hk j |2 .

5.5.1.3

Why using CTI
In our work, we will focus on ZigBee-Wi-Fi interference. The advantages of using ZigBee-

Wi-Fi CTI come in four folds.
First, compared to other noise addition schemes, CTI is more controllable and fine-tuned
by adjusting the above deterministic factors, e.g., Pjt and di,j .
Second, it is possible to achieve “stealthiness” described in Objective 2 if CTI-impacted
SINR successfully deceives the Wi-Fi receiver. Devices that can generate CTI, e.g. ZigBee pads, can
be small enough to be unnoticeable. They are handier and cheaper than Software-defined Radios
like USRP, which allows a wider application of IS-WARS attacks.
Third, ZigBee transmission power can be as low as 1mw (two orders of magnitude lower
than Wi-Fi’s), making the CTI-based attack less detectable and the possibility of triggering collision
avoidance during interference lower, while its transmission range (10 - 100 meters) is sufficient for
attacking a small-scale Wi-Fi-based system.
Last but not least, deploying ZigBee protocol in our attack is free from modification on
protocol design. It does not offer complex interference avoidance features like the adaptive frequency
hopping technique used in Bluetooth. Moreover, the data rate of ZigBee is comparatively slower
than other wireless protocols in the 2.4GHz spectrum. Without manually putting constraints on
data rate, the travel time of a ZigBee packet is long enough to cover the entire transmitting Wi-Fi
packets, which makes it more difficult for legitimate receivers to discover and mitigate interference.
Hence, attacking with ZigBee signals is more reliable than other coexisting protocols.

5.5.2

Empirical Study on CTI-impacted CSI
We conduct an empirical study to evaluate CSI statistics and show that CTI is capable of

interfering with CSI in practice.
5.5.2.1

Experiment Setting
We set a pair of Wi-Fi transceivers (1m to each other) and a ZigBee source locating in

the middle to generate interference at different transmission powers. For each interference level, we
collect 10 CSI sequences from received Wi-Fi traffic with a time duration of 20 seconds.
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Figure 5.2: Ratio of Interfered Signals vs. Clean Signals
5.5.2.2

Performance Evaluation
The means and variances of amplitudes and phases, which are represented as the ratios of

the differences between contaminated CSI sequences’ statistics and clean samples’ statistics to clean
samples’ statistics, are shown in Fig. 5.2. In Fig. 5.2a, when the interference level is -15 dBm, though
sometimes the ratio is below 0 due to random fluctuations, the average ratio is approximately 0.1,
which means that the average amplitude of interfered signals is around 1.1 times the amplitude of
clean signals. We can tell that the averages of amplitudes in Fig. 5.2a are larger than those of clean
samples, and are increasing with the interference level (from -18dBm to -9dBm). If the interference
level exceeds a threshold (-9 dBm in our cases), the interference reflected by amplitudes becomes
smaller because the Wi-Fi transmitter backoffs in response to the existence of noises or the Wi-Fi
receiver discards highly-contaminated, corrupted packets. The large variances of interfered amplitudes may lead to inaccurate recognition. From Fig. 5.2c, the differences between average phases
between interfered signals and clean signals are much smaller than those of amplitudes. However,
the ranges of phases are significantly expanded with an increased number of outliers and large vari91

Table 5.1: A Summary of Recognition Systems and Their Vulnerabilities

Mathematical Profiles

Existing Works
Wang et al. [144]
Widar 3.0 [171]

Used Quantities or Models
Location velocity profile
Body-coordinate velocity
profile
Multi-dimensional
signal
parameters

Widar 2.0 [110]

Fresnel Zone Model

Black-box Classification

Zhang et al. [164]
Wang et al. [141]
Wu et al. [153]
Jiang et al. [71]
Gu et al. [50]
Wang et al. [145]
Ordóñez et al. [105]

Vulnerabilities
CSI amplitude and phase
CSI phase and Doppler
Frequency Shift
AoA, ToF, Doppler shifts

Phase shifts in Fresnel zones CSI amplitude and phase
CNN
Classification tree
Kernel SVM
DeepConvLSTM

Everything in CSI
RSS fingerprint
Everything in CSI
Everything in CSI

ances. Therefore, we can confidently deduce that the robustness of CSI-based recognition systems
will be jeopardized by the interference and the abnormality of attacks may be more unnoticeable
from phase statistic monitoring.

5.5.3

Existing Recognition Systems and Their Vulnerabilities
Existing approaches are either domain-related or domain-free, where domain is a pair of

activity and the corresponding environment factors, such as location and orientation. We summarize
them into three categories: mathematically derived profiles, Fresnel zone model, and black-box
classification as in Table 5.1 and explore their vulnerabilities as below.

5.5.3.1

Mathematical Profiles
In [144], Wang et al. model the domain-related velocity profile from multi-path length

changes and rewrite H(f, t) as a summation of responses on multiple travel paths. They divide the
power of CSI |H(f, t)|2 into dynamic portion |Hd (f )|2 and static portion |Hs (f )|2 . |H(f, t)|2 holds
the speed vk of human subject moving on k-th path as follows:

|Hs (f )ak (f, t)| cos


2πvk t 2πdk (0)
+
+ ϕsk ,
λ
λ

where ak (f, t) is the attenuation, λ is the wavelength, dk (0) is the initial path length on k-th path,
and ϕsk is an initial phase offset.
Z

CTI creates perturbations ak j (f, t) on ak (f, t). So, compared to the ground truth vk , the
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CTI-interfered velocity profile vk′ derived has an error of:
(
arccos


)
ak (f, t)
2πdk (0)
2πvk t
cos
+
+ ϕsk
P Z
λ
λ
ak (f, t) + j ak j (f, t)

Widar 3.0 [171] works on another velocity profile, body-coordinate velocity profile (BVP). It
is a domain-free quantity that describes the velocities at different body parts involved in the gesture
movements. It first estimates a human subject’s location and orientation via ToF, AoA, and Doppler
Frequency Shift (DFS) D in the dynamic portion of CSI, and then derives BVP from DFS without
domain impacts. The CSI representation of BVP is similar to that of velocity profile. Therefore,
though the static portion is fully ignored, dynamic DFS D can still be mistaken with perturbed CSI
and results in wrong BVP. The location and orientation inference could also be obfuscated from
AoA and ToF, which leads to wrong base points when discarding domain effects. Specifically, the
signal phase of the l-the path, i-th packet, j-th subcarrier and k-th sensor [110] is:

fτl (i, j, k) ≈ fc τl + ∆fj τl + fc ∆sk · ϕl − fDl ∆ti ,

where τl , ϕl , and fDl are the ToF, AoA, and DFS of the l-th path. For a contaminated phase with
P Z
CTI-introduced error j fl j , the error is distributed among ToF, AoA, and DFS.
5.5.3.2

Fresnel Zone Model
Fresnel zone is a series of concentric ellipsoids representing the signal strength of propagation

in free space. When a human object is moving, they cross zone boundaries and introduce phase
shifts, leading to constructive or destructive interference in the received signal. In [164], they model
the sum of dynamic part and static part in a slightly different way:

|H(f, θ)|2 = |Hs (f )|2 + |Hd (f )|2 + 2|Hs (f )||Hd (f )| cos θ,

where θ is the phase difference between the static vector and dynamic vector. In their model, they
assume that the amplitude of the dynamic vector is stable.
The contaminated phase difference between the static vector and dynamic vector become
P
c∆θ
θ′ = θ + j θZj . The path-length difference between direct path and reflected path as ∆d := 2π∆f
is derived for classification, where ∆θ is the difference between θs of two subcarriers and ∆f is the
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subcarrier spacing. The contaminated ∆′ d is ∆′ θ/∆θ times of the ground true ∆d.

5.5.3.3

Black-box Classification
A black-box approach in [71] uses Convolution Neural Networks (CNNs) to train and classify

activity data with two labels, domains and ground truth, to remove domain-specific quantities. The
quantity extracted from CSI is represented as V = Softplus(Wz Z + bz ), where Wz and bz are
parameters to be learned and the softplus function is an activation function to introduce linearity,
Z is the output of feature extractor. Another softmax layer obtains the probability vector yi
of activities of mapped feature representation H i and output the activity label with the highest
probability. Here, everything in CSI may lead to misclassification. The attacking goal turns into how
to make the unclassified data cross CNN’s decision boundaries. This is impossible to be analyzed
from formulation due to the complexity of neural networks. We will show how IS-WARS attack
performs against neural networks by experiments later.

5.5.4

De-noising Performance against CTI
A majority of de-noising schemes used in Wi-Fi-based recognition systems are originated

from eigenvalue-based methods, such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA), which works more
effectively than filters [132]. The basic idea of PCA is to perform eigen-decomposition on the
correlation matrix of CSI to calculate the eigenvectors and then eliminate out-band noises and quasistatic offsets by reconstructing the principal components from eigenvectors. The CSI is orthogonally
transformed into a new coordinate systems such that the greatest variance, i.e., noise, of the data is
projected on the first coordinate, which is called the first principal component. The interfered phase
on k-th path,


 2πd (t)
h
i
X
Zj
k
j
cos
+ ϕk +
ϕZ
,
s (t) − ϕk (t)
 λ

j
is decomposed into



2π∆k (t)
2π∆k (t)
, − sin(ϕ′k ) sin
λ
λ
i
P h Z
Z
where ϕ′k is 2πdλk (0) + ϕk + j ϕs j (t) − ϕk j (t) and ∆k (t) is the length of the path changes between
cos(ϕ′k ) cos



time 0 and t. The first PCA component is discarded for de-noising. Due to the orthogonality of
PCA components, the discarded one is either cos part or sin part. Obviously, the error introduced
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by CTI,

P h
j

i
Z
Z
ϕs j (t) − ϕk j (t) , still remains in other components. Therefore, the de-noising scheme

will not effectively work against CTI noises, for which Objective 3 will be satisfied.
As for the cyclostationary analysis [169], it locates the subset of stained subcarriers by
finding the spiked peak/valley of CSI amplitudes over all subcarriers. When the level of CTI is
carefully controlled and widely spread, the peaks are not significant for detection.

5.6

Design of IS-WARS

5.6.1

Wi-Fi Packet Sniffing
In correspondence with the aforementioned adversarial model and analysis, the attacker is

assumed to have a sniffer to sense the Wi-Fi environment and a ZigBee device to generate CTI.
The sniffer can be deployed near the scene within desired period of time before launching the attack
in order to retrieve rich background information, including average CSI amplitudes, which can be
used to pre-analyze different CSI patterns. The attacker can use this background information to
determine suboptimal settings Is 0 for their initial attack. For example, to decide an initial CTI
power level, the attacker will jointly consider a set of distance and transmit power to ensure that
the CTI power received at the Wi-Fi’s side meets the expectation of attack after suffering from
path loss (Equation (5.3)). Moreover, the attacker may choose to attack the Wi-Fi device with the
highest received packet power because it allows more intense CTI while preserving normal traffic.
Theoretically, the Objective 1 is always fulfilled regardless of other settings. Under this objective,
the attacker has freedom to change interference given the analysis in Sec. 5.5.1.

5.6.2

Malicious CTI Generation
In North America, the 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi works on 2401 MHz to 2473 MHz. Though the band-

width of ZigBee channels is only 2 MHz (1/10 of Wi-Fi channel’s bandwidth), ZigBee channels can
cover a frequency range from 2402 MHz to 2480 MHz. Thus, it is sufficient for ZigBee devices to
affect as many WiFi channels and subcarriers as wishes. To meet the Objective 2, it is of great
importance to ensure the generated CTI could be adequate enough to invoke wrong recognition but
without impacting normal Wi-Fi transmissions. For the IS-WARS attacker, changing the perturbation on CSI can be easily achieved by increasing the power of interference level, while the stealthiness

95

can only be fulfilled by jointly considering the normal symbol decoding at the receiver side. The

P Z 
CSI can be estimated from the received symbols y k = hk + j hk j xk + nk with known ground
truth symbols in Sec. 5.5.1.1, which is usually transmitted on pilot subcarriers,



ĥk = y k x∗k = hk +

X

Z
hk j  |xk |

+ nk x∗k .

(5.4)

j

Given the estimated channel status, Maximum Likelihood (ML) detector is more frequently
used way to find the optimal transmitted symbols from the received signals, where the receiver
finds the optimally transmitted signal vector x̂ via Maximum Likelihood criterion that minimizes
the Euclidean distance to the received signal vector y and perform an exhaustive search across all
valid sequences for the transmitted symbol as x̂ = arg min ||y − Ĥx||2 . It is impractical to give a
mathematical constraint on Ĥ for stealthiness or compute solutions every time, so our idea is to
lower the sensitivity of CSI estimation to noise in order to reduce the possibility of decoding failure.
The sensitivity of the solution to small changes in the input data is measured by condition
number κ(Ĥ) of Ĥ, which evaluates how much error in the output results from an error in the
input and gives a bound on how inaccurate the message decoding will be. The condition number is
defined as:
||∆x||
||∆y||
≤ κ(Ĥ)
,
||x + ∆x||
||y||
and formulated as:


κ Ĥ ′



 
σmax Ĥ ′
 ,
=
σmin Ĥ ′

(5.5)

(5.6)

where || · || is the matrix norm. If the condition number is large, a small change in the transmitted
signal will generate larger perturbations in y, which indicates low reliability and higher probability
of solution finding failure. σmax (Ĥ ′ ) and σmin (Ĥ ′ ) are maximal and minimal singular values of Ĥ ′ ,
respectively.
Therefore, from Equation (5.5), the attacker, who has the ability of Wi-Fi packet sniffing, has
to minimize the condition number κ(Ĥ). Along with decreasing κ(Ĥ) to avoid the decoding failure,
the attacker has to ensure that the perturbation triggered is large enough to cause misrecognition.
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The problem turns into as follows,
min
s.t.
′

 
κ Ĥ ′
i
h
i
h ′
′
Ω ĥi , · · · , ĥj − Ω ĥi , · · · , ĥj ≥ TΩ ,

(5.7)

′

where Ω([ĥi , · · · , ĥj ]) is the quantities derived from a set of perturbed CSI readings for recognition and TΩ is the minimum difference between noisy quantities and clean ones that can lead to
misclassification.
Finding the optimal solution for κ(Ĥ ′ ) is an NP hard problem due to the nonlinear and
non-convex nature of singular values, but it can be changed into a convex optimization problem
with existing relaxation methods. For example, authors in [80] relax the nonconvex problem of
controlling singular values in to a set of optimization problems on convex subsets. Then, we can
find the optimal solution on the convex problem K(σmax (Ĥ ′ ), σmin (Ĥ ′ )) converted from (Ĥ ′ ).

5.6.3

Iterative Optimal Solution Finding
We propose to find the optimal interference on the converted convex problem in an iterative

way by observing the resulting noisy CSI matrix Ĥ ′ from interference. At the very beginning, the
attacker holds a vector of parameters Is with attacker-chosen factors that can change the interference
posed on CSI. The possible candidates include the transmit power level of Zj , the frequency range
that Zj works on, the location of the attacker (locx , locy , locz ), and the distance di,j to the system
sensor Wi .
To improve the suboptimal initial attack settings and find the optimal solutions of Is , a
function f (Is ) is derived from Equation (5.7), which is formulated by combining the constraint and
minimization goal together:

 
 
f (Is ) = K σmax Ĥ ′ , σmin Ĥ ′ Ĥ ′ (Is ) + δ (Is ) ,

(5.8)

where Ĥ ′ (Is ) is CSI matrix interfered by Is and δ(Is ) is:
′

max log

′

Ω([ĥ(Is )i , · · · , ĥ(Is )j ])
Ω([ĥ(Is )i , · · · , ĥ(Is )j ]

97

!

!

) , − log(TΩ )

(5.9)

Then, we apply a method similar to Zeroth Order Stochastic Descent [30]. If the optimal is not
reached, an interference setting Isk is randomly picked in Is to be updated by subtracting a small
amount computed from the approximate gradient gi and Hessian estimate Si :
f (Is + ϵei ) − f (Is − ϵei )
,
2ϵ

(5.10)

f (Is + ϵei ) − 2f (Is ) + f (Is − ϵei )
,
ϵ2

(5.11)

gi :≈

Si :≈

where ϵ is a small constant and ei is a standard basis vector with only the i-th component as 1. Isk
is modified based on the values of gi and Si .
Optimal Isk is located when the newly updated Isk is similar to the old one, which is equivalent to that the approximated gradient is almost zero as summarized in Algorithm 3. Therefore,
the resulting Isk and Is find a balance between stealthiness and effectiveness. After deciding the
optimal Is , the attacker finds the optimal location (distance), transmit power, etc., and may leave
the device at the spot for a continuous attack. The computation complexity of this optimization
depends linearly on the dimensionality [14].
Algorithm 3 Basic IS-WARS Attack
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:

Sense Wi-Fi environment
Initialize a suboptimal attacking profile Is 0
while The incurred interference does not meet the attacker’s expectation do
i
Obtain the CSI sequences Ĥ ′ (Is ) under current attacking profile Is i
Compute f (Is )
Pick an interference setting Isj i in Is i
Choose a small constant ϵ and a standard basis vector ei with only the j-th component as 1
Slightly modify Isj i by computing gradient gi and Hessian estimate Si
Choose a scaling factor η
if Si ≤ 0 then
Isj i+1 = Isj i − ηgi
elseIsj i+1 = Isj i − ηgi /Si
end if
Monitor the newly incurred interference on CSI
end while
return Optimal Is
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5.6.4

Advanced Scheme
The stealthiness property in the basic scheme is not as desired in the sense that the attacking

device will stay at its optimal location. Moreover, based on the analysis in Section 5.5, existing
recognition systems rely more on dynamic portions and frequency domain properties of CSI. A
stable attacker affects more from the aspect of CSI amplitudes but produces less perturbation in the
frequency domain. To generate a more untraceable and powerful interference, we add a dynamic
property to the IS-WARS attack, e.g, the attacking device is moving at a certain speed. If the
interference source is moving, its signal arouses Doppler shift from the view of Wi-Fi receiver Wi as:

∆Zj f =

∆v
f0 ,
c

(5.12)

where ∆v is the relative velocity to Wi .
Not only will it directly affect the Doppler-shift-related profiles for recognition (e.g., the
DFS profile, D, used in BVP), ∆f also creates a Carrier Frequency Offset (CFO) in signals, which
deviates the CSI phase ϕ(t) by 2π∆f t with time t and further affects the CSI power/amplitudes and
thus, resulting in a new Ĥ ′ . Based on the fact that ∆f is positive when the source and the receiver
are moving towards each other, the attacker is able to control the constructive or destructive effect
of dynamic adversarial property on CSI sequences. By including the relative velocity ∆v in Is , the
strategy is optimized in the same fashion as Algorithm 3.

5.7

Performance Evaluation
In this section, we analyze the attacking performance on profiles and then implement our

attack on a real system.

5.7.1

Evaluation Settings

5.7.1.1

Attacker Setting
To verify that our attack is feasible in the most constrained situation, we only consider an

attacker that can achieve Objective 1, Basic in Section 5.4.2 instead of Objective 1, Advanced.
Thus, the sensing and observation ability of the attacker is limited to sensing the frequency band
that Wi-Fi senders/receivers are working on and extracting the CSI from sensed packets. Their
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attacking profiles only consists of the transmit power level, the location of the attacker, and their
moving speed.

5.7.1.2

Environmental Setting
The experiment is done in a 3m × 5m room as shown in Fig. 5.3a. The distance between

the Wi-Fi sender and the Wi-Fi receiver is 1.5 meters. We choose Nexus 5 smartphones as the WiFi
devices, which are installed with Nexmon [120], a C-based firmware patching framework enabling
raw Wi-Fi signal transmission and CSI extraction. The Wi-Fi transmission happens in 2.4GHz and
on single antenna. The interference sources are ZigBee devices setting on different frequency bands,
TI SimpleLink Multi-Standard CC26x2R Wireless MCU LaunchPads. The devices used are shown
in Fig. 5.3b, where the human subject is waving.

Non Line-of-Sight
Line-of-Sight
“Waving”

WiFi Receiver
WiFi Receiver

WiFi Sender

ZigBee Attacker

WiFi Sender

(b) Environment Setup

(a) Floorplan

Figure 5.3: Experimental Settings

5.7.1.3

Experimental Settings
Wi-Fi devices are set to work on Wi-Fi Channel 1 (2401 MHz-2423 MHz with center fre-

quency 2412 MHz) and the ZigBee interference sources can work on a combination of ZigBee Channel
11 (center frequency 2405 MHz), Channel 12 (center frequency 2410 MHz), Channel 13 (center frequency 2415 MHz), or Channle 14 (center frequency 2420 MHz) to cover as many as Wi-Fi subcarriers
as they want. Two activities categories are designed for experiments. The first one is gentle movements, including resting in bed, waving, clap, and push and pull, during which the human subject
stays at the same location. The second category is vigorous activities involving location changes,
including walking, sitting down, entering and leaving the room. In total, twenty volunteers were
recruited for data collection.
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For the basic attack scenario, the attacker’s location is fixed. In the advanced scheme,
the attacker walks with relative speed to the Wi-Fi receiver. Under each set of settings, 2-3 CSI
sequences with a monitoring time of 20 seconds are recorded.
Table 5.2: Network Performance Under Different levels of CTI
# of Received Packets
Successful Transmission Ratio
Throughput (kbps)

5.7.2

0 dBm
682
85.25%
38.74

-3 dBm
684
85.5%
40.57

-6 dBm
686
85.75%
39.54

-9 dBm
663
82.88%
37.81

-12 dBm
632
79%
36.04

-15 dBm
652
81.5%
37.26

-18 dBm
706
88.25%
40.26

clean
701
87.63%
40.65

Throughput Analysis
We first monitor the wireless environment when a ZigBee device, 1.5 meters away from the

Wi-Fi receiver, is emitting interference signals. The Wi-Fi sender sends 8 × 800 packets under 8
different levels of CTI. This process is repeated for 10 times. We have verified that all captured
packets can be correctly decoded. The numbers of packets received by Wi-Fi receiver are recorded
and the packet success transmission rates, as well as network throughputs, are evaluated as shown in
Table 5.2. We can tell that CTI will not greatly affect throughput and thus, it is hard to distinguish
an attacker from the network performance perspective, which verifies the objective of achieving
stealthiness. When the CTI level is -18 dBm, the ZigBee interference sensed by the Wi-Fi receiver is
so low that it does not affect the network performance at all. However, slight drops in performance
are observed when CTI level is -9 dBm, -12 dBm, and -15 dBm, which is in correspondence with
the change of CSI amplitudes in Table 5.2a.

5.7.3

Attacking Mathematical Profiles
Next, we break down the interfered CSI sequences and analyze how the derived profiles

affected by interference. The attack effectiveness is directly reflected by profiles because the basic
principle of real systems is matching profiles with the closest known label. If the statistics of an
interfered sample becomes closer to a wrong class than the correct one, it definitely leads to incorrect
classification. The reason for comparing the distance changes between labeled and unlabeled profiles instead of comparing against a certain threshold is that reliable recognition systems rarely set
thresholds manually and instead, their thresholds/decision boundaries are learned from data. We
will not talk about Fresnel zone model because it is directly related to CSI amplitudes and phases,
which have been proven to be influenceable by CTI.
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Figure 5.4: DWT Coefficient Distances
5.7.3.1

Location Velocity Profile
After PCA de-noising, authors in [144] apply Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) to decom-

pose the first five PCA components into 12 levels and average the results to capture the movement
information presented in different PCA components. The recognition is done by calculating the
likelihood of each activity’s hidden Markov model. Therefore, we extract DWT-decomposed coefficients of interfered samples and compare them with coefficients of clean samples. We set the
decomposition level to 6 because our data experience boundary effects if the level is 12. The average
distances of coefficients between two classes of activities are shown in Fig. 5.4, where M1 and M2
are two different gentle motion types, while M3 and M4 are vigorous.
In Fig. 5.4, we measure four types of distances: between coefficients of clean samples from
M1 and clean samples from M2, between coefficients of clean samples in M1, between coefficients
of noisy samples in M1 and clean samples in M2, and between coefficients of noisy samples in M1
and clean samples in M2. Intuitively, the distances between clean samples from two different motion
classes are larger than those from the same class. After experiencing the attack, however, not only
the distances between noisy samples to samples in its actual class become larger, but also we witness
an increase in the distances between noisy samples and samples from a wrong class. Moreover, for
5 out of 6 coefficients, the gap between the distances of noisy samples to M1 and M2 is smaller.
All aforementioned results indicate that our attack successfully blurs the boundary between M1 and
M2 for interfered CSI, so the system will more likely guess a random class to fit noisy CSI in. For
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vigorous activities, the differences between classes are larger, but the coefficient changes still suffer
from the attack.

(a) Motion 1

(b) Interfered Motion 1

(c) Motion 2

(d) Interfered Motion 2

Figure 5.5: Doppler Spectrum of Detected Motions

5.7.3.2

BVP
BVP in [171] is estimated as an l0 -optimization problem from the Doppler spectrum, which

is derived from CSI amplitudes and phases after basic PCA de-noising. We use the authors’ opensource codes to compute Doppler spectrum and visualize some examples in Fig. 5.5, where Motion
1 is push/pull and Motion 2 is clap.
In Fig. 5.5, more peaks show up in interfered Doppler spectrum of Motion 1 while a featured
peak in the clean spectrum of Motion 2 is replaced by a bunch of small peaks. Moreover, the spectrum
apart from the peaks in Fig. 5.5d is changed by the interference and becomes similar to that in
Fig. 5.5b. Visually, the interfered Motion 2’s Doppler spectrum is closer to the spectrum of the other
class. To verify this observation, we calculated the correlation coefficients between spectrum
matrices. The correlation between clean Motion 1 and clean Motion 2 is 0.1616, demonstrating
their distinctiveness, but there is a sharp increase in the correlation between interfered Motion 2
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and clean Motion 1, which is 0.6509, while the correlation between interfered Motion 2 and clean
Motion 2 is only 0.3651. Thus, it is highly possible for the system to classify the interfered Motion 2
CSI as Motion 1. Though the correlation between interfered Motion 1 and clean Motion 1 is slightly
higher than the correlation between interfered Motion 1 and clean Motion 2 (0.4994 compared to
0.4341), the advantage of correct classification over misclassification is so subtle that the expected
classification accuracy will certainly be downgraded by IS-WARS attack. This result also applies to
the average spectrum matrices of all other activities.

5.7.4

Improvement with Advanced Attacking Scheme
In an advanced attack, the attacker is moving at a speed of 0.02 m/s. We introduce an

additional setting, whether the transmission path of the interference signal to the Wi-Fi receiver is
Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS), into the performance analysis, where NLOS is modeled by placing the
source behind the door. The performance under NLOS is measured in advanced attacks because it
is possible for the interference source to be occasionally blocked by obstacles during moving, but the
effects of NLOS are also valid on basic attacks.
No ATK

Basic

15

No ATK

Basic
Advanced
NLOS

Advanced

0.65

10

Distance

0.6

0.55
5

0.5
0
1

2

3

4

5

6

Advanced

DWT Coefficients
(a) Location velocity profiles

Advanced NLOS
(b) BVP

Figure 5.6: Invoked changes in profiles

The performance of advanced attack on mathematical profiles is illustrated in Fig. 5.6. The
y-axis in Fig. 5.6a are distances between a class A to be attacked and another class B that the
interfered samples for A are much easier to be misclassified into. Distances are averaged over all
possible classes A. From Fig. 5.6a, the advanced attacker is more powerful than the basic one as
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4 out of 6 interfered coefficients move closer to class B. The advanced attack under NLOS setting
is worse than the LOS one, but still outperforms the basic one. Fig. 5.6b shows the correlation
coefficients between clean class A samples (no attack exists) and class B samples, class A samples
under basic attack and class B samples, class A samples under advanced attack and class B samples,
and class A samples under advanced NLOS attack and class B samples. The results are aligned
with what in Fig. 5.6a, i.e., the interfered A samples under advanced attack, whose coefficient is
approximately 0.7, is the closest one to the B samples. The NLOS setting brings negative effects
to attack performance, but the basic one is still the worst. The effectiveness of advanced attack is
proved.

5.7.5

Attacking a Real System

5.7.5.1

System settings
As mentioned in Section 5.5, we implement our attack on a real learning-based recognition

system built on Convolutional, long short-term memory, fully connected Deep Neural Networks
(CLDNN) [117], which is a combination of Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) layers, Long ShortTerm Memory (LSTM) layers, and Deep Neural Networks layers. We recruit 10 volunteers to perform
each motion for 5 times with a time duration of 100 seconds to collect enough CSI data. In all,
25,000 seconds of samples are stored for 5 activity labels. 80% of these CSI sequences are clean ones
labeled with activities for training, 10% of them are unlabeled, clean samples for testing, and the
remaining are unlabeled, IS-WARS-attacked samples for testing.

5.7.5.2

Attack Performance
The accuracy of training and testing are illustrated in Fig. 5.7. From the converged training

accuracy (close to 100%) and original testing accuracy (approximately 93%), we can tell that this
model is well-trained. However, the accuracy after attack dropped to around 53%, which is close to
random guess. This huge drop proves the effectiveness of IS-WARS on learning-based systems.
Next, we analyze the accuracy w.r.t. activity categories, which is shown in the confusion
matrices for gentle and vigorous activities, respectively, in Fig. 5.8. For the movements in the
gentle activity category, samples with ground truth “rest” are likely to be misclassified into other
categories with a probability of 61.25%, while samples with other three ground truth labels have a
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Figure 5.7: Effect on CLDNN-based system’s accuracy
misclassification rate less than 50%. Thus, “rest” tends to be more vulnerable to the attack compared
to the other three activities because “rest” creates less distinct turbulences on CSI sequences while ISWARS attack adds perturbation to make CSI sequences to be more like CSI from activities involving
hand movements. It also explains why it is less possible for CSI sequences to be misclassified as
“rest”. Vigorous activities are slightly more difficult to be attacked because they contain more
dynamic features. Nevertheless, there is still a chance to fool the recognition because the spatial
information, which is used to distinguish walking, entering the room, and leaving the room, can be
blurred under CTI.
5.7.5.3

Compare with Random Interference
To further validate the practicability and effectiveness of both the activity recognition sys-

tem and our attack, we bring up several additional experimental scenarios featured with random
noises. The new designs are as below. All devices are working on frequencies that overlap with the
frequencies used by recognition systems.
1. Random background noises from other types of source: Some Wi-Fi devices are
downloading data on the 2.4 GHz spectrum at a place at the scene.
2. Random background noises from the same type of source: Some benign ZigBee devices
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Figure 5.8: Confusion Matrix
are producing ZigBee traffics.
In the previous experimental scenario, experiments are done in an apartment building with
ongoing 2.4GHz Wi-Fi traffics on all channels in the background. We have also collected each activity
multiple times to include the randomness of human activities. From the performance mentioned
above, we can tell that our attack is way more harmful than random Wi-Fi interference. Therefore,
we focus on the second scenario.
In the previous experimental environment, the attacking device was initially placed at a
random place. Here, we replace the attacking device with a benign ZigBee device. The benign
ZigBee is transmitting on ZigBee Channel 13 with a transmission level chosen from -21 dBm to
10 dBm. This channel overlaps with Wi-Fi Channel 1 but will not affect the attacker working on
ZigBee Channel 11. Unlike the attacker, the benign ZigBee will always stay at its initial place and
not change its initial transmission level. The impacts of the benign ZigBee device with different
power levels are averaged. Table 5.3 shows the average effects of random ZigBee interference and
attacker. Since the benign ZigBee device is placed at a fixed position near the Wi-Fi transceiver,
more Wi-Fi packets are held back from the transmission or received as corrupted, which results in
a huge drop in the average ratio of successfully received packets. On the contrary, the packets that
survived interference are mostly those experiencing a low level of ZigBee CTI and less perturbed.
Thus, they produce more accurate recognition compared to packets interfered with by our attack.
Then, we add the attacking device back to the scene and let the attack and the transmission of benign
ZigBee packets happen simultaneously. The success transmission ratio does not change much. The
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impact on recognition accuracy is almost the same as when there is only one attacker at the spot
and is much lower than there is only one benign ZigBee device. Despite how much noise is in the
background, the attacker’s goal is still to try to minimize the extra packet loss caused by malicious
interference and maximize the drop in accuracy of recognizing activities using successfully received
packets.
Table 5.3: Performance Under Random ZigBee Interference

Clean
One Benign
One Attacker
Benign & Attacker

5.7.6

Success Transmission
87.63%
49.11%
84.10%
47.42%

Accuracy
93%
76%
53%
59%

De-Noising Performance Vs. Interference
We evaluate whether interference from other wireless sources will be discarded. Along with

the aforementioned discussion, the de-noising scheme considered here is based on PCA.
Since human cannot precisely control their activities and it is hard to synchronize the
timestamps of different CSI samples, we leverage another technique, Dynamic Time Warping (DTW)
[16], to measure how far the unlabeled signals are from their ground truth. The Euclidean distances
between interfered signals and the ground truth clean signals are divided by the average amplitudes
of ground truth clean sequences, denoted as “distance ratio”. We compute the average distance
ratios before and after de-noising applied to both interfered ones and clean ones. Surprisingly, the
average distance ratio after de-noising is almost 10 times more than the ratio before. The resulting
sequence is drifting farther away than the ground truth, so the de-noising approach cannot discard
interference without harming the recognition accuracy.

5.8

Potential Defenses
Generally, a wireless human activity recognition system has at least three components:

signal preprocessing, feature extraction, and activity recognition. This section briefly provides some
insights into how to defend against our proposed attack in these three steps.
Defense during Signal Preprocessing. In our attack, the attacker can cover all Wi-Fi
subcarriers with CTI. If most CTI can be removed from the signal, the possibility of a successful
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attack will be significantly reduced. Thus, one possible defense is to recover the fully contaminated
signal.
Defense during Feature Extraction. The recognition results are directly influenced by
the values of features. Current features used in recognition systems, such as amplitudes and phases,
are very sensitive to noises. If less sensitive features are explored, this could undermine the impact
of CTI.
Defense during Activity Recognition. Lastly, the recognition scheme can be made
more robust. For example, if machine learning techniques are used for recognition, techniques
like deliberately training the model with CTI-interfered signals should raise the model’s robustness
against CTI.

5.9

Chapter Summary
Benefiting from ubiquitous wireless device deployments, human activity recognition systems

can achieve non-intrusiveness and high accuracy at the same time leveraging the rich channel information embedded in Wi-Fi signals. However, Wi-Fi-based recognition systems are vulnerable to
wireless attacks. In this work, we discover an intelligent but stealthy attack on human activity recognition systems by leveraging wireless signal interference. “Intelligence” is to find optimal interference
that can incur misrecognition while preserving normal packet decoding, while “stealth” means the
attack remains unnoticeable because it does not harm the function of systems. We thoroughly
analyze this new attack from both theoretical and experimental perspective, and demonstrate the
feasibility of the attack on real profiles and systems. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first
one to quantitatively analyze the influence of wireless interference and demonstrate effectiveness in
real-world experiments.
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6.1

Chapter Overview
Recent public health monitoring applications take advantage of mobile crowd sensing to

conduct large-scale sensing and monitoring. Mobile crowd sensing is an emerging sensing paradigm
that outsources the collection of data to a crowd of participating workers with mobile devices. Mobile
devices are equipped with a plethora of on-board sensors (e.g., compass, accelerometer, gyroscope,
camera, GPS) to sense various types of data. In mobile crowd sensing driven by public health monitoring, the environmental data related to human health conditions, e.g., air pollution, noise pollution,
etc., are reported together with health data. The environmental data are location-sensitive, so workers who participate in this kind of sensing task usually have to upload their location information
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sensed by GPS. For example, in a mobile crowd sensing system involving noise-monitoring, the server
collects the noise level data at preset time slots near noise sources to estimate the noise exposure,
and further provides references to noise control methodologies. McAlexander et al. in [98] set up a
process for collecting and analyzing noise data throughout New York City from the crowd. Workers
in the area near noise sources will provide their locations together with time and sensed noise levels
to the crowd sensing server. However, the disclosure of actual locations that a worker visited with
timestamps will compromise his location privacy and be used to infer his daily routines, personal
interests, etc. Another aspect of privacy breaches resides in the noise level data itself. For a single,
non-directional noise source, its noise power will diminish inversely to the square of the distance
from the source because the sound energy is spreading over the increasing area of a sphere. The
sound pressure levels of various random and uncorrelated noise sources can be added together [15].
Given this knowledge, since the server knows the exact locations of noise sources and even has the
open access to estimated noise level online (e.g., Manhanttan noise map [24]), it can estimate the
noise levels at locations with different distances to noise sources. Workers’ actual distances to the
noise centers can be reckoned, and finally, their actual locations can be inferred. Thus, noise level
data should also be protected. To address these issues, every worker should incorporate a privacypreserving mechanism to both their locations and sensing data. However, anonymizing workers’
data alone is not helpful in the sense that anonymized data still can be used to infer daily patterns
and other information [166, 167].
Differential privacy [37] is a mechanism applied in numerous systems to protect data privacy.
In our noise-monitoring crowd sensing scenario, if everyone simply deploys a differential privacy
mechanism to himself without cooperating with others, the group privacy level of their locations
at one time will be far lower than their individual privacy levels due to the composition property
of differential privacy [37]. To achieve a low composed budget, the simplest way is decreasing each
worker’s privacy budget, but it will bring large variances in workers’ perturbed data and hinder
the completion of tasks. Differential privacy can also be embedded in the sensing data for location
protection because noise level data possesses some location-related characteristics as mentioned
above. Obviously, protecting privacy is bound to degrade data accuracy and service quality in mobile
crowd sensing while consuming more computation resources and energy. Therefore, without a proper
scheme designed for protecting the group location privacy and data privacy while guaranteeing task
accuracy, workers will be reluctant to participate in location-based mobile crowd sensing tasks and
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the crowd sensing server cannot make desired profits from collected data nor provide sound data
services.
Our Contributions: Our work enables location-related differential privacy for a group
of workers. The Bayesian game [12] is deployed to model workers’ behaviors and costs, giving a
practical basis for formal decision making and algorithm development. We list our contributions as
follows:
 Our scheme fulfills indistinguishability for locations without the help of a trusted entity. More-

over, locations cannot be inferred from workers’ sensing data. Sensitive information leakage
can be effectively restricted even for a group of workers.
 The server receives data with the desired accuracy when workers’ data is protected.
 Our scheme enables workers to make proper choices for cost minimization while being aware

of malicious workers during decision making.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.3 introduces several preliminaries. Section 6.4 presents the system architecture and the adversary model. A new location
inference attack is proposed and analyzed in Section 6.5. Then, we describe the detailed game in
Section 6.6, followed by the privacy preservation scheme. The protocol is evaluated in Section 6.7.
In the following Section 6.2, we briefly review some relevant works and their deficiencies. Finally,
Section 6.8 summarizes the chapter.

6.2

Related Work
Location privacy preservation is widely considered in various applications. The approaches

can be categorized [67] as cryptographic methods, k-anonymity, and differential privacy.

6.2.1

Cryptographic Approaches
Cryptographic or private information retrieval (PIR) approaches use searchable encryption,

asymmetric cryptography, and private proximity testing [79,129] to provide location privacy for users.
However, they do not address inference disclosures, and their schemes often incur high computation
costs. Hence, they cannot be implemented directly on mobile devices due to their high memory
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and energy costs. Moreover, the curious service provider will still try to decrypt users’ location
coordinates even if they are encrypted, which will cause widespread network latency because of
resource-consuming decryption operations [95].

6.2.2

k-anonymity and its extensions
In [131], Sweeney et. el. propose the notion of k-anonymity, which provides protection in a

way that the information of each person contained in the released dataset cannot be distinguished
from at least k individuals’ information in the dataset. Nonetheless, an attacker can discover the
values of sensitive attributes when there is little diversity in them. The k-anonymity approaches
cannot protect against attackers with sufficient background knowledge. There are some extensions
of k-anonymity to handle these deficiencies like l-diversity [94], p-sensitive [127], and t-closeness [82].
However, methods in the class of k-anonymity face plenty of shortcomings, such as relying on trusted
intermediaries, offering limited privacy guarantees, and revealing approximate real-world locations
to the servers in plaintext. In [143], authors combine the concepts of differential privacy and kanonymity to propose the notions of query-indistinguishable k-anonymity and differentially private
k-anonymity (DPkA) for query privacy in location-based service. In their algorithm, the privacy
budget ϵ is minimized and the major breach of traditional k-anonymity among k queries reported
to the service provider is overcome. However, this work only protects the query privacy and its
application is limited.

6.2.3

Differential Privacy
Other than methodologies mentioned above, differential privacy [37] is a new way to bound

the probability of distinguishing between two databases, which has been applied in location-based
services to protect location privacy crowd sensing. Some works use differential privacy to protect
workers’ locations when performing tasks [73, 142], while some other works protect the aggregated
data in a crowd sensing task [72]. In particular, existing differentially private crowd sensing usually
unrealistically relies on a trusted entity. In [158], the authors propose a new definition, ’δ-location
set’ based differential privacy, to account for the temporal correlations in location data and a new
notion, sensitivity hull, to bound the error of differential privacy. This work does not need a trusted
entity, but it just protects a single trajectory. Our scheme effectively protects a group of workers’
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privacy in one region without a trusted third party.
Though privacy-preserving schemes provide privacy gains to mobile workers, they are so
costly that mobile workers may not want to pay for privacy preservation. Some works are inspired
by the concept of game theory to tackle the conflict between costs and privacy gains [72, 89, 124].
Compared to their works, our scheme does not need complete knowledge and takes more factors like
data trustfulness into consideration to achieve higher efficiency for mobile crowd sensing.

6.3
6.3.1

Preliminaries
Physics of Sound and Noise Control
As introduced in the Noise Manual [15], the decibel notation of sound pressure level (SPL)

is:

Lp = 20 log

p
p0




= 10 log

p2
p20


,

(6.1)

where p is the measured root-mean square (rms) sound pressure and p0 is the reference rms sound
pressure. The reference distance to the sound source is set to be r0 . The effectiveness of a noise
control method is usually evaluated from the arithmetic difference between the SPLs measured at
two locations as Lp1 −Lp2 , one on either side of a noise control device, or at the same fixed measuring
location before and after a noise control method has been applied.
Sound levels can be added together in decibels when there are multiple noise sources. An
example is the estimation of the total SPL due to the addition of a new machine of known sound
output to an existing noise environment of known characteristics. The addition equation of the
sound levels for N random, uncorrelated sounds is:
PN
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From Equation (6.1), we find that p2i /p20 = 10

LP = 10 log
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. Hence,

Lp
i
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!
,

(6.2)

i=1

where LP is the total SPL in decibels generated by N sources and Lpi represents the individual
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SPLs to be added.
Many noise-control problems require knowledge of the relationship between sound fields and
SPL. We only introduce the free field here for simplicity. A free field exists when sound radiates into
space from a source and there is nothing to impede the sound energy as it flows from the source.
Considering a small and nondirectional sound source that is radiating sound equally in all directions,
the SPL will be the same at any point on the surface of a sphere centered on the source. The sound
intensity diminishes inversely as the square of the distance, r, from the source since the sound energy
is spreading over the increasing area of the sphere (4πr2 ). Thus, the decrease of noise level with
respect to the distance from a nondirectional noise source is proportional to 10 log

6.3.2

1
r2

.

Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is first introduced in the database, where a database can be viewed as

a set of rows. Databases D1 and D2 differ in at most one element if one dataset is a proper subset
of the other and the larger database contains just one additional row [37].
Definition 7 (Differential Privacy). A randomized function K gives ϵ-differential privacy if for all
data sets D1 and D2 differing on at most one element, and all S ⊆ Range(K),

P r[K(D1 ) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ϵ) × P r[K(D2 ) ∈ S].

(6.3)

The probability is taken over the coin tosses of K.
Differential privacy can also be interpreted to be (α, β)-accurate as introduced in [37].
Definition 8 ((α, β)-Accuracy). For two random variables Y1 and Y2 within the range, Y1 is (α, β)accurate to Y2 if and only if Pr[|Y1 − Y2 | ≥ α] ≤ β, where β ∈ (0, 1).
Geo-indistinguishability [11] is a formal notion of privacy for location-based systems to
protect the actual location of a user (worker), while still allowing approximate information needed
for a certain desired service to be released. The indistinguishability of locations is achieved so that
an adversary cannot tell a random location from the actual location. Geo-indistinguishability is an
extension of the generalized version of differential privacy.
Definition 9 (Geo-indistinguishability). For any radius r > 0, a mechanism K satisfies ϵr-geoindistinguishability iff the worker enjoys ϵr-privacy within r.
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The ϵr-geo-indistinguishability is mathematically defined as: a mechanism satisfies ϵr-geoindistinguishability iff for all observations in a set of possible reported values S, the probability that
the worker is assumed to be located at x and x′ are bounded as:
P (S|x)
≤ eϵr , ∀ r > 0, ∀x, x′ : d(x, x′ ) ≤ r.
P (S|x′ )

(6.4)

One property of geo-indistinguishability is that the privacy level at a location is smaller
when it is farther away from the worker’s location. Within a small radius, for instance, r = 1 km,
ϵr is also small, which guarantees that the attacker cannot infer the worker’s location. When r
increases, such as r = 10 km, ϵr becomes very large, and the attacker can infer that the worker
is located within a city with high probability. Adding noise is a way to fulfill the requirements of
geo-indistinguishability, which is the same as traditional differential privacy. However, since the
location is a two-dimensional coordinate including longitude and latitude, we should add a planar
Laplace distribution in the polar coordinate system to the location. For example, given an actual
location x = (s, t), we need to pick a point (rc , θ) from the polar Laplacian. Then, the obfuscated
point will be z = (s + rc cos θ, t + rc sin θ).

6.4

System Model

6.4.1

System Overview
Our system shown in Fig. 6.1 consists of a LBS server and a set of participating workers,

denoted as W := {W1 , · · · , Ww }.
 LBS Server: The LBS server publishes a set of K sensing tasks, denoted as T = {T1 , · · · , TK },

and corresponding rewards, e.g., a fixed or flexible (determined by the workload of each worker)
amount of financial compensation, for workers to participate. It is also responsible for distributing public parameters for privacy preservation to workers and aggregating data collected by
workers. One practical scenario is a noise controlling one: the server is notified of several newly
coming noise sources and wants to check how these sources impact the neighborhood. The
workers’ locations and noise data are not required to be exactly the same as ground truth, but
should be bounded in a certain range (the locations are in the wanted neighborhood and the
noise data can reflect the impact) to retain the task utility.
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Wireless Access Point

LBS Server

Wireless Communication
Data Exchange

Worker

Worker
Noise Source

Master

Noise Source

Worker

Noise Source

Figure 6.1: System model
 Workers: A bunch of workers in one sensing region is required to report noise levels at their

locations for each task. If a worker Wi accepts the task Tj , he will provide his location and
noise level as {li,j , Xi,j } to the server (cheating, e.g., accept a task but do not report sensing
data, is not related to information privacy concerns in this work, so it is not considered).
However, directly reporting data to the server will impair workers’ privacy. So, in our scheme,
′
′
workers only report perturbed locations and falsified noise levels {li,j
, Xi.j
} via differential

privacy. In case workers have to collaborate to fulfill privacy goals, a master is selected to
collect information from all members.
 Wireless Infrastructures: Workers communicate with the server and each other via cellular

networks, such as 4G/LTE. The communication is done via network access points such as base
stations, so they do not need to be in close physical proximity for direct communication. The
server also relies on cellular networks to release tasks and collect data from the workers. The
base station is assumed to be honest for relaying messages, and it does not reveal workers’
location information from physical properties, such as signal strength, during the packet relay.
However, it is not a centralized trusted third party and does not contribute to the privacy
protection process except for packet relaying.
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Table 6.1: Notation Table
Notations
Tj
T
Wi j
li,j
Xi,j
′
′
li,j
, Xi,j
ϵl , Ri
ξ
Gpi
Gdi
Si
S−i
ρi
Ui
F
ηi
o
fh−1
ci,h−1
Dϵl (x0 )(x)
Cϵl (r)
ril .θil

6.4.2

Definitions
the j-th crowdsensing task in the task set T
the i-th worker in the group W Tj for Tj
the location of worker i when carrying out task Tj
the sensing data reported by worker i for task Tj
the perturbed versions of li,j , Xi,j
the privacy budget for location privacy protection
the accuracy requirement of the reported sensing data
the privacy gain for i-th worker if participate in game
the privacy gain for i-th worker if deceive in game
the strategy chosen by the i-th worker in the game
the strategies chosen by all workers other than i
the type assigned to the i-th worker
the utility gained in the game for i-th worker
the distribution of privacy requirements
the expected Cooperate probability of worker i
the fan-out for parent nodes at height h in the tree
the value of the i-th node at height h − 1 in the tree
the planar Laplace noise that perturb location x0 to x
the cumulative function of Dϵl (x0 )(x)
the noises added to location li,j in polar coordinates

Adversarial Model

 Server: The server is assumed to be honest but curious. It will follow rules when announcing

tasks, giving out rewards, and computing the aggregated data. However, it tries to get workers’
private information and make profits from it. The server should not learn the worker’s private
information from uploaded locations and sensing data.
 Workers: Workers are curious about other workers’ information and may misuse their location

and data information, so a worker’s actual location and sensing data should be kept confidential
from others and hard to be inferred from his/her uploaded data. There are also malicious
workers, who are going to cheat and make the privacy goal fail.

6.4.3

Notations and Definitions
For clarity, we summarize the important notations in the following Table 6.1 and list their

corresponding definitions.
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6.5

Location Inference Attack
In the example of noise monitoring crowd sensing, workers are required to report noise levels

with location information, which further compromises their location privacy. Here, we identify a
new location inference attack to illustrate this additional location privacy leakage in mobile crowd
sensing.

6.5.1

Attack Description
This attack is similar to trilateration with auxiliary knowledge. Because the noise level is

closely related to the distances between the noise sources and measuring devices, an entity that has
knowledge of the noise sources’ locations can deduce a noise map. Assume that the server broadcasts
one sensing task in one round to the target area. We conduct a simulation with 100 × 100 grids
as an example, in which exist three noise sources at the squared regions with coordinates [20, 45],
[42, 40], and [23, 37]. The SPLs of noise sources measured at the reference distances r0 within the
red regions are 100 dB, 90 dB, and 80 dB, respectively. The theoretic SPLs distributed in each grid
without considering the specific environments (e.g., building, traffic, and etc.) can be computed
from Equation (6.1) and (6.2). For a spot whose distances to the three red regions are r1 , r2 , r3 ,
the SPLs incurred by each individual noise source are Lp1 = 100 − 20 log

r0
r1

, Lp2 = 90 − 20 log

r0
r2

,

and Lp3 = 80 − 20 log rr30 . Therefore, the SPL after taking all three sources into account is LP =
P

Lp
i
3
10
10 log
. We simulate each grid’s SPL on MATLAB and list parts of them in Fig 6.2,
i=1 10
where grids containing noise sources are painted red. Suppose there is a worker resides at the yellow
grid and reports his true noise level data 69.81427 dB. With the help of differential privacy and
geo-indistinguishability, he intends to hide himself in a circled area colored in green. However, his
noise level data is closer to those in the blue grids, indicating that he is more likely to appear in the
blue region. Thus, his location information is further revealed. As a result, we need to randomize
workers’ sensing data to avoid location information leakage.

6.5.2

The Defending Capability of Differential Privacy
Suppose that the worker applies geo-indistinguishability to perturb his location l as l′ .

Then, we will analyze how the inference ability is restricted by geo-indistinguishability in traditional
inference attacks and how the ability is enhanced in our proposed attack. The attacker’s goal is to
infer the user’s actual location l. We assume that the adversary has prior knowledge of the location
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x/y
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

36
70.13624
70.32591
70.59573
71.31369
72.30724
70.94009
69.71265
68.97068
68.40084
67.90252
67.44873
67.03554
66.66777
66.35467
66.10902
65.947
65.888
65.9533
66.16166
66.51945
67.00224
67.52873
67.94487
68.06453
67.78543

37
71.10184
71.29677
71.58633
72.97867
80.45777
72.58731
70.49131
69.61052
68.96509
68.40325
67.89314
67.43102
67.02255
66.67841
66.41386
66.24956
66.21263
66.33698
66.6609
67.21764
68.01024
68.95639
69.80372
70.13517
69.69397

38
72.18349
72.35507
72.47626
72.83085
73.40365
72.1654
71.00951
70.19693
69.51131
68.89089
68.32279
67.80865
67.35605
66.977
66.68883
66.51621
66.49396
66.67018
67.10862
67.88701
69.08121
70.69925
72.44624
73.30604
72.3835

39
73.43516
73.59476
73.55685
73.36147
72.98703
72.34005
71.5578
70.78247
70.04839
69.36318
68.73236
68.16257
67.66259
67.2448
66.92741
66.73757
66.71567
66.92141
67.44215
68.40499
69.99688
72.49634
76.17852
79.09179
76.15075

40
74.92418
75.11047
74.9692
74.53857
73.89339
73.10704
72.25386
71.3983
70.57883
69.81427
69.11425
68.4856
67.93594
67.47639
67.12429
66.90675
66.86559
67.06473
67.60138
68.62594
70.38762
73.38327
79.10139
90.00688
79.08664

41
76.74026
77.00862
76.7567
76.06975
75.12527
74.07916
73.02795
72.02251
71.08683
70.23056
69.45715
68.76874
68.16925
67.66675
67.27585
67.02086
66.94013
67.09219
67.56431
68.4847
70.04227
72.51748
76.18607
79.09503
76.15613

42
79.0266
79.48494
79.03257
77.90401
76.50755
75.10272
73.79326
72.60644
71.54176
70.59111
69.74621
69.00144
68.35524
67.81136
67.38028
67.08131
66.94543
67.0186
67.36432
68.06208
69.19099
70.7621
72.48137
73.33027
72.40882

43
82.02641
82.99468
82.02844
79.99485
77.8993
76.04688
74.45705
73.09023
71.90548
70.87114
69.96496
69.17265
68.48676
67.90633
67.4371
67.09241
66.89418
66.8734
67.06783
67.51258
68.21411
69.09319
69.89811
70.20886
69.76305

44
86.00053
89.00952
86.00114
82.02775
79.02824
76.73974
74.91611
73.41181
72.13999
71.04678
70.09805
69.27243
68.55763
67.94859
67.4467
67.05949
66.8003
66.68688
66.73707
66.95865
67.32994
67.77201
68.13098
68.21761
67.92407

45
89.00923
100.0001
89.00947
82.99406
79.48168
76.99719
75.07875
73.52126
72.21625
71.10033
70.13433
69.2937
68.56359
67.93631
67.40992
66.98728
66.67491
66.48086
66.41048
66.45869
66.59892
66.77245
66.88923
66.85382
66.61067

Figure 6.2: Noise-Location table
obfuscation mechanism, which is named as an informed adversary in [38].

6.5.2.1

Defending against Traditional Inference Attacks
Since that the adversary knows the distribution of location obfuscation scheme and the set

of possible locations after observing l′ , he can perform the optimal inference attack and Bayesian
inference attack [134] by computing the highest posterior probability Pr(l|l′ ) and minimizing the
expected inference error as introduced in [162]. The posterior probability distribution follows:
φ(l)Dϵl (l′ |l)
′
l∈S φ(l)Dϵl (l |l)

Pr(l|l′ ) = P

where φ is the prior distribution of the set S of possible locations, Dϵl is the distribution of the
added noise in geo-indistinguishability, and ϵl is the privacy budget.
Based on the probability distribution, the expected inference error is formulated as the
expected distance between the estimated location ˆl and the actual location l:
X
l′ ∈S

min
′
l ∈S

X

φ(l)Dϵl (l′ |l)d(ˆl, l)

l∈S
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(6.5)

Noise Source 2
Noise Source 1

Noise Source
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θ
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Noise Source n
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rn

r+∆2r
Worker

Single Noise Source

rn+∆ rn

Multiple Noise Source

Figure 6.3: Attack Demonstration
Thus, the optimal inference attacker guesses a location ˆl by minimizing the expected disP
tance: ˆl = arg min l∈S Pr(l|l′ )d(ˆl, l). A Bayesian inference attacker chooses an estimated location
by maximizing the posterior probability: ˆl = arg max Pr(l|l′ ).
According to the analysis in [162], the capability of geo-indistinguishability for defending
against optimal inference attack and Bayesian inference attack are bounded. The lower bound of
P φ(x) ˆ
φ(x)
ϵl P
P
inference error is e−ϵl min
φ(y) d(l, x) and the upper bound of posterior probability is e
φ(y) ,
where x and y are random locations in the protected region.

6.5.2.2

Noise-level-involved Inference Attack
Obviously, the defending capability is influenced by the size of the protected region and the

privacy budget. Our noise-level-involved inference attack can impair the geo-indistinguishability’s
defending capability without changing the privacy budget, and this negative effect goes stronger with
more noise sources. The adversary in our proposed attack model considers the noise level data X
published by the worker and the locations of all noise sources provided by the crowd sensing server
for deducing the worker’s actual location. How to scale down the protected region is demonstrated
in Fig. 6.3 and explained as follows:
Scenario 1: Single Noise Source.

The worker is r meters away from one single

noise source with noise level data X and his location is protected in the gray circle by geoindistinguishability. The adversary assumes that the worker locates in the range where all noise
levels are X ± ∆X. According to the relationship between SPL and distance introduced in Section
6.3.1, the protected region is cut by two orange circles, whose radiuses are r − ∆1 r and r + ∆2 r,
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respectively. These radiuses are derived from:

10 log

(r + ∆2 r)2
r2
=
10
log
= ∆X
(r − ∆1 r)2
r2

Thus, the protected region is restricted (the white part of the gray circle). The lower bound of
inference error declines and the upper bound of posterior probability grows, implying that the
attacker can deduce the actual location more easily.
Theorem 5. When R ≪ r, the lower bound of inference error is decreased by min{∆1 r, ∆2 r}/R and
the upper bound of posterior probability is increased in relationship with

2R2
[θ(∆1 r+∆2 r)(2r+∆2 r−∆1 r)] ,

where R is the radius of original protected region and θ is the angle shown in Fig. 6.3.
Proof: When R ≪ r, the shrunk protected region can be approximated by the area difference
between two sectors with the same angle θ, which is computed according to the law of cosines:

θ = 2 arccos

(r − ∆1 r)2 + r2 − R2
2r(r − ∆1 r)



Therefore, the size of the shrunk region is θπ (r + ∆2 r)2 − (r − ∆1 r)2 /(2π), which is simplified as
θ(∆1 r + ∆2 r)(2r + ∆2 r − ∆1 r)/2.
In the formulation of inference error’s lower bound, the effects of the region size are canceled
out due to the sum at the denominator and the overall sum, but the minimum distance between ˆl
and the random location x is reduced from R to min{∆1 r, ∆2 r}.
As for the upper bound of posterior probability, φ(x) is not affected because the protect
area size is not the prior knowledge obtained by the attacker. However, the sum of φ(y) over the
protected area is lowered due to the side information: reduction in protected area size. The ratio of
area reduction is by [θ(∆1 r + ∆2 r)(2r + ∆2 r − ∆1 r)] /2R2 . Therefore, the upper bound turns out
to be larger.
The changes in the bounds are proved.
How the attack goes stronger for other R and r can also be derived by computing the area
of shrunk protected region.
Scenario 2: Multiple Noise Sources. If this attack is extended to multiple noise sources,
the border of the shrunk region is defined by the noise level as follows:
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10 log

10 log

1
r1 2
1
(r1 +∆r1 )2

+

1
1
r2 2 · · · rn 2
1
1
(r2 +∆r2 )2 · · · (rn +∆rn )2

= ∆X

1
(r1 −∆r1 )2

1
1
(r2 −∆r2 )2 · · · (rn −∆rn )2
1
1
1
r1 2 + r2 2 · · · rn 2

= ∆X

+

+

Intuitively, the shrunk region observed by the adversary, where the noise levels are bounded
by X ± ∆X, is smaller than that under the single-source scenario and the inference attack ability is
further reinforced.

6.6
6.6.1

Scheme Details
Overview
In our scheme, the server first publishes a set of sensing tasks T = {T1 , · · · , TK } and

corresponding rewards, i.e. money, for workers to participate. A privacy budget for location privacy
ϵl and a sensing data accuracy requirement ξ are announced together by the server. Workers spot
these tasks and decide whether they will accept them according to the rewards. Then, workers
who reside in the task Ti ’s required area and accept this task will form a group W Ti . Assume
there is a master worker in W Ti who is responsible for collecting information from all members and
computing individual’s parameters to provide differential privacy in this group. Group members
provide needed information to the master and receive noise parameters back from the master. Based
on all parameters, the ”falsified” locations and randomized noise levels are calculated and uploaded
by workers.
The privacy budgets ϵl and accuracy requirement ξ require the server to utilize some existing
methods to find out. Since each worker has his own privacy demands, the budget should satisfy
more workers’ privacy demands while guaranteeing the accuracy, which will enable the mobile crowd
sensing system to collect high-quality data from the crowd. A game-theoretical approach is necessary
to be incorporated into the design to let the group W Ti choose a proper master, because how to
effectively achieve the composed group privacy goals also needs more efforts on cooperation. After
the game, workers collaborate to reach group geo-indistinguishability and differential privacy on the
sensing data.
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6.6.2

Private Crowd Sensing Game Model
In the game, for one task Tj , all workers who agree to perform this task are making deci-

sions simultaneously without being informed of others’ choices and game utilities. This activity is
modeled as a non-cooperative Bayesian game denoted as the Private Crowd sensing Game (PCG).
In accordance with the definition of a Bayesian game, the PCG has the following components:

6.6.2.1

The Player Set and the Finite Strategy Set
T

The player set W Tj = {Wi j |i ∈ {1, · · · , N }} includes all workers currently present within
the service area and accept privacy budgets when conducting the task Tj .
The strategy set Si of a player refers to all available moves to the player. In our scheme, a
malicious master cannot get the precise information of workers’ locations, but he can refuse to return
the needed values so that the privacy goal fails. Other workers can decide whether to cooperate
with the master or decline the task to avoid loss. Therefore, strategies included in the set are shown
in Fig. 6.4: Master, i.e., group management and data collection; Deceive, i.e., announce to be a
master but do not fulfill the requests from other workers; Cooperate, i.e., to be a group member and
send needed information to the master, do not interact with other cooperative workers; or Decline,
i.e., be suspicious of a deceiving master and refuse to cooperate. The strategies for all players are
T

represented as S = {S1 , · · · , SN }. The strategy profile of Wi j ’s opponents is S−i .
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6.6.2.2

Game Utility
The game utility of a player depends on the strategies adopted by all players. When there

is a master who helps preserve privacy, players’ game utilities are their obtained privacy gains
subtracting their costs severally. However, if none of the players chooses to be a master in the game,
T

or if the master is a malicious one, the privacy objective fails. For a player Wi j , we will discuss his
privacy gains before introducing other factors.
Privacy Gains: Following the formulations in Equation (6.2) and Equation (6.4), we define
Tj

privacy gains for each worker Wi

as quantitative measures for the probabilistic ratio of indistin-

guishability benefits. With a privacy budget ϵl Ri , the probability for an adversary to distinguish the
true location from a falsified one is exp(ϵl Ri ). This probability decreases with the increase of budget
value, which indicates that it becomes more possible for an attacker to guess out the actual location.
Therefore, we formulate the location privacy gain as an inverse of the aforementioned probability.
The gain for noise level data privacy follows the same fashion because it is also protected with differential privacy. The location privacy gain Pgl and the noise level data privacy gain Pgn are summed
up to represent the privacy gain Gpi :

Gpi =

1

+
exp(ϵl Ri ) exp

1
10 log[max(ζ1 ,ζ2 )]
ln ξ

(6.6)



T

where ϵl and Ri are the privacy budget and Wi j ’s radius requirement in geo-indistinguishability, ξ
2

is the data accuracy requirement, ζ1 = (1 + Ri /κi )2 and ζ2 = (1 − Ri /κi ) . The first part on the
right side reflects the inverse of posterior information gain. The posterior information gain is the
ratio of posterior probability and prior probability, so the adversary benefits more and the worker
enjoys less privacy with a larger posterior information gain. How we get the second part on the right
side will be introduced in Section 6.6.3.2. Briefly speaking, it is the inverse of posterior information
gain for noise level data.
Disruption Gains: The gain of malicious activities comes from disrupting the privacy
Tj

goal and wasting the resources of regular nodes. If player Wi

is a malicious player, he gains Gdi

after disrupting the privacy procedure.
Energy Costs and Ratios: A master needs more energy to communicate and process
data than ordinary members as he needs to exchange information with N − 1 members via available
networks and compute on these data. The communication cost is the energy spent on accessing
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network and sending/receiving data, so it depends on the data packet size, which is relevant to the
number of workers. We denote the cost for a master as the fraction of energy costs to his remaining
battery. To simplify the expression, we use the fraction of the expected sum of a group member’s
network connection cost, data sending/receiving cost, and data processing cost to the expected
master energy consumption as the degradation factor δ. The unit costs are defined as the energy
depleted by actions on one data packet. In all, the costs are formulated as follows:
3(N − 1)Ec1 + (N + 3)Ec2 + Ed
,
E Tj (B)
(N − 1)Ec1 + Ec2
E(Deceive) =
,
2E Tj (B)
Ec1 + Ec2 + Ed
E(Cooperate) =
,
E Tj (B)
E(Master) =

E(Decline) = 0,

where Ec1 is the network connection cost, Ec2 is the unit data sending/receiving cost, Ed is the
unit energy consumed when processing data, and E Tj (B) is the remaining battery capacity when
receiving task Tj . For simpler and clearer formulation, we do not go into the details of data processing
complexity. In Section 6.6.3.3, we will interpret how we get these energy costs after presenting
the complete scheme. The ratios of costs and gains γi (·) are derived and normalized from cost
formulations.
Now that every worker knows the expected costs and gains, the utility functions for a regular
player can be formulated as:
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Ui (·; ρi , Si , S−i ) =


































Gpi [1 − γi (Si )] ,

Si = Master,

Gdi [1 − γi (Si )] ,

Si = Deceive,

0,

Si = Decline,

Gpi [1 − γi (Si )] ,

Si = Cooperate,
nm (S−i ) ≥ 1,
nd (S−i ) = 0







−Ec1 /E Tj (B),













−E(Si )/2,













Si = Cooperate,
nm (S−i ) = 0
Si = Cooperate,
nm (S−i ) ≥ 1,
nd (S−i ) ≥ 1
Tj

where nm (S−i ) denotes the number of masters (excluding deceiving masters) other than Wi

himself

and nd (S−i ) denotes the number of deceiving masters. If there is no master, the privacy goal fails and
the network connection energy is wasted. If the announced masters are all malicious, the cooperative
player gains nothing and wastes his energy, which is less than the energy consumed when actually
cooperating because there is no return data from the master.

6.6.2.3

Type ρ
A player does not have complete knowledge about other players’ utilities, so we introduce

Nature into the game as in [55]. Each player is assigned a type ρi by Nature, which is the privacy
requirement for geo-indistinguishability, ϵl Ri , and the malicious probability pi . The privacy requirements are sampled independently from a distribution F with the probability density function f . In
T

PCG, the strategy space, possible types, F, and f are known to players, while ρi is Wi j ’s private
information.

6.6.2.4

Best Response and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
In the game, all rational players’ choices are made to maximize their utilities. We introduce

the concept of best response in [89] to capture this behavior:
T

Definition 10 (Best Response). A player Wi j ’s best response Ŝi is the strategy that maximizes his
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utility Ui given S−i :
Ŝi (S−i ) = arg max Ui (ρi , Si , S−i )
Our PCG is a Bayesian game on account of players with incomplete information. Here we
refer to the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium to describe the steady state, where no player will get better
utility by unilaterally changing his strategy.
Definition 11 (Bayesian Nash Equilibrium). A strategy profile S ∗ = S1∗ , S2∗ , · · · , Sn∗ is a Bayesian
Tj

Nash Equilibrium (BNE) if strategy Si∗ for every player Wi

is the best response that maximizes

their expected utilities. That is, given S−i and players’ beliefs about the types of other players ρ−i ,
we have:
Si∗ (ρi ) ∈ arg max
Si

6.6.2.5

X

∗
f (ρ−i ) × Ui (ρi , Si∗ , S−i
), ∀ρi

ρ−i

Mixed Strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of PCG
Tj

To derive a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, we assign pi to each player Wi

as the probability

that this player behaves maliciously. Then, we use the cooperate probability in [89] as a reference.
Tj

Given a type ρi , a player Wi

has a probability of di (ρi ) to choose Cooperate. The expected

probability that one player chooses Cooperate is:
Z
ηi =

di (ρi )dF(ρi )
Tj

Then, the expected utility for player Wi

(6.7)

is re-formulated as:

E [Ui (Master; ρi , Si , S−i , F)] = (1 − pi )Gpi [1 − γi (Master)] ,
E [Ui (Deceive; ρi , Si , S−i , F)] = pi Gdi [1 − γi (Deceive)] ,
E [Ui (Cooperate; ρi , Si , S−i , F)]


Y
Y
= Gpi × 1 −
ηk  × (1 − pj ) −

Ec1 Y
ηk
E Tj (B)
k̸=i
j̸=i
k̸=i



Y
Y
1
1
− E(Cooperate) 1 −
ηk   +
(1 − pj ) ,
2 2
k̸=i

E [Ui (Decline; ρi , Si , S−i , F)] = 0.
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j̸=i

Tj

Since the goal of Wi

is to maximize his game utility, the player chooses to be a master,

whether malicious or not, if

E [Ui (Master; ρi , Si , S−i , F)] E [Ui (Deceive; ρi , Si , S−i , F)]
>E [Ui (Cooperate; ρi , Si , S−i , F)] + E [Ui (Decline; ρi , Si , S−i , F)]

His further choice in line with game utilities becomes:

si =




Master,



1

if pi ≤
1+




 Deceive, if pi >

Gd [1−γi (Deceive)]
i
Gp [1−γi (Master)]
i

(6.8)

1
1+

Gd [1−γi (Deceive)]
i
Gp [1−γi (Master)]
i

Otherwise, he decides whether he will cooperate with the master:

si =



 Cooperate, if Gpi ≥

 Decline,

where ϕ1 = (1 −

Q

k̸=i

ηk ) and ϕ2 =

if Gpi <
Q

j̸=i

Ec1 (1−ϕ1 )+E(Cooperate)ϕ1 (1− 12 ϕ2 )
ϕ1 ϕ2 E Tj (B)
Ec1 (1−ϕ1 )+E(Cooperate)ϕ1 (1− 21 ϕ2 )
ϕ1 ϕ2 E

Tj

(6.9)

(B)

(1 − pj ). If he find out that the master behave maliciously

during cooperation, he will report this to the crowd sensing platform.
A player will decide to be a master only when the expected utility of being a master is greater
than not to maximize his utility. Then, he will behave maliciously if E [Ui (Deceive; ρi , Si , S−i , F)] >
E [Ui (Master; ρi , Si , S−i , F)], which gives out the threshold in Equation (6.8). The other condition
in Equation 6.9 can be derived in a similar manner. These equilibriums indicate that when the
additional cost to be a master is smaller and/or fewer players present in the game, a player is more
likely to become a master. It satisfies the intuitive knowledge that players want to protect privacy
with fewer costs.
Theorem 6. For supp(F) ⊆ [0, 1], there exist N pure strategy equilibriums that exactly one player
chooses Master or Deceive while all other players choose Cooperate or Decline.
T

T

Proof: If all of Wi j ’s opponents choose Cooperate or Decline, Wi j ’s best response is Master.
Tj

Otherwise, Wi

will receive a payoff of no more than 0. Because players are symmetric, it does not

matter which player is the one that chooses Master or Deceive. Hence, there exist N pure-strategy
equilibriums.
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The privacy goal fails only if the only master is deceiving while the other players are cooperating with the master. A new round of game will start without this master if all other players
choose to decline.
Theorem 7. The probability of failure is smaller with larger the privacy gain Gpi .
Proof: The probability of failure is:

Pr[failure] = 1 −


Y

Ωi  × Ω′ ,

k̸=i

where
"
Ωi = Pr Gpk

Ec1 (1 − ϕ1 ) + E(Cooperate)ϕ1 1 − 12 ϕ2
>
ϕ1 ϕ2 E Tj (B)

#

and

Ω = Pr pi >
′


Gpi [1 − γi (Master)]
.
Gpi [1 − γi (Master)] + Gdi [1 − γi (Deceive)]

Ωi and Ω′ are one-sided p-values given by the complementary cumulative distribution functions.
The observed value

Gpi [1−γi (Master)]
Gpi [1−γi (Master)]+Gdi [1−γi (Deceive)]

w.r.t. Gpi , so Ω′ is negatively correlated with privacy gain.



in Ω′ is monotonically increasing

Q
1 − k̸=i Ωi becomes smaller with

larger gain because Ωi is a p-value increasing monotonically w.r.t. Gpi . Therefore, the increasingdecreasing characteristics of Pr[failure] are proved.

6.6.3

Group Location Privacy and Sensing Data Perturbation
In this subsection, we discuss the details of how privacy goals are fulfilled. Our scheme

proceeds to privacy preservation after the master is chosen. In one group, locations of all members satisfy a group geo-indistinguishability related to the maximum radius requirement for geoindistinguishability in the group. The noise level data of each individual also confronts to differential
privacy w.r.t. locations.

6.6.3.1

Group Geo-indistinguishability
As mentioned in the introduction, decreasing each worker’s privacy budget for a low com-

posed one endures large variances in workers’ perturbed data. In our design, the master and his
group members deploy the differential privacy mechanism via wavelet transformation [157] so that
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Figure 6.5: Decomposition tree
the achieved group geo-indistinguishability has much lower privacy bound than simply applying
geo-indistinguishability to each worker without bringing about great variances. We first decompose
a location in polar coordinates to wavelet coefficients and add noises to these coefficients. Then the
perturbed location can be reconstructed from noisy coefficients.
Tree Construction: Since radius and angle components of a location are independent in
polar coordinates, the wavelet transform of a location can be viewed to be separate for its radius
and angle. For radius decomposition, each worker initially reports a random integer referring to the
radius component of his location in polar coordinates to the master. The master collects integers
from workers and arranges them as a vector M. A group hierarchy H connects the master and
cooperative workers as shown in Fig. 6.5, which indicates that the master can receive information
from all workers and is responsible for processing the received information. Based on H, a nominal
wavelet decomposition tree R is constructed from H by attaching a child node Leaf ci to each leaf
node Leaf i in H. The value of Leaf ci is the same as the corresponding entry in M. The nodes except
leaf children are wavelet decomposition coefficients, which are computed differently: The wavelet
coefficient for the root node (referred to as the base coefficient) is set as the sum of all leaves in
its subtree (the leaf-sum of the node), while the coefficient for any other internal node equals its
leaf-sum minus the average leaf-sum of its parent’s children. We illustrate this step with an example
in Fig. 6.5. The left side is the hierarchy H and random numbers in M. The master occupies both
the root node and one leaf node to manage group data and fulfill privacy, while members take the
remaining N − 1 leaf nodes. The decomposition tree constructed from H is to the right of H. We
will continue using this example in the following sections.
Obfuscation: Next, a planar Laplace noise [11] is added with parameter ϵl to each decom131

position coefficient of a location:

Dϵl (x0 )(x) =

(ϵl WNom (ci,j ))2 −ϵl rWNom (ci,j )
e
,
2π

(6.10)

where r is the distance between x and x0 , which is, in other words, the noise to perturb location x0
to x. WNom (ci,j ) = 1 if ci,j is the base coefficient, otherwise WNom (ci,j ) = fjo /(2fjo − 2), where fjo
is the fan-out of ci,j ’s parent in the decomposition tree (e.g., the fan-out f0o of the root node is 5 in
Fig. 6.5). Due to the independence of radius and angle, the marginal probabilities of Dϵl (x0 )(x) are
also independently, whose probability density functions are Dϵl ,R (r) and Dϵl ,Θ (r) respectively. The
angle is randomly selected in [0, 2π), so we only describe how each worker computes his radius noise
and adds it to his occupied leaf coefficient. In that sampling a random number from Dϵl ,R (r) is
complicated, the inverse transform sampling is deployed to draw a value z uniformly in [0, 1) and the
noise is computed as r = Cϵ−1
(z), where Cϵl (r) is the cumulative function of Dϵl ,R (r) and Cϵ−1
(z) is
l
l
its inverse function:
Z
Dϵl ,R (r) =

2π

Dϵl (r, θ)dθ = (ϵl WNom (c))2 re−ϵl rWNom

0

Cϵl (r) = 1 − (1 + ϵl rWNom )e−ϵl rWNom
Then, the noisy coefficients ĉi,h−1 are produced with its dedicated noise ri as ĉi,h−1 =
ri + ci,h−1 . Apart from the leaf coefficient noise, the master computes one more noise for the base
coefficient and announces the noisy base coefficient ĉ0 to other workers. All noises are normalized
with WNom (c). The computation and annunciation of noisy angle coefficients follow the same fashion.
After that, workers reconstruct their perturbed components from noisy coefficients following the
equation:
vi = ĉi,h−1 +

h−2
X

h−2
Y

j=0

k=0

(ĉi,j ·

1
) = ĉi,1 + ĉi,0 /f0o ,
fko

(6.11)

where h is the height of H, ci,h−1 is the ancestor of vi in the h level of the decomposition tree, and
fko is the fan-out of ci,k . A worker subtracts his originally reported number from vi and gets his
radius noises ril . The angle noise θil is available in the same way. A new location is mapped from
the actual location by adding component noises to coordinates as illustrated in Fig. 6.6: suppose
T

a worker Wi j ’s actual location when conducting task Tj is li,j = (s, t), his falsified location is
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Figure 6.6: Location obfuscation
′
li,j
= [s + ril cos(θil ), t + ril sin(θil )]. Only the worker himself knows the total noise, so both the master

and the server cannot learn his actual location from the obfuscated one even if they collude with
each other.
Theoretical Analysis: Some mathematical properties of group geo-indistinguishability
are analyzed here.
Theorem 8. The group geo-indistinguishability based on wavelet transform and Laplace noise has a
generalized sensitivity of 2Rmax with respect to WNom . It can achieve 2ϵl Rmax -geo-indistinguishability.
Proof: According to Lemma 4 in [157], the nominal wavelet transform has a generalized sensitivity
of h with respect to WNom , where h the height of the hierarchy associated with the input frequency
matrix. If we expand the concept of generalized sensitivity from matrix differs only at one tuple
to locations in a circle with radius R, the generalized sensitivity is also expanded to hR. In the
decomposition tree, the maximum sensitivity that can be generated by a leaf node is Rmax . Thus
the decomposition tree can have a sensitivity ∆f of 2Rmax , where 2 is the height of the tree in our
work. Therefore, the achieved privacy level is ∆f /λ = 2Rmax /λ = 2ϵl Rmax .
Starting from a tuple of locations l = (l1 · · · , ln ), if we independently apply ϵl Ri geoP
indistinguishability to li , the achieved privacy level is
ϵl Ri due to composition property. From
Theorem 8, the geo-indistinguishability level achieved here is far lower.
Theorem 9. The variance of the added noise increase when the fan-out f augments, but the variance
of the noise in the answer is always less than 8λ2 .
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Proof: In Equation (6.10), the new ϵ′l equals to ϵl WNom . Then, for the scale in Laplace noise:
λ′ =

1
λ
=
.
ϵl WNom
WNom

(6.12)

As WNom is monotonically decreasing to f , the variance 2λ′2 increases.
The variance of one reconstructed element following Equation (6.11) is at most:



(1 − 1/f )2 + 1/f 2 (f − 1) · 4(1 − 1/f )2 · 2λ2 = 4(1 − 1/f )3 · 2λ2

whose approximation is 8λ2 for f → ∞.

6.6.3.2

Sensing Data Perturbation
T

In this step, the privacy goal is: a worker Wi j ’s reported noise level cannot be distinguished
from others collected within distance Ri with probability bounded by a budget related to ξ. The
total sound pressure level generated by N sources follows Equation (6.2) and the SPL for each
source follows Equation (6.1). We assume for simplicity that in the noise monitoring task for one
noise source, the sound field is a free field. Thus, for one location which is κ km away from the
source and another random location whose distance to the noise source differs from κ by rrand , the
2
2
rand )
difference of measured noise levels shall be 10 log 4π(κ±r
= 10 log 1 ± rrand
. Again, the
4πκ2
κ
noise controlling application is considered. The server may announce some known noise sources and
encourage workers to measure the noise levels around the sources. If κ is unknown to the worker, it is
possible for the worker to guess the distance by sight if the noise source is close enough. Otherwise,
the worker chooses a κ larger than the protection range r to confine the accuracy loss rising from
imprecise distance.
Tj

Since the worker Wi

assigns his original data Xi,j

wants to protect his location (κi km from the source) within Ri , he


1 ,ζ2 )]
′
with a Laplacian noise Lap 0, 10 log[max(ζ
to get Xi,j
, where
ln ξ
2

′
ζ1 = (1 + Ri /κi )2 , and ζ2 = (1 − Ri /κi ) . Xi,j
can achieve | ln ξ/10 log[max (ζ1 , ζ2 )]|-differential

privacy in the dataset of possible noise levels collected within distance Ri .
Theorem 10. The data perturbation mechanism given above satisfies the privacy goal and accuracy
demand:
 ′

Pr |Xi,j
− Xi,j | ≥ |10 log[max (ζ1 , ζ2 )]| ≤ ξ
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(6.13)

Proof:

|10 log[max (ζ1 , ζ2 )]| = α, Ni ∼ Lap 0,


Pr

6.6.3.3

′
Xi,j
− Xi,j ≥

α
| ln ξ|


,






Z ∞
α
| ln ξ|
| ln ξ|x
α
= Pr |Ni | ≥
=2
exp −
dx = ξ
| ln ξ|
| ln ξ|
2α
α
α

Energy Analysis
In the tree construction step, every member only exchanges information with the master

once, whereas the master needs to receive/deliver N − 1 packets from/to members and compute
values of N + 1 nodes in the decomposition tree. In the perturbation step, every worker spends
energy on computing noises. The master’s computation burden is as twice as a member’s since he
occupies two nodes. Also, the master has additional communication cost originated from sending
noisy roots to N − 1 members. The last part of energy consumption stems from sensing data
perturbation, which is the same for all workers. Hence, we can derive the ratio of energy consumed
by a member and the master after summing them up as:
E(Cooperate)
Ec1 + Ec2 + Ed
≈
E(Master)
3(N − 1)Ec1 + (N + 3)Ec2 + Ed
which corresponds to what we proposed in Section. 6.6.2.2.

6.7
6.7.1

Evaluation
Experiment Settings
We implement our scheme on a PC with an Intel Core i5 CPU running at 3.20 GHz and 8

GB RAM and use the real-world datasets, noise collected by Lubin Liu from Microsoft [88, 146, 170]
and Yelp [5] to evaluate our scheme. In [88,146,170], authors provide noise level data at 36 locations
collected by six users on Manhattan and draw noise heat maps for weekdays and weekends. The
fine-grained noise situation is reflected. Usually, areas with more points of interest (venues in a
physical world, like a shopping mall or theatre, having a name, address, coordinates, category, and
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Figure 6.7: Manhattan Map segments and experiment regions
other attributes [170]) expose to more severe noise situations, and thus, demand more intense noise
monitoring. Therefore, we choose regions near Time Square (red), Columbia University (yellow),
and Washington Square (blue), divided by streets and avenues, as task regions in Fig. 6.7. Each
location entry in regions is considered to be reported by an individual worker.
Besides this small crowd sensing dataset, we implement another location dataset to evaluate
the performance of our scheme on a large number of workers. The Yelp [5] dataset contains 70,745
user check-in locations, where check-ins are logged incontinuously at a relatively low frequency. It
fits our scenario where workers carry out tasks and only report their locations when presenting at
specific spots.
According to [2] regarding smartphones’ energy consumptions, the energy consumed under
IEEE 802.11 when transmitting data at 700kb/s and staying in a dynamic connection cost 31 mA
and 2 mA respectively. The power consumptions of active CPU can be between 100 and 200 mA.
The total battery capacity E(B) is 3000 mAh. Usually one wireless data packet is sized at 8 kB. We
suppose that a worker has equal probability to use LTE and WiFi and each round of computation
has around 1000 float operations, so the settings of unit energy deduced from above statistics are:
Ec1 /E(B) = 6.67e − 4 for one second, Ec2 /E(B) = 1.18e − 5, Ed /E(B) = 0.067 for one second.
The distribution F of privacy demands follows Beta distribution B(0.149, 0.109) according to the
analysis of social privacy demand distribution in [89]. For the clarity of analysis, we confine ϵl to
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the range from 0.3 to 10 [104], under which most existing algorithms are evaluated.

6.7.2

Evaluation Metrics
We define the following metrics in our experiments to quantify the performance from aspects

of PCG, location obfuscation, and data perturbation.
Game Failure Ratio (GFR): It is the ratio describing how many failed PCG happen
after performing certain rounds of games. It shows the effectiveness of PCG.
Drift Distances: The drift distance Ddist is the difference between a released location
′
li,j
and its corresponding actual location li,j . Both the mean and standard deviation (STD) are

computed to measure the usefulness and stability of the location obfuscation. The mathematical
formulation of its mean is defined as:

Ddist =

N
1 X
′
d(li,j − li,j
),
N

(6.14)

Wi :i=1

′
′
where d(li,j − li,j
) is the distance between li,j and li,j
.

Satisfaction Ratio (SR): This metric calculates the ratio of the number of workers whose
new locations are outside their radius requirements to the total number of workers.
Out-of-range Ratio (ORR): This ratio is to measure the possibility that workers’ perturbed locations are out of the required task region while they are actually residing inside.
Data Trustfulness: Data trustfulness is the probability that the shift from perturbed data
′
to truth exceeds the bound claimed by (α, ξ)-accuracy. Pr[|Xi,j
− Xi,j | ≥ α] should not be greater

than ξ.
We construct two application scenarios for the evaluation. One scenario is a crowd sensing
application only containing location information and the other has both location and noise level
data. The former is contributed by Yelp and Microsoft datasets and merely tested for two locations
metrics. The latter is built on Microsoft dataset and provides extra performance assessment w.r.t.
task completion and data accuracy.
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6.7.3

Experimental Results

6.7.3.1

PCG Performance
Fig. 6.8 shows the GFR under varying ϵl and number of workers. Generally, it is climbing

up with the growth of ϵl , which is in correspondence with Theorem 7. Since the probability that
all workers choose to cooperate with a malicious master is smaller when more workers join in the
game, GFR is declining if the number of participating workers increase. The GFR is almost 0 with
over 20 workers, which proves the usefulness of PCG in practical applications.

6.7.3.2

Location Obfuscation Performance
The performance results of location obfuscation in the first scenario are shown in Fig. 6.9,

Fig. 6.10 and Fig. 6.11. The group size of workers and the choice of ϵl can influence the performance.
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Figure 6.8: Game failure ratio

Impact of Group Size: Fig. 6.9 demonstrates how the group size influences the performance of drift distances when ϵl is fixed. In Fig. 6.9a, the drift distance averaging from a group
of workers (10 to 500 workers) in Yelp approaches 0.3 km steadily, manifesting the stability of the
PCG and the location obfuscation. On the contrary, the STD climbs up since the variances of added
noises are growing with the group size. However, the STDs stay in the range confined by the upper
bound, which indicates that the service quality regarding locations will not decline significantly even
when there are many workers. The experiment on Microsoft dataset starts at the minimum number
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of workers (2 workers), which results in a much greater average drift in Fig. 6.9b than in Fig. 6.9a
at the beginning. Nevertheless, it gradually approaches the similar mean value afterward. Though
STDs are all slightly growing due to the accumulating variance, the increment is comparatively
negligible to the group size. We can conclude that the PCG and the location obfuscation are stable
with a relatively small drift.
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Figure 6.9: Drift distances with different group size, ϵl = 3
As for the satisfaction ratio, more workers indicate a larger fan-out, which contributes to
a larger but bounded variance according to Theorem 9. Thus, the satisfaction ratio in Fig. 6.10
fluctuates greatly due to the increasing variance, yet it will stay around 0.6 even when more workers
participate in the task because of the upper bound of variances. In other words, around 60% of
obfuscated locations from participating workers are located within the area required by their geo′
indistinguishability: Pr[d(li,j , li,j
) ≤ Ri ] ≈ 0.6.

Table 6.2: Impact of ϵl on metrics
ϵl
Satisfactory Ratio
ORR

0.3
0.625
0.972

0.5
0.807
0.722

0.7
0.660
0.671

1
0.605
0.556

2
0.596
0.364

3
0.522
0.176

5
0.464
0.111

7
0.423
0.090

10
0.589
0.092

Impact of ϵl : The impact of ϵl is evaluate and summarized in Fig. 6.11 and the first row of
Table 6.2. The increasing of ϵl means the downgrade of privacy demands, which is a straightforward
explanation of the downward trends of average drift distances. A mathematical explanation for
changes in the STD is that the noise variance

2
(ϵl WNom )2

turns to be smaller, so the added noise is

closer to 0, indicating that the obfuscated location is more like to be in close physical proximity
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Figure 6.10: Workers satisfaction ratio, ϵl = 1
of the true location. The satisfaction ratio in Table 6.2 is a weighted average of results from two
datasets since its trend is the same for two datasets. The influences from privacy demands and ϵl
are combined: most workers’ privacy demands are comparatively small or large as they follow the
Beta distribution; the growing of ϵl scales down the drift distance but meanwhile reduces all workers’
radius requirements. Therefore, the distribution of satisfaction ratio follows neither a complete Beta
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Figure 6.11: Drift distances under different ϵl
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6.7.3.3

Data Accuracy and Task Completion
The second application is run for analyzing how our scheme can affect the completion of

mobile crowd sensing tasks. Besides drift distance and satisfaction ratio that have already been
discussed, we quantize the effects with other two metrics, ORR and data trustfulness. The group
size is set as a constant here for valid evaluations. As revealed in the second row of Table 6.2, the
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Figure 6.12: Under different ϵl for ξ = 0.05
higher possibility of close physical proximity stems from larger ϵl benefits the out-of-range ratio,
implying that workers’ reported false locations are less possible to be out of task region and thus
the completion of a crowd sensing task is more assured.
We also compute the trustfulness of data, which reflects the data accuracy after perturbation.
More specifically, it is the probability that the distance between the perturbed data and the truth
is smaller than ξ. Theoretically, the data trustfulness is bounded by Theorem 10. Here, ξ is set to
be 0.05 in our simulation. The average trustfulness under each ϵl is about 0.25 ± 0.15 in Fig. 6.12a,
which is much lower than the requirement ξ depicted by the green line. So the accuracy demand for
crowd sensing tasks is fulfilled.
Fig. 6.12b shows the levels of noises added during data perturbation. They are the means
and STDs of the numerical differences between perturbed data and estimated noise level data from
Equation 6.2 under different settings of ϵ. We can tell from the graph that the average difference is
only 1 dB with a choice of ϵ as small as 0.01, and the value goes even smaller with a larger privacy
budget ϵ.
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From both Fig. 6.12a and Fig. 6.12b we can tell that trustfulness is not evidently affected
by ϵl while the accuracy of data is boosted with the growth of ϵl (lower privacy demand). In all,
noises added to the sensing data can be lower than 3 dB when ϵl is greater than 0.7. To conclude
from the analysis above, our scheme will not impede task objectives with a proper choice of ϵl to
balance accuracy and privacy.

6.7.3.4

Time Efficiency
The time costs for PCG, location obfuscation, and data perturbation are listed in Table 6.3.

Obviously, the time consumed only relates to the number of workers. However, since the individual
computations in PCG and obfuscation processes are parallel, the time differences are relatively
subtle. The time cost of noise data perturbation remains constant at around 2.65 ms. Overall, our
scheme will not bring much burden to mobile crowd sensing in terms of time consumption.
Table 6.3: Time costs

PCG
Location
Data

6.8

3 Workers
91.398 ms
5.771 ms
2.657 ms

13 Workers
106.012 ms
5.721 ms
2.651 ms

23 Workers
116.531 ms
5.970 ms
2.613 ms

Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we propose a game-theoretical approach that implements differential privacy

in location-based crowd sensing services. It fulfills indistinguishability for both locations and sensing
data, such that sensitive location information leakage can be effectively restricted. The Bayesian
game is formulated with regard to the privacy gains and costs, and the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
is derived from the game. Then, crowd sensing workers’ privacy is protected via differential privacy.
Based on theoretical analysis and evaluations on the real-world dataset, we have shown that a
sufficient privacy guarantee is achieved and demonstrated the efficiency and accuracy of our scheme.
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Chapter 7

Conclusions and Discussion
This dissertation is about designing schemes for secure data collection and analysis in smart
health monitoring, starting from user authentication design and ending at data statistics protection.
Various mechanisms catering to the open nature of wireless media, the resource constraints of sensing devices, the incompatibility and interference between wireless protocols, and the requirement
on maintaining data accuracy are proposed in previous chapters to address security and privacy
concerns. The effectiveness and efficiency of our schemes are validated through theoretical analysis
and extensive real-world experiments.
In this dissertation, we leverage the CTI between ZigBee and Wi-Fi for authentication.
However, the coexistence between ZigBee and Wi-Fi is only a single example of heterogeneous
wireless environments. In future work, the potential of CTI between other commonly used protocols,
e.g., Wi-Fi v.s. Bluetooth and Bluetooth v.s. ZigBee, shall be thoroughly studied. Moreover, recent
researches have brought forth some Cross-Technology Communication (CTC) schemes to enable
direct communication across those wireless protocols. It is another direction of supporting device
authentication in smart health monitoring. To understand the privacy issues during data analysis,
we have already explored misclassification, one vulnerability of machine learning techniques, in smart
health monitoring. Still, there are many other issues worth future investigation, e.g., the leakage of
machine learning model parameters, the breach of training data statistics, etc. How to design secure
data analysis pipelines remain an open question.
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A Patané. Broken hearted: How to attack ecg biometrics. In NDSS Symposium 2017. Internet Society, 2017.
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[105] Francisco Javier Ordóñez and Daniel Roggen. Deep convolutional and lstm recurrent neural
networks for multimodal wearable activity recognition. Sensors, 16(1):115, 2016.
[106] Bo Peng, Fengnian Zhao, Jianfeng Ping, and Yibin Ying. Recent advances in nanomaterialenabled wearable sensors: Material synthesis, sensor design, and personal health monitoring.
Small, 16(44):2002681, 2020.
150

[107] T Penzel, GB Moody, RG Mark, AL Goldberger, and JH Peter. The apnea-ecg database. In
Computers in Cardiology 2000, pages 255–258. IEEE, 2000.
[108] Huy Xuan Pham, Hung Manh La, David Feil-Seifer, and Matthew Dean. A distributed control
framework of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles for dynamic wildfire tracking. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1803.07926, 2018.
[109] João Ribeiro Pinto, Jaime S Cardoso, André Lourenço, and Carlos Carreiras. Towards a
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